Communal Conflict and Economic Considerations: the Case of Cyprus
| Date | 01 June 1968 |
| Author | Stahis S. Panagides |
| Published date | 01 June 1968 |
| DOI | 10.1177/002234336800500203 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
COMMUNAL
CONFLICT
AND
ECONOMIC
CONSIDERATIONS:
THE
CASE
OF
CYPRUS*
By
STAHIS
S.
PANAGIDES
Brazil
Development
Assistance
Program
University
of
California,
Berkeley
1.
Introduction
A
large
class
of social
problems
needs
to
be
investigated
through
the
combined
efforts
of
many
cooperating
social
sciences.
Such
cooperation
is
becoming
increasingly
difficult,
however,
especially
in
the
realm
of
policy.
While
the
increasing
use
of
mathematical
reasoning
is
precipitating
a
unified
approach
to
social
theory,
increas-
ing
demand
for
specialization
inhibits
useful
interdisciplinary
cooperation
in
theory
application.
Nevertheless,
the
ob-
vious
interdependence
of
the
social
system
is
forcing
us
to
realize
that
the
social
milieu
cannot
remain
compartmentalized
in
our
approach
to
policy
problems.
This
paper
demonstrates
how
economic
theory
and
policy
might
be
used
to
pro-
mote
a
more
stable
social
equilibrium
between
the
Greek
and
Turkish
communi-
ties
in
the
Republic
of
Cyprus:
that
is,
how
economic
tools
traditionally
used
in
economics
can
be
brought
to
bear
on
the
broader
objectives
of
political stability
and
social
harmony.
The
implicit
underlying
thesis
is
what
Louis
Wirth
expressed
as
early
as
1945:
While
minorities
more
often
than
not
stand
in
a
relationship
of
conflict
with
the
dominant
group,
it
is
their
nonparticipation
in
the
life
of
the
larger
society,
or
in
certain
aspects
thereof,
that
more
particularly
marks
them
as
a
minority people
and
per-
petuates
their
status
as
such.1
More
fundamentally,
the
following
from
economic
theory
motivates
the
survey
of
the
economic
conditions
of
the
Greek
and
Turkish
communities
and
the
sub-
sequent
design
of
appropriate
economic
policies
to
deal
with
the
existing
situation.
Eisenberg2
has
shown
that
under
the
rele-
vant
assumptions,
if
all
members
of
a
society
have
a
distribution
of
resources
proportionate
to
the
aggregate
distribution
(proportionate
shares
in
total
resources)
and
if
they
have
positive
homogeneous
utility
functions
(but
not
necessarily
identical),
then
their
behavior
can
be
represented
by
a
single
utility
function.
That
is,
a
country
as
a
whole
acts
’as
if’
it
were
a
single
’rational’
unit.
In
a
sense,
the
interests
of
the
citizens
can
be
har-
monized.
This
can
be
interpreted
to
suggest
that
when
a
minority’s
share
of
the
total
re-
sources
of
the
society
becomes
proportional
to
that
minority’s
share
in
the
total
popu-
lation,
a
situation
more
conducive
to
social
stability
is
realized,
than
if
resources
are
not
so
distributed
(assuming
similar
pro-
ductivity
in
the
two
groups).
It
is
further-
more
assumed
that
resource
ownership
and
income
are
positively
and
linearly
related.
The
above
theoretical
findings
are
fundamental
to
the
subsequent
analysis.
It
may
be
argued
that
the
conditions
necessary
for
Eisenberg’s
theorem
to
be
valid
are
not
realized
in
the
Cyprus
case
here
under
consideration.
What
is
signifi-
cant,
however,
for
conflict
theory,
is
the
fact
that
the
utility
functions
in
the
proof
of
Eisenberg’s
theorem
do
not
have
to
be
identical.
In
view
of
this,
the
minimization
of
a
social
welfare
function,
referred
to
as
the
inequality
coefficient
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