Communicating China to the World: Confucius Institutes and China's Strategic Narratives
| Published date | 01 November 2015 |
| Author | Falk Hartig |
| DOI | 10.1111/1467-9256.12093 |
| Date | 01 November 2015 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
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P O L I T I C S : 2 0 1 5 V O L 3 5 ( 3 - 4 ) , 2 4 5 – 2 5 8
doi: 10.1111/1467-9256.12093
Communicating China to the World:
Confucius Institutes and China’s
Strategic Narratives
Falk Hartig
Frankfurt Inter-Centre-Programme on new African-Asian Interactions (AFRASO)
Goethe University
This article analyses the strategies, goals and impact of the Confucius Institutes (CIs). It examines CIs as an
important tool in China’s public diplomacy, employed by its government to communicate specific strategic
narratives about China to foreign publics, and, in so doing, increase China’s soft power. Based on empirical data
from CIs in different parts of the world, the article demonstrates that the impact of CIs is hampered both by
political/ideological concerns and by a number of practical issues. It is argued that CIs do not present the ‘real’
China to the world, but rather a ‘correct version’ of it, which in turn limits their ability to project China’s
strategic narratives effectively and increase its soft power.
Keywords: Confucius Institutes; public diplomacy; soft power; strategic narratives
Introduction
On 27 September 2014, the first Confucius Institute Day was celebrated at the Confucius
Institute Headquarters in Beijing and in Confucius Institutes (CIs) around the world in
honour of the Institute’s tenth anniversary. Two days before the global celebrations were
due to be held, the University of Chicago decided ‘to suspend negotiations for the renewal
of the agreement for a second term of the Confucius Institute at the University of Chicago’
(UChicagoNews, 2014), which would lead to its closure. Both events illustrate, in their
contrasting ways, the development path of CIs and the differing perceptions of them over
the last ten years. While the Chinese government officially praises them as an ‘ongoing
symbol for China’s efforts toward world peace and international cooperation’, as President
Xi Jinping noted in his congratulatory letter (Liu, 2014), the Chicago decision ‘mirrors
controversies over the CIs’ perceived threats to western academic freedom that in turn
reflect wide-ranging perceptions of China as a general threat to global well-being’ (Hubbert,
2014a).
This article contributes to the growing debate about CIs by considering the broader political
dimensions beyond the ideological disputes they have fomented. The scope of the article is
limited as it applies an actor-centred approach to public diplomacy and focuses on the CIs as
one performing instrument of China’s public diplomacy and not on the recipients. In order to
analyse how these institutes promote (or inhibit) Chinese soft power, the concept of ‘strategic
narratives’ is applied in order to illustrate the connection between CIs and the wider goals of
China’s foreign policy, although those running CIs tend to reject the foreign policy dimension
© 2015 The Author. Politics © 2015 Political Studies Association
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F A L K H A R T I G
of their work. The article further demonstrates that the impact of CIs is hampered not only by
political and/or ideological concerns, but also by a number of practical issues. Therefore, the
conclusion is that CIs do not present the ‘real’ China to the world, which is one of China’s
public diplomacy’s overarching aims, but rather a ‘correct version’ of it, which in turn limits
their ability to project China’s strategic narratives effectively and increase China’s soft power.
The article is based on interviews with managers/directors of CIs (Chinese and non-Chinese)
in countries in Europe, Oceania and Africa between 2007 and 2014; discussions with Chinese
officials; conversations with academics and members of think tanks in China and interna-
tionally; and on an analysis of public and internal documents and relevant literature.1,2 I also
attended the CI annual conferences in Beijing in 2011 and 2013 – a gathering where the CI
headquarters invites representatives from institutes around the world to attend panel discus-
sions, workshops and seminars on current CI related topics.
The article is structured as follows. First, CIs are introduced and the concept of ‘strategic
narratives’ is presented, particularly in relation to soft power and public diplomacy. The article
then outlines the strategic narratives China wishes to communicate to the world and analyses
the role CIs play in this regard. Finally, the article discusses what impact both practical issues
and political/ideological concerns have on the CIs’ mission to communicate with the world.
Confucius Institutes: facts, figures, structure and function
CIs are ‘non-profit educational organizations promoting the teaching of Chinese language
outside China, training language instructors and strengthening cultural exchange and
cooperation between China and other countries’ (Tang, 2010). According to official statistics,
by December 2014 there were 475 CIs and 851 CCs (Confucius Classrooms) in primary and
secondary schools in 126 countries (Sun and Cheng, 2014). There are also more than 200
institutions in some 70 countries currently applying for a CI (Liu, 2014). All CIs are under the
supervision of Hanban, the Office of Chinese Language Council International. Hanban is
composed of representatives from twelve ministries and commissions within the Chinese
central government (Zhe, 2010, p. 1), while the Ministry of Education bears the main
responsibility. Hanban is responsible for the administration of the institutes, the supply of
teachers, and the development and distribution of teaching materials. Furthermore, it
co-ordinates the cooperation between partner institutions in China and abroad that run CIs,
and provides funding (Hartig, 2012). Although CIs were initially located in colleges and
universities, in 2007 Hanban launched the CC programme (Hubbert, 2014b): Chinese lan-
guage and culture programmes similar to CIs, but located in high schools and usually linked
to a CI.
More often than not, CIs are mistakenly described as the ‘Chinese version of ... Germany’s
Goethe Institute [or] the British Council’ (Li, 2008). A closer look reveals that this is only
partly correct. One important difference between CIs and their Western counterparts is their
organisational form (Hartig, 2012). While Starr (2009) identifies three operational modes, the
most common form is the joint venture. These joint ventures are cooperation projects
between Chinese and international partners. Usually the Chinese supply teaching materials
and send over language teachers, while local partners provide accommodation, facilities and
local staff. The host institutions typically receive initial funding of US$100,000–150,000 per
annum for a period of three to five years. Although at the beginning there was ‘the expec-
tation that the programs will eventually become self-funded’ (Starr, 2009, p. 71), develop-
ments in recent years indicate that Hanban was coming to terms with funding CIs on a more
© 2015 The Author. Politics © 2015 Political Studies Association
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long-term basis. Such funding normally includes the salaries of teaching staff from China,
teaching materials and reference libraries. Furthermore, Hanban provides additional subsidies
for CI events and activities on a 50:50 basis. It is precisely this financial support from an
authoritarian government that, on the one hand, ‘permits educational institutions ... that
have suffered drastic budget cuts in the past decade, to establish or enhance foreign language
programs without draining funds from other departments and programs’ (Hubbert, 2014b)
and, on the other hand, provokes criticism of CIs.
CIs usually, but not exclusively, address a mainstream public audience that does not normally
have any specialist knowledge about China. The programmes consist mainly of language
courses at various levels and a wide range of cultural events such as exhibitions, film
screenings and various talks. Schedules differ from institute to institute, but generally offer
broadly similar content while trying to develop some individuality or more unusual
programmes.
Conceptual background: public diplomacy, soft power and
strategic narratives
Conceptually, the institutes are described in three different ways: first, they can be understood
as an instrument of China’s soft power (Barr, 2011; Gil, 2009; Lien, Ghosh and Yamarik, 2014;
Ngamsang and Walsh, 2013; Paradise, 2009; Park, 2013; Schmidt, 2013; Yang, 2010); second,
CIs can be understood as an instrument of China’s public and/or cultural diplomacy
(d’Hooghe, 2007; Hartig, 2012; Pan, 2013; Rawnsley, 2009, 2012; Wang and Lu, 2008;
Wheeler, 2014); and third, there is a line of scholarship that sees CIs as a ‘propaganda project’
of the Chinese leadership (Brady, 2008; 2012, p. 172; Niquet, 2011).
Soft power was defined by Joseph Nye (2004, p. x) as ‘the ability to get what you want
through attraction rather than coercion or payments’, and it stems from ‘the attractiveness of
a country’s culture, political ideas, and policies’. The ‘instrument that governments use to
mobilize these resources to communicate with and attract the publics of other countries’ is
public diplomacy (Nye, 2008, p. 95). ‘Public diplomacy’ is broadly understood to be ‘a
country’s engagement and communication with foreign publics’ (Wang, 2011, p. 3), and its
practice can be divided into five elements: ‘listing, advocacy, cultural diplomacy, exchange
diplomacy, and international...
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