A community of values: Democratic identity formation in the European Union
| Author | Shaul R Shenhav,Tamir Sheafer,Odelia Oshri |
| Published date | 01 March 2016 |
| Date | 01 March 2016 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/1465116515608957 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Article
European Union Politics
2016, Vol. 17(1) 114–137
! The Author(s) 2015
A community of values:
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Democratic identity
DOI: 10.1177/1465116515608957
eup.sagepub.com
formation in the
European Union
Odelia Oshri
Department of Political Science, Hebrew University of Jerusalem,
Israel
Tamir Sheafer
Departments of Political Science and Communication, Hebrew
University of Jerusalem, Israel
Shaul R Shenhav
Department of Political Science, Hebrew University of Jerusalem,
Israel
Abstract
Has the European Union (EU) succeeded in socializing citizens to support the demo-
cratic values it claims to promote? On the face of it, the prevailing skepticism precludes
any expectation of a successful socialization of EU citizens to the EU values. Yet,
according to the socialization hypothesis, citizens’ support for these values is expected
to increase as countries accumulate more years of the EU membership. Using survey
data to isolate distinct dimensions of democratic values, we examine differences among
countries in this regard, as well as changes within countries over time. Results confirm
the socialization hypothesis, showing that support for democratic values is generally
higher in countries with more years of the EU membership, and that this support trends
upwards over time.
Keywords
Comparative politics, European integration, European identity, democratization, norms
and ideas, public opinion
Corresponding author:
Odelia Oshri, Department of Political Science, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Mt. Scopus, Jerusalem
9190501, Israel.
Email: odelia.oshri@mail.huji.ac.il
Oshri et al.
115
Introduction
Since its formation, the European Union (EU) has not only grown from six to
28 member states but has also broadened and deepened their mutual cooperation.
At the same time, calls have been voiced to restrict this interconnection, and the
governments of some member states have faced difficulties in ratifying EU treaties.
This suggests that, during the years of integration, a legitimacy deficit may have
evolved, symptomatic of a mismatch between the growing integration and insuffi-
cient community building (De Vries and Van Kersbergen, 2007; Eichenberg and
Dalton, 2007; Etzioni, 2007; Føllesdal, 2006; Harpaz, 2011).
This study investigates whether, during the years of integration, the European
community has been able to form a core of shared values among EU citizens.1
Specifically, it probes whether and to what extent the duration of EU membership
influences individuals’ support for democratic values. According to the socializa-
tion hypothesis developed by scholars of EU studies (see, for example, Dixon,
2008), the longer a country’s membership in the EU, the more its citizens are
expected to manifest EU values. In reality, however, considering its current legit-
imacy and community deficits, it seems unlikely that the EU has been able to
socialize its reluctant citizens. The analysis in this article will examine the social-
ization hypothesis in the context of the legitimacy deficit. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first study that explicitly addresses the question of whether
the EU has succeeded in socializing its citizens to support the values it promotes.
Democratic values were defined by the EU as an important facet of the
European identity (European Commission, 2001). They play a crucial role in the
organization of social life, and are a pivotal component of individuals’ personal-
ities, guiding both their attitudes and their behavior (Meuleman et al., 2013). Most
importantly, these values are explicitly promoted by EU institutions (Kennedy,
2013; McCormick, 2010). For the purposes of this analysis, values were identified
and measured utilizing four waves of the European Value Survey (EVS) and the
World Value Study (WVS).
Based on the above cross-national surveys, we fitted multilevel models and sub-
sequent robustness tests to examine the effect of EU membership on people’s
adherence to general democratic values. Even when controlling for competing
macro-level explanations and individual characteristics that might correlate with
values, results confirm that membership in the EU fosters adherence to democratic
values among citizens of EU member states. These results hold when comparison is
drawn cross-nationally, between old members and new or non-members, as well as
longitudinally, within countries over time.
Promoting a European identity
Collective identity has been commonly conceptualized in the literature as a cohesive
element that holds a political system together and serves as a precondition for its
endurance for the long term (Almond and Verba, 1963; Easton, 1965). Accordingly,
in the last three decades, the European Commission has focused on promoting
116
European Union Politics 17(1)
European identity within the EU (for example, European Commission, 2001)—trig-
gering, in turn, theoretical, empirical and review work on this subject. These studies,
however, have produced contradictory results regarding the existence of European
identity. Some researchers contend that there is no European demos sharing collect-
ive identity, in default of a community engaged in ongoing communication or having
collective experiences and common memories—a conclusion that has received some
empirical support (Duchesne and Frognier, 1995; Meinhof, 2004). Others object to
this claim, appealing to empirical studies that have produced evidence for the emer-
gence of a European collective identity (Bruter, 2003, 2005; Citrin and Sides, 2004;
Deutsch, 1954; Niedermayer, 1995; Risse, 2010; Schild, 2001).
These conflicting findings can be attributed to divergent understandings of the
concept of identity—both in general and specifically at European level—and to
different methods used to measure identity (e.g. survey data, content analysis or
experiments). Some studies have focused on the question of whether national and
European identities are compatible or mutually exclusive (Hooghe and Marks,
2007; McCormick, 2010). Hooghe and Marks (2007), for example, found that
people who strongly identify with their nation-state are more likely to identify
with Europe as a whole. Other studies suggested that mutual trust among
Europeans can be regarded as a proxy for a unified European identity (Delhey,
2007). Bruter’s experimental studies distinguished between the political and the
cultural component of European identity and found that people tend to identify
more with the latter than with the former (Bruter, 2003, 2005).
Common to the studies cited above is their thick, and hence exclusive, percep-
tion of what is conceived of or envisioned as European identity. These studies
borrow elements of national identities to define and subsequently measure identity
at the European level. Yet, the EU is a distinct political entity sui generis, whose
members do not necessarily share the same culture, tradition, religion or national
history (Bellucci et al., 2012). Therefore, the concept of identity at the European
level requires adaptations and adjustments.
As already noted, in view of the EU declarations regarding a pan-European
supranational identity, its core element is democratic values. Thus, according to the
Declaration of European Identity, the EU is ‘determined to defend the principles
of representative democracy, of the rule of law . . . and of respect for human rights.
All of these are fundamental elements of European Identity’.
Democratic values as a proxy for European identity
In this study, the European identity is operationalized as democratic values. The
rationale for this stipulation is threefold. First, promoting these values is a declared
policy of the EU (European Commission, 2001). Accordingly, democratic values
are actively endorsed by different EU institutions by both word (e.g. declarations,
white papers, treaties) and deed (e.g. policies, sanctions, benefits). These values are
upheld within the EU as well as vis-a-vis third countries (Kotzian et al., 2011).
The European Commission oversees the fulfillment of the EU law and the
Oshri et al.
117
implementation of democratic and human rights policies (Youngs, 2004). The
European Council sets up democratic agendas. The European Court of Justice
(ECJ) holds governments and firms accountable when citizens’ human rights are
violated (Moravcsik, 2000; Schimmelfennig, 2010). According to Dixon (2008),
Engert and Knobel (2003), and Schimmelfennig (2007) the EU promotes demo-
cratic policies vis-a-vis accession countries as well. The latter must meet political
criteria as a condition for their accession into the EU. These are known as the
Copenhagen Criteria and are set out in Article 6(1) of the Treaty on EU. They
require ‘that a candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing
democracy, the rule of law, human rights, respect for and protection of minorities’
(European Council, 1993: 7.A.iii).
These values also pervade the European Treaties, the primary legislative instru-
ment of the EU (TEU, Article 49). According to these Treaties, EU membership is
open to ‘any European State which respects the values referred to in Article 2 and is
committed to promoting them’ (TEU, Article 49). The values in question are
‘respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and
respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities’.
The preamble to the Lisbon Treaty opens with the assertion that human rights,
freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law are...
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