Comparative Perspectives on Euthanasia in Nigeria and Ethiopia
| DOI | 10.3366/ajicl.2010.0003 |
| Author | Anthony O. Nwafor |
| Date | 01 September 2010 |
| Pages | 170-191 |
| Published date | 01 September 2010 |
The concept of euthanasia has continued to attract sound debate in the intellectual circle often laced with moral and medico-legal issues. This is an area of legal development in which moral concept has so much intruded into the realms of law that it has become increasingly difficult to adopt a rational view of the events without the risk of being adjudged an unbeliever. It must, however, not be denied that even if law and morals are distinguishable, it remains true that morality is in some way an integral part of law or legal development, and as stated by Freeman
M. D. A. Freeman,
What is the value of life when the person is permanently incapacitated mentally and physically and is only sustained medically through artificial means and under great pain and suffering, not just to the person, but also the relatives who must now shoulder the unenviable responsibility of sustaining the person at great expense even when the hope of recovery is entirely lost. Will it not be more convenient and sensible to allow such a person easy and less painful passage to the great beyond than indulging in the futile medical exercise of sustaining such life for whatever length of time?
The response to these questions is certainly not expected to attract a consensus or be an easy one having regard to the passion or compassion that any discourse pertaining to human life often attracts. This is apparent in the statement of Ronald Dorkin where he equated abortion with euthanasia as follows:
Abortion is a waste of the start of human life. Death intervenes before life in earnest has even begun. Now we turn to decisions that people must make about death at the other end of life after life in earnest has ended. We shall find that the same issues recur. That the moral questions we ask about the two edges of life have much in common.
R. Dworkin,
Notwithstanding the moralist standpoint, it may just be conceded that at a certain stage in human life when death has become inevitable, the dying might as well be assisted to end it all and for good rather than continuously protracting that which cannot be prevented. Considering such concession, however, raises further issues as to what stage in human life should the concession be made, who determines that stage and what should be the criteria? How is this assistance, which leads to death, to be rendered; is it by positively terminating the person's life or passively allowing the terminally ill to die? These are some of the issues raised by the concept of euthanasia, which form the focal points of this paper.
An acceptable definition of the term ‘euthanasia’ is beclouded by the moral cum medico-legal debate on the acceptability or otherwise of termination of human life in whatever guise. Davies proffers what may be described as a compromise stand where he asserts that the term may best be described as an umbrella term connoting decisions made in relation to the ending of the life of the patient.
M. Davies,
A close appraisal of this definition would immediately reveal such terms as activity, passivity and voluntariness on the part of the physician, which leads to the death of the patient. Some of these conducts are obviously abhorred by those who oppose euthanasia. An unequivocal rejection of a positive act leading to death as euthanasia can be found in the statement of Bingham, MR in the leading case of
[1993] A.C 808, [1993] 1 All ER 821. Emphasis mine.
which deals with the issue of removal of life support from a patient in a persistent or permanent vegetative state. His Lordship considered that such practiceis not about euthanasia, if by that is meant the taking of
This denial of a positive act which causes death as euthanasia has also found acceptance in the United States of America as evidenced in the case of
117 Ct 2293(1997).
where the court emphasised that ‘the distinction between assisting suicide and withdrawing life sustaining treatment in hopeless case is logical, widely recognised and endorsed by the medical profession and by legal tradition’.Implicit in this judicial approach is that merely assisting a terminally ill patient to die by withholding life support facility (a passive act) amounts to euthanasia, whereas administering a lethal therapy to hasten the death of the patient is not euthanasia and is unacceptable. This may rightly be referred to as a distinction without a difference as the ultimate goal in both cases is to hasten or facilitate the death of the terminally ill patient. There is indeed no logical difference or distinction between the conduct of a physician who responds to a request to disconnect the ventilator in a case of progressive neurological disease and that of another physician who administers a lethal therapy on the patient at the patient's request. Both acts are aimed at achieving the same goal, which is the death of the patient. It is in the light of this that euthanasia has been defined in some circles as encompassing both positive and passive acts that lead to the death of the patient.
Proponents of euthanasia would lightly define the same as providing a ‘good’ death or easing the passing.
J. K. Mason and M. Smith,
H. C. Black,
This definition unequivocally reveals that it is in the interest of the suffering and pain-stricken patient that death be facilitated. The manner in which it is administered, whether passively or actively, is certainly secondary and does not solely by that means preclude the conduct from properly being referred to by what it is, which is euthanasia.
Thus, some writers have deduced various classifications of euthanasia, instead of outrightly denying that fact. Euthanasia has been classified as active, passive, voluntary, involuntary, non-voluntary euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide. This should command greater acceptability than drawing a distinction where none obviously exists.
For instance, Nead has defined euthanasia as ‘the intentional premature termination of another person's life either by direct intervention also known as active euthanasia or passive euthanasia by withholding life-prolonging measures and resources, either at the express or implied request of that person’. N. Nead
The common factor in all these categories of euthanasia is death, which often results not so much out of the physician's desire to kill the patient, as to the desire to ease the patient's pain, suffering, disdain, odium or embarrassment attendant upon such a worthless life. In other words, the best interest of such a patient is objectively considered to be the death of the patient, and whichever way or manner death is brought about is rather of little significance. Euthanasia may thus be looked upon as the act of bringing about the death of a patient by a physician, by whatever means so attained, in the interest of the patient.
The debate on legal recognition of the concept of euthanasia is often beclouded by the general belief in the sanctity of human life. Life, it is argued, is a gift from God which people are mere stewards employed by God to polish and nourish. No one shall therefore under any guise terminate that which he or she cannot bring into being. A close scrutiny of the various standpoints of the religious reveals some moderation...
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