Compassion as a Political Virtue
| DOI | 10.1111/1467-9248.00383 |
| Author | Maureen Whitebrook |
| Date | 01 August 2002 |
| Published date | 01 August 2002 |
| Subject Matter | Original Article |
Compassion as a Political Virtue
Maureen Whitebrook
University of Sheffield
The place of compassion in political thought and practice is debatable. This debate can be clarified
by stipulating ‘compassion’ as referring to the practice of acting on the feeling of ‘pity’; in addition,
compassion might best be understood politically speaking as properly exercised towards vulnera-
bility rather than suffering. Working with these understandings, I contrast Martha Nussbaum’s
account of the criteria for the exercise of compassion in modern democracies with the treatment
of compassion in Toni Morrison’s novels in order to suggest how compassion can be viewed politi-
cally. In respect of distributive justice and public policy, in both cases compassion might modify
the strict application of principles in the light of knowledge of particulars, suggesting an enlarged
role for discretion in the implementation of social justice. More generally, compassion’s focus on
particulars and the interpersonal draws attention to the importance of imagination and judgement.
The latter returns a consideration of compassion to the question of the relationship of compassion
to justice. In the political context, although strict criteria for compassion are inappropriate,
principles of justice might work as modifying compassion (rather than vice-versa, as might
be expected).
While it may be widely agreed that there is a need for principles of justice –
proportionality, for instance – there is also uneasiness about their application, as
evidenced by debates over the concepts of ‘need’ or ‘desert’, for example.1Uneasi-
ness is also caused by the utilitarian effect (if not intention) of practice derived
from much abstract theorizing about justice – concentration on deterrence rather
than proven guilt, or the criterion that the application of justice should result in
net (social) gain, for instance; or, the administration of justice may be imperfect,
or be corrupted by the exercise of power. Consequently, both classical authors and
recent critiques have suggested that mercy, pity, or compassion might mitigate or
replace strict principles of justice:2thus, for instance, the provision of aid simulta-
neously with and within situations of conflict, or inter-national debt cancellation.
However, mercy, like justice, is characterized by a form of inequality: the dispenser
of justice or mercy holds power over others; in the legal sense, both justice and
mercy are situation-specific, focussed on guilt. The acts of dispensing justice or
granting mercy reinforce the understanding that these actions occur in response
to persons who are at fault, or lacking, and in one’s power. Political justice – ‘the
distribution of benefits and burdens throughout a society’, thus entailing not
punishment but ‘burdens’ (and excluding power as such, the distribution of which
is the matter of political ‘concepts such as democracy and authority’) (Miller, 1976,
pp. 19, 22) – then largely excludes considerations of mercy, insofar as that is
associated with legal, or personal, justice and hence questions of fault and blame.
That being so, pity or compassion may seem more appropriate as alternatives to,
or modification of, justice in the political context.
POLITICAL STUDIES: 2002 VOL 50, 529–544
© Political Studies Association, 2002.
Published by Blackwell Publishers, 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA
530 MAUREEN WHITEBROOK
The Nature of Compassion
Pity and compassion are distinguished by lack of attribution of blame, and hence
move away from the notion of punishment or retribution and towards the notion
of care. There is a paradox in claiming a political relevance for these virtues in that
whereas justice and, to an extent, mercy focus objectively on the whole social
situation in which the other person is placed, pity and compassion express direct
feelings towards the particular other. Feelings are aroused by the plight of another
person: responses may not then depend primarily, as do justice or mercy, on the
overall – or ‘objective’ – situation of a perpetrator in their social or political context,
but on the observer’s perception of the person and their condition as such. Pity
and compassion are largely non-judgemental, but are concerned for the person(s)
within the disordered situation (rather than how to deal with the disorder per se).
As against the overt or implied power relationship inherent in justice and mercy,
pity and compassion include an element of equality, by way of the sense of fellow
feeling involved, a sense of suffering with rather than having power over.
Pity and Compassion
There is some variability in the usage of ‘pity’ and ‘compassion’ in theoretical
discourse. Nussbaum uses the terms interchangeably, ‘When I use the words
“pity” and “compassion” I am really speaking about a single emotion’ (Nussbaum,
1996, p. 29), whereas Arendt makes a strong distinction between the two (in terms
of the specifically verbal nature of pity) (Arendt, 1963, pp. 80–5); Margalit notes
the general habit of using the terms synonymously but suggests that they are
distinguished by the ‘asymmetry’ of pity, whereby the pitier does not think the
misfortune could happen to them (Margalit, 1996, pp. 233–4). Against such usages,
I suggest that it would be helpful to separate out the terms, taking pity to denote
the feeling as such and compassion to refer to feeling accompanied by action. That
is, ‘compassion’ should denote acting on the basis of feelings of pity, rather than
simply feeling an emotion: and hereafter I use pity for the feeling and compassion
for action following from such feelings.
A significant element of this distinction is that pity and compassion do not neces-
sarily go together. Suffering invokes feelings of pity: such feelings may or may not
be accompanied, or followed, by the exercise of compassion. For example, the first
sight of suffering invokes pity – the road-accident victim is injured. Additional
knowledge may modify the first impression: they are drunk, injured in an accident
they themselves have caused. Compassionate action may then still follow – the
driver is given medical treatment, quite possibly accompanied by a feeling that
‘there, but for the grace of God ...’. Alternatively, one might see, pity, understand,
withdraw sympathy but still be willing to act to alleviate the suffering. Or pity may
be so generalized an emotion as not to issue in action at all (and thus like Arendt’s
‘to be sorry without being touched in the flesh’ (Arendt, 1963, p. 80). In summary:
suffering as such is liable prima facie to invoke a response; however, reflective
judgement may quickly follow and then initial identification with suffering or
vulnerability may be modified, even if not entirely negated.
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