COMPENSATION FOR WORKERS' DISUTILITY
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9485.1980.tb00558.x |
| Author | D. L. BOSWORTH,P. J. DAWKINS |
| Date | 01 February 1980 |
| Published date | 01 February 1980 |
Scotfish
Journal
ofPolifical
Economy,
Vol.
27,
No
1,
February
1980
Q
1980
Scottish Economic Society
0036-9292/80/00050080
$02.00
COMPENSATION FOR WORKERS’
DISUTILITY: TIME
OF
DAY, LENGTH
OF
SHIFT AND OTHER FEATURES OF
WORK PATTERNS
D.
L.
BOSWORTH
AND
P.
J.
DAWKINS
Loughborougli
University
I
It does
not
seem to be widely appreciated that the level of earnings can vary
considerably within a particular occupational group even where these
workers are employed in the same plant. Differences
in
levels of payment
arise because employees are divided into groups, each of which undertakes
to provide labour services at
a
different time of day and for a different length
of work period. Indeed an unskilled manual worker
on
a
shift system with
a
certain amount of overtime may command an income level in excess of
a
skilled non-manual employee working normal hours during the day period.
This fact is not
an
indication of the inadequacies of the theory of wage
differentials. The differences in earning levels reflect differences in “net
advantages”, to use Adam Smith‘s term,
of
the various types of work patterns.
The degree of disutility associated with certain patterns of work (e.g.,
permanent nights), may be because of the intrinsic disagreeableness of such
work
or
because of the inferior provision of facilities by the employer or the
community at large for those working abnormal hours. Just as different
levels of disutility are associated with different occupations because they are
more or less “dirty” or “risky”,
so
jobs in a given occupation possess
different degrees of disutility, depending
on
the time
of
day at which the
labour services are consumed, the length of working day and other features
of work patterns. Just as dirty and dangerous jobs command a relatively high
level
of
earnings
so
does work at unsocial or abnormal times of the day or
week. Their relatively high levels of earnings are still a reflection of market
forces: because of their greater disutility, fewer workers are willing to supply
themselves at the going wage and thus, for any given demand curve, the
going wage is forced upward. Nevertheless, for the individual who values
income (and the things it can buy) relatively highly and evaluates the dis-
utility
of
the
job
at a relatively low level, he has this opportunity to earn
higher than average reward for his labour services.
In
general, supply and
demand forces ensure that less arduous and more socially acceptable work
patterns can be expected to command a lower rate of compensation. All
dimensions
of
work patterns can be expected to influence, one way or another,
Date
of
receipt
of
final manuscript:
25
May
1979.
80
COMPENSATION
FOR
WORKERS’
DISUTILITY
81
the numbers of workers willing to supply themselves and thereby the going
c‘price’’ of labour. The main dimensions of length of working day and time
of the day are considered below, although the currently less common
phenomena such as split shifts, flexible working hours and irregular work
patterns may also be relevant.
I1
A
THEORETICAL
FRAMEWORK
FOR
THE
“TIME-OF-DAY”
AND
“LENGTH-OF-DAY”
PAYMENTS
“Time-of-Duy”
The existence of a “time-of-day” wage pattern appears to arise principally
out of differences
in
the supply of and demand for labour at different points
in the day. This can be demonstrated in a simple way by assuming that each
firm in the labour market decides upon an optimal rate of production, a
rate which is technologically fixed and varies with the wage rate only insofar
as
high wage rates may cause any particular firm to close down its operations.
(This is consistent with the model of capital utilisation developed by Winston
and McCoy (1974))
As
far as the labour market is concerned, therefore,
more and more firms choose to close down, if only temporarily, as wage
rates reach higher and higher levels.
As
far as employees are concerned, the disutility of work is not identical at
all points during the day.
For
one thing, certain hours of the day are more
valuable for leisure than others: it is a frustrating business playing golf
in
the dark; it is not possible to watch a film when the cinema is closed. In
addition to this different evaluation of the “time-of-day” with regard to
leisure, there is the whole question of body rhythms and the mental and
physical disutility that work during abnormal hours may cause. The net
disadvantages of certain hours over and above others will result in a smaller
supply at each wage for the more highly valued leisure hours. Consequently,
assuming that the demand curve is unaffected, market forces will result in
a
higher wage and lower employment at the more disagreeable times of the day.
If
we could assume that the greatest numbers
of
individuals were willing to
supply themselves at 12.00 noon, the least number
at
12.00
midnight and that
the transition between these two states is steady, then the path of the going
wage over a 24 hour period is cyclical, of the form assumed by Winston and
McCoy (1974) in
a
model explaining the extent of capital utilisation: the
optimal length of operating day for the firm is related, in part, to the shape of
this cyclical pattern.1
What we are interested in at the moment, however, is the average wage that
will prevail for any given length of shift when the starting time of the shift
varies. If we take
a
shift that begins at say
6.00
a.m. and finishes at
2.00
p.m.,
then the underlying wage rate at each point in time is given by the appropriate
interval in this cyclical wage pattern. We now compare two shifts of equal
We consider this question
in
detail elsewhere
(see
Bosworth and Dawkins
(1978)).
6
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