Competition and Complementarity between Global and Regional Human Rights Institutions
| Published date | 01 February 2017 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12395 |
| Date | 01 February 2017 |
Competition and Complementarity between
Global and Regional Human Rights Institutions
Erik Voeten
Georgetown University
Abstract
Fragmentation and competition between global and regional institutions are not among the major issues that threaten the
regime. There are three ways in which tensions nonetheless arise. First, consistent with the universalist aspirations of human
rights, global conventions have played a focal role in verbally defining rights. This masks considerable cross-regional and
intra-regional differences in how rights should be interpreted. Second, judicialization of human rights has mostly occurred at
the regional level. This occasionally creates inconsistencies with the global regime. Third, rights concerns often encroach on
other areas of international cooperation, including security, trade, and development. This raises similar issues of forum shop-
ping as in the other issue areas, for example because some governments may shop for trade agreements or development
loans with fewer rights conditions.
The relationship between global and regional human rights
institutions looks different from other policy areas. In trade,
development lending, and finance there are strong global
institutions in which the United States exerts great influ-
ence: the World Trade Organization (WTO), World Bank,
and the International Monetary Fund. These global institu-
tions are challenged by regional institutions that provide
similar functions. This raises concerns about forum shop-
ping, fragmentation, the formation of clubs, and the ability
to deliver global public goods. Moreover, the United States
worries that the new regional institutions weaken its
influence.
By contrast, the global human rights regime is relatively
weak and the US has stayed out of most judicialized aspects
of the regime. Europe, the Americas, and more recently
Africa have created regional human rights courts that have
no global parallel. The global United Nations Human Rights
Council (UNHRC) is a weak political institution that has no
regional counterpart.
There is a straightforward functionalist explanation for this
difference in centralization. International human rights insti-
tutions do not regulate transactions between states. Instead,
these institutions attempt to regulate how states treat their
residents. A state that does not abide by tariff rules or finan-
cial regulations hurts other states. Region-specific tariffs, reg-
ulations, or lending requirements can undermine or
compete with global ones. By contrast, variation in human
rights observance does not materially affect other states
except in extreme cases. Fragmentation and competition
between regional and global institutions are therefore not
typically seen as major issues.
I discuss three ways in which tensions between global
and regional human rights institutions nonetheless arise.
First, the power of human rights stems from their moral
and social appeal (e.g. Risse and Sikkink, 2013). Human
rights are universal in their aspiration. They are rights that
people have by virtue of being human. Global treaties and
conventions have played a focal role in shaping the texts
of regional and national human rights instruments. Yet,
consensus around language masks cross-regional and intra-
regional variation in how exactly these rights should be
interpreted.
Second, the most credible way to interpret and enforce
rights is by delegating authority to an independent judicial
body. Politically this has only been feasible at a regional
level and only in some regions. This leads to some inconsis-
tencies between the regional and global regime as well as
forum shopping between the UN’s semi-judicial bodies and
these regional courts. The main exception is the regime for
international criminal law, which has a global court. I argue
that this is so because its main function is deterrence, which
does require centralization.
Third, human rights concerns have entered the deci-
sions of non-human rights institutions, including the UN
Security Council, Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs), the
World Bank, and the European Union (EU). This is an
increasingly important component of international rights
enforcement and an area where global and regional insti-
tutions sometimes clash due to different interpretations of
human rights. Moreover, there is typically a power
dynamic, with wealthy Western liberal democracies using
the carrots and sticks embedded international institutions
to advance a human rights agenda. States sometimes
strategically shop for trade agreements or development
loans with fewer human rights conditions. In this way, the
issues that arise from regional and global institutional
competition are similar to those discussed in other parts
of this special section.
Global Policy (2017) 8:1 doi: 10.1111/1758-5899.12395 ©2017 University of Durham and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Global Policy Volume 8 . Issue 1 . February 2017 119
Special Section Article
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