Conditions of critique and the non-irreversibility of politics
| Author | Hartmut Behr |
| Published date | 01 February 2017 |
| Date | 01 February 2017 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/1755088216671734 |
Journal of International Political Theory
2017, Vol. 13(1) 122 –140
© The Author(s) 2016
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DOI: 10.1177/1755088216671734
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Conditions of critique and the
non-irreversibility of politics
Hartmut Behr
Newcastle University, UK
Abstract
Critique is a driving force not only for the development of political ideas and concepts
but also for protecting humane and democratic politics against the perils of epistemic
and political ideologies. Yet, while there is much debate about the question of ‘What
is critique?’ the conditions of critique appear largely under-reflected in International
Politics and the Social Sciences more generally. This article goes beyond the question
of what critique in politics and social science might consist of and holds that critique is
not an end in itself, but rather requires a yardstick to discuss and judge its generative
conditions, that is, its foundation, legitimization and direction that it must pertain to be
meaningful. The following article will explore the oeuvres of twentieth-century political
and social theorists Hans J. Morgenthau, Herbert Marcuse and Eric Voegelin and argues
that the three principles of ‘perspectivity’, ‘negation’ and ‘noesis’ that can be concluded
from their work provide such generative conditions of critique, practically leading to a
novel policy framework of the non-irreversibility of politics.
Keywords
Apperception, conditions of critique, negation, non-irreversibility of politics,
perspectivity
Introduction
Critique seems to assume that we are in a better or superior position than the author, text
or politician that is criticized; but what justifies this assumption? In researching this
question, this article attempts to go beyond the question of ‘What is critique?’1 but asks
what enables and legitimizes the social scientist, the philosopher, the politician, finally
every one of us, to be critical. While Herbert Marcuse’s, Hans J Morgenthau’s and Eric
Corresponding author:
Hartmut Behr, International Politics, The School of Geography, Politics and Sociology, Newcastle University,
40-42 Great North Road, Newcastle upon Tyne NE1 7RU, UK.
Email: Hartmut.behr@ncl.ac.uk
671734IPT0010.1177/1755088216671734Journal of International Political TheoryBehr
research-article2016
Article
Behr 123
Voegelin’s work is each deficient in explicating their conditions of critique, together and
combined, they promise to hold important insights to elaborate conditions of critique and
of humane politics.
Even though the work of Morgenthau, Marcuse and Voegelin does not explicitly
reflect upon the conditions of (their) critique, their oeuvres nevertheless hold crucial
insights for the formulation of knowledge and its practical application. These insights
become visible as conditions of critique when elaborated through intertextual analysis.
An intertextual triangulation of their views on knowledge production and political/social
practice, that takes into account their different approaches and lessons while interrelating
them, thus promises significant findings about the under-researched question of what
enables, legitimates and directs critique.
While Marcuse argues that in modern (advanced industrial) societies the individual
would be bereft of his or her ability to critique because technological developments
would work against human liberation and the human condition as means of control and
command, he himself then presents a whole book (and more) of and on social and politi-
cal critique.2 But what are the conditions of his critique and the possibilities he offers?
His notion of dialectic negation seems fundamental and stimulating for the study of
conditions of critique.
His contemporary Morgenthau was certainly not shy of critiquing politicians and col-
leagues, in publications, speeches and political action. Indeed, he was very much an
alerting voice and public intellectual against, academically, positivist science, a-histori-
cal inquiry and dehumanizing tendencies of a priori-rationalizations in the social sci-
ences; and, politically, of modern ideologies of social planning, consumer society and
national power politics.3 We find in Morgenthau’s writings, however, even less reflection
on the conditions that enabled his critique than in Marcuse. However, when taking into
account, too, his unpublished work, we can elaborate the notion of the contingency of
political knowledge and practice as, too, the conditions of his own arguments.
And Voegelin, probably the least known to students of International Politics, is often
associated with conservative scholarship, shares, however, many critiques with Critical
Theory and Classical Realism as of modern reason, of the idea of an autonomous indi-
vidual and of nationalism and political ideologies (even if all three arrived at different
answers).4 But it also needs to be asked here: ‘What enables his critique?’ and ‘What
thoughts can we find in his work with regard to the question of conditions of critique?’
His specific contribution – which comes to full fruition under the present inquiry when
linked and combined with the notions of perspectivity (à la Morgenthau) and dialectic
negation of knowledge (à la Marcuse) – lies in the embedding of ‘negative’, deconstruct-
ing knowledge by means of perspectivity and negation into a ‘positive’ re-articulation of
humanity and political order through the notion of ‘noesis’.
More specifically, Morgenthau’s idea of the temporal and spatial contingency and
perspectivity of knowledge (a concept that he develops in reference to Karl Mannheim’s
concept of ‘Standortgebundenheit’), combined with the notion of a dialectical negation
of arguments as discussed by Marcuse (as ‘thesis’ and ‘anti-thesis’), needs to be framed
and embedded within the concept of ‘noesis’ (i.e. apperceiving self-reflectivity) as inter-
preted by Voegelin. The triangulation of perspectivity and dialectical negation with polit-
ical ‘noesis’ provides a catalogue of principles that prevents epistemic and political
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