Confounding Conventional Wisdom: Political not Principled Differences in the Transatlantic Regulatory Relationship
| Date | 01 November 2009 |
| Author | Alasdair R. Young |
| Published date | 01 November 2009 |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-856X.2009.00386.x |
| Subject Matter | Article |
Confounding Conventional Wisdom:
Political not Principled Differences
in the Transatlantic Regulatory
Relationshipbjpi_386666..689
Alasdair R. Young
The transatlantic complaints over hormone-treated beef and genetically modified organisms before
the World Trade Organisation (WTO) seem to confirm two separate but related conventional
wisdoms about the transatlantic economic relationship: that it is highly conflictual and that many
of the conflicts are rooted in profoundly different approaches to regulation. This article argues that
neither of the two conventional wisdoms is accurate. Rather, it contends that they are products of
two, compounding analytical shortcomings: one methodological, one empirical. The methodological
shortcoming takes the form of an implicit selection bias. While WTO complaints are high profile
they are rare and extreme examples; it is, therefore, unsound to generalise from them to the
regulatory relationship as a whole. The empirical shortcoming has to do with neither the beef
hormones nor the GMO dispute demonstrating what it is purported to. The article thus serves as a
cautionary tale about the dangers of relying on obvious cases and the need to question whether
evidence really does support a prevailing popular narrative.
Keywords: precautionary principle; trade disputes; transatlantic relations; World
Trade Organisation
In 2008 two long-standing regulatory disputes between the United States and the
European Union again hit the news. In January 2008 the deadline for the EU’s
compliance with the World TradeOrganisation’s (WTO) ruling on its procedures for
approving genetically modified organisms (GMOs) expired with only partial com-
pliance. In October 2008 the WTO ruled that the US and Canada had not violated
WTO rules by continuing to apply sanctions against the EU despite it having
modified its ban on hormone-treated beef. These WTO complaints seem to confirm
two separate but related conventional wisdoms about the transatlantic economic
relationship: that it is highly conflictual and that many of the conflicts are rooted in
profoundly different approaches to regulation.
This article argues that neither of these conventional wisdoms is accurate. Rather,
it contends that they are products of two, compounding analytical shortcomings:
one methodological, one empirical. The methodological shortcoming takes the form
of an implicit selection bias. WTO complaints overwhelmingly attract media, politi-
cal and academic attention. They are, however, rare and extreme examples. Gen-
eralising from them to the regulatory relationship in general, therefore, is unsound.
If one considers the full range of regulatory measures that impede transatlantic
The British Journal of
Politics and International Relations
doi: 10.1111/j.1467-856X.2009.00386.x BJPIR: 2009 VOL 11, 666–689
© 2009 The Author.Journal compilation © 2009 Political Studies Association
trade but that have not become WTO complaints, the relationship appears to be
characterised by tolerance rather than conflict.
The empirical shortcoming has to do with neither the beef hormones nor the GMO
dispute demonstrating what it is purported to. The tendency is to depict these WTO
complaints as reflecting fundamental differences in the two parties’ approaches to
regulation, with the US advocating ‘sound science’ and the EU advocating the
‘precautionary principle’. While the US and EU are to an extent responsible for
fostering the perception of competing principles, detailed analyses of the prime
exhibits invoked to support this conventional wisdom reveal sharply different
approaches to risk management within the EU and EU policy outcomes that reflect
messy political processes. The EU’s regulations, therefore, are more political than
principled. Moreover, contrary to how the WTO complaints are normally depicted,
how the US pursued those complaints actually supports the characterisation of the
transatlantic relationship as tolerant.
In developing this argument, this article draws together research conducted for
three previous research projects. One is on the early days of the transatlantic
dispute over genetically modified crops conducted when I was a BP Transatlantic
Jean Monnet Fellow at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies at the
European University Institute. One is for the European Commission’s Directorate
General for External Relations on the state of the transatlantic relationship 10 years
after the signing of the New Transatlantic Agenda.1One is on the EU’s use of WTO
dispute settlement, which was funded by the British Academy.2In all the article
draws on 28 not-for-attribution interviews with trade officials, regulators and
business groups on both sides of the Atlantic. Regulators and trade officials were
asked about their perceptions of sources of regulatory differences. Trade officials
were also asked about what influences their decisions to initiate WTO complaints.
Business group representatives were asked about their views of the origins of trade
barriers, whether and how they sought to address them and what they perceive to
influence trade officials’ decisions about how to pursue trade barriers. These differ-
ent perspectives were triangulated with each other and documentary sources.
The article begins by setting out the significance of trade barriers stemming from
public health and environmental regulations in the transatlantic relationship and
the particular challenges of resolving them. It then describes the established con-
ventional wisdoms about the transatlantic relationship. It then exposes in turn the
methodological and empirical shortcomings that underpin those conventional
wisdoms. It concludes by drawing out the implications of the analysis and reassess-
ing the transatlantic regulatory relationship.
The Distinctive Politics of Regulatory Trade Barriers
Excluding the European Union itself the transatlantic economic relationship is the
largest, broadest and most intensive international economic relationship in the
world. As tariffs have been reduced through successive rounds of multilateral trade
negotiations, regulatory differences have become increasingly significant obstacles
to transatlantic trade in goods (Commission 2008c, 9; USTR 2008, 213). Because
regulations are statutory requirements governing products’ characteristics or how
they are produced, products that do not meet those requirements cannot be sold
CONFOUNDING CONVENTIONAL WISDOM 667
© 2009 The Author.Journal compilation © 2009 Political Studies Association
BJPIR, 2009, 11(4)
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