Confronting the caliphate? Explaining civil resistance in jihadist proto-states
| Author | Daniel Finnbogason,Isak Svensson |
| Date | 01 June 2021 |
| Published date | 01 June 2021 |
| DOI | 10.1177/1354066120976790 |
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https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066120976790
European Journal of
International Relations
2021, Vol. 27(2) 572 –595
© The Author(s) 2020
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DOI: 10.1177/1354066120976790
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Confronting the caliphate?
Explaining civil resistance in
jihadist proto-states
Isak Svensson
and Daniel Finnbogason
Uppsala University, Sweden
Abstract
Research has shown the potential of nonviolent civil resistance in challenging autocratic
state regimes (e.g. Sharp, 1973; Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011). Yet, little is known about
its applicability in jihadist proto-states, that is, territories governed by militant jihadist
groups. We argue that civil resistance is more likely to occur when jihadists impose a
rule that local populations perceive as alien and when organizational structures capable
of collective nonviolent mobilization are activated. We develop this argument through a
comparative analysis of three jihadist proto-states: one in which manifest and organized
civil resistance occurred (Islamic Emirate of Azawad in Mali in 2012), and two in which
it did not: the Islamic State of Iraq (2006–2008) and the Islamic Principality of al-Mukalla
in Yemen (2015–2016). Whereas the former was met with mainly armed resistance
(the Sunni Awakening campaign), the latter saw neither armed nor unarmed organized
and collective resistance by locals under its rule. We demonstrate how variation in the
jihadists’ governing strategies (especially the degree of adaptation to local conditions) as
well as in the social structures for mobilization (i.e. whether opposition was channeled
through civil society networks or tribal networks) created different conditions for
civil resistance. This study adds to a growing research discussion on civil resistance
against rebel governance (e.g. Arjona, 2015; Kaplan, 2017). More broadly, our study is
an innovative first attempt to bridge research on terrorism, rebel governance, and civil
resistance, three fields that have been siloed in previous research.
Keywords
Civil resistance, jihadist proto-states, rebel governance, civil society, al-Qaeda, Islamic
State
Corresponding author:
Isak Svensson, Uppsala University, Box 514, Uppsala 75120, Sweden.
Email: isak.svensson@pcr.uu.se
976790EJT0010.1177/1354066120976790European Journal of International RelationsSvensson and Finnbogason
research-article2020
Article
Svensson and Finnbogason 573
Introduction
Recent years have seen a significant rise in the number of radical Islamist groups with
territorial aspirations who seek to establish so-called “jihadi proto-states” (Lia, 2015:
31), or “terrorist semi-states” (Honig and Yahel, 2019: 1210). After the Arab Spring,
many jihadist groups have expanded into the civilian realm, transforming themselves (at
least partly) from underground terrorists into socially embedded insurgent groups. They
have moved to declare proto-states on an unprecedented scale: Between 2011 and 2016,
jihadist groups created more proto-states than in the preceding 20 years (Lia, 2016: 81).
The creation of such proto-states is part of a larger trend of a dramatic increase in armed
conflicts over transnational Islamist claims (Svensson and Nilsson, 2018). The Islamic
State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and its diffusion to other areas of the world indicate that
jihadist proto-states are a serious contemporary security issue.
In this study, we suggest that there is space for civil resistance against jihadist
proto-states, something that has received little attention in policy-making and
research. Where jihadists try to govern, they need civilians to accept their rule.
Civilian populations can, however, withdraw their consent, mobilize, and resist jihad-
ist rule. A fundamental insight from the study of civil resistance is that power ulti-
mately relies on dependency relationships outside the power-holders’ control (Sharp,
1973). Yet, this insight remains to be incorporated in the study of jihadist proto-states.
A growing body of work has shown the potential of nonviolent resistance to challenge
unjust rules and authoritarian systems. Nonviolent means outperform violent means
(Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011) and increase the chances for democracy in the longer
term (e.g. Karatnycky and Ackerman, 2005). After previous research predominantly
focused on civil resistance against established state regimes, there has been a growing
interest recently in civil resistance against rebel governance (Arjona, 2015; Barter,
2014; Hallward et al., 2017; Idler et al., 2015; Kaplan, 2017; van Baalen, 2020). Yet
it has largely avoided the study of civil resistance against jihadist rebel governance
projects. Thus, with a few exceptions (Aarseth, 2018; Revkin, 2016, 2020; Stephan,
2015), there is next to nothing when it comes to empirical research on civil resistance
against jihadist proto-states. These exceptions are important as they have identified
the potential of civil resistance (Stephan, 2015), demonstrated how ISIS’s governance
impacted civilian populations (Revkin, 2016, 2020), and described how civilians in
Mosul engaged civil resistance against ISIS in acts of noncooperation (Aarseth,
2018), but they have not examined conditions for civil resistance.
Our study addresses this research lacuna—located in between the study of terrorism,
rebel governance, and civil resistance—and is the first to ask why civil resistance occurs
against some jihadist proto-states but not others. We advance an argument in which the
interaction between the jihadist groups’ governance strategies, and which (if any) of the
local social structures for political mobilization that are activated, account for the popu-
lar response to jihadist proto-states. More specifically, we suggest that civil resistance
against jihadist proto-states is more likely to occur when the jihadists impose a type of
rule perceived as alien by local populations, thus generating grievances and motives for
resistance, and when civil society organizations capable of collective nonviolent mobili-
zation are activated to mobilize this potential for resistance.
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