Confucian reflective commitment and free expression
| Published date | 01 July 2020 |
| DOI | 10.1177/1474885116681175 |
| Date | 01 July 2020 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
European Journal of Political Theory
2020, Vol. 19(3) 314–333
!The Author(s) 2016
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DOI: 10.1177/1474885116681175
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Article
Confucian reflective
commitment and
free expression
David Elstein
SUNY New Paltz, USA
Abstract
As Confucian political thought is adapted to modern circumstances, the question of free
expression merits more attention. Most contemporary Confucian political theorists
accept a right to political free expression, but this is hard to reconcile with traditional
Confucian sources which mainly argue for the need to limit expression in various ways.
Through a comparison with John Stuart Mill’s classic account, I make a case that
although Confucianism does not accept liberal neutrality, it does appreciate the need
for a kind of autonomy in choosing values that I call reflective commitment. This is a
long-standing value in Confucian thought. Confucian reflective commitment is not iden-
tical to liberal reflective commitment, but it is structurally similar enough to ground free
expression of ethical and political views. Expression that is not mainly propositional
(such as art) or does not argue for a position on values is a different question, and here
Confucians will generally accept more restrictions than liberals. However, legal prohib-
ition of expression is a complex matter and must take into account a number of factors.
Keywords
Free speech, free expression, Confucianism, Mill, reflective commitment
Political thought is one of the most vibrant areas of recent Confucian philosophy.
Despite many differences, all sides can probably agree on one thing: current
East Asian governments, notably the PRC, are not practicing Confucian politics.
Here I want to take a close look at one element of Confucian political thought and
what it would mean to realise it. Most contemporary Confucians support a system
of basic human rights, including a right to free expression. This is true of more
liberal and democratic Confucians and is even supported by some who are not as
Corresponding author:
David Elstein, Department of Philosophy, SUNY New Paltz, 1 Hawk Drive, New Paltz, NY 12561, USA.
Email: Davidelstein1@gmail.com
friendly to democracy. Yet insufficient attention has been given to how a Confucian
right to free expression can be justified and the scope of its protection.
Confucian free expression merits more examination for several reasons.
First, many contemporary Confucians seem to take such a right for granted. Xu
Fuguan (1902–1982) said true democratic elections require freedom of speech,
assembly, and publication, yet did not explain how Confucianism supports these
rights (1985: 42–43). Lee Ming-huei (1953–) quotes the 1993 Vienna Declaration on
human rights approvingly and argues that first-generation civil rights are universal
(and thus can be accepted by Confucians), but goes on to explain how
Confucianism can support human rights in general without considering free expres-
sion specifically (2005: 76–80). Joseph Chan argues that Confucians should make
civil and political rights (including free speech) a priority, but does not give specific
attention to the moral impact of free speech (2013: 127–128; see also Angle, 2012:
56). A danger with these arguments is that the importance of free speech is tied
instrumentally to its role in democratic deliberation (and for Xu, popular elec-
tions). If one is suspicious about democratic deliberation (as in the PRC), the
instrumental value dries up. Furthermore, the argument is not particularly
Confucian, since democratic deliberation was never endorsed by classical
Confucians. I want to consider a different way of making the case for
free expression.
As I will illustrate, deriving a right of free expression from Confucian thought is
not straightforward. Most traditional sources either say next to nothing about it or
are clearly hostile to unrestricted expression, out of concern for the moral effects.
Whether Confucian thought can justify free expression (and I believe it can)
requires more careful investigation of precisely how. Free expression was not a
significant concern for traditional Confucians. The scope of government power was
much more limited, so legal restrictions on government management of speech
were less of a worry. It simply would not have been possible for a government
to ban public discussion of a topic effectively. Now, when most communication is
not face to face, technology does allow governments to restrict public expression
significantly.
1
Similarly, in classical times, the vast majority of the population was
illiterate, so whether written communication was limited or not had little impact on
most people’s ability to access information. Not so today.
A vastly different landscape of how information is transmitted and accessed
demands reinterpreting classical views on expression. I argue that although there
is little textual support for anything like a broad right of free expression in tradi-
tional Confucian sources, basic Confucian commitments can be better realised in
modern societies by allowing free expression. A reconstructed Confucianism
appropriate for modern times thus has reason to argue for such a right, which is
ultimately justified by the fact that it is conducive to realising essential aspects of
traditional Confucian thought. I will argue that Confucianism has always recog-
nised the importance of a certain kind of autonomy in choosing values that I call
‘reflective commitment’, which also figures prominently in John Stuart Mill’s case
for free expression. Although Confucian reflective commitment is motivated dif-
ferently, it too requires freedom of expression (of certain kinds).
Elstein 315
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