Congress, public opinion, and an informal constraint on the commander-in-chief
| Author | Douglas L Kriner |
| DOI | 10.1177/1369148117745860 |
| Published date | 01 February 2018 |
| Date | 01 February 2018 |
| Subject Matter | Special Issue Articles |
https://doi.org/10.1177/1369148117745860
The British Journal of Politics and
International Relations
2018, Vol. 20(1) 52 –68
© The Author(s) 2018
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DOI: 10.1177/1369148117745860
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Congress, public opinion, and
an informal constraint on the
commander-in-chief
Douglas L Kriner
Abstract
US presidents have routinely ordered the use of force without seeking prior authorisation from
Congress. However, this practice does not mean that the legislature is irrelevant, as Congress
often influences decisions by exercising informal political levers. One of the most important is
through Congress’ ability to affect popular support for the commander-in-chief. Through a pair
of experiments embedded on nationally representative opinion surveys, this article evaluates
whether Congress’ constitutional prerogatives in war powers remain relevant when battling the
president in the public sphere. Policy criticism significantly decreased support for the use of force,
as did challenges to administration actions on constitutional grounds. Although Congress routinely
fails to use the constitutional tools at its disposal to check the commander-in-chief, these powers
bolster Congress’ capacity to influence public opinion. Hence, while presidents enjoy considerable
leeway in the military arena, Congress’ capacity to erode public support can serve as a check on
presidential power.
Keywords
Congress, president, public opinion, survey experiment, war powers
An emerging literature challenges the conventional portrayal of executive-driven foreign
policy-making that leaves little room for parliamentary influence or constraint (see Mello
and Peters, 2018, the introduction to this Special Issue, as well as Mello, 2014; Raunio
and Wagner, 2017). However, much of this literature has focused strictly on legislatures’
assertions of their formal powers to constrain executive initiative in security policy
(Dieterich et al., 2015; Mello, 2012; Raube, 2014), and perhaps most importantly, their
ability to exercise an ex ante veto on the use of force (Peters and Wagner, 2011, 2014;
Wagner, 2017). For example, recent research argues that the Parliament of the United
Kingdom, by virtue of securing votes on authorising the use of force in Iraq, Libya, and
Syria—and in the latter case blocking the Prime Minister’s desired intervention—has
established a parliamentary prerogative to vote before the use of force (Strong, 2015).
This parliamentary assertion is particularly notable given that the Parliament of the United
Political Science, Boston University, Boston, MA, USA
Corresponding author:
Douglas L Kriner, Political Science, Boston University, 232 Bay State Road, Boston, MA 02215, USA.
Email: dkriner@bu.edu
745860BPI0010.1177/1369148117745860The British Journal of Politics and International RelationsKriner
research-article2018
Special Issue Article
Kriner 53
Kingdom is traditionally classified as being relatively ‘weak’ in terms of its capacity to
influence security policy compared to other European legislatures (Kaarbo and Kenealy,
2015; Mello, 2017).
While these studies offer an important corrective to conventional models that all but
ignore the legislature’s role in shaping security policy, they largely omit many important
informal mechanisms through which legislatures constrain executive initiative in the inter-
national arena. In the American context, these informal levers routinely afford Congress
greater influence over policy outcomes than do its formal constitutional powers.
With respect to its share of constitutional war powers, the United States Congress is
perhaps the most powerful legislature in the world. Congress alone can declare war.
Article I also grants Congress authority over the initiation of limited military actions,
through its sole power to grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal (Lofgren, 1972), and it
empowers Congress to raise and regulate the Armed Forces. Ultimately, Congress also
controls the federal purse strings.
Yet throughout American history, Congress has struggled mightily to employ any of
these tools legally to constrain the commander-in-chief. Presidents have routinely
deployed American troops abroad without first seeking congressional authorisation
(Torreon, 2016). The power of the purse has proved a blunt instrument; the prospect of
cutting off funding for American forces committed to the field is so politically toxic that
it all but precludes the power’s successful use.1 Similarly, the War Powers Resolution,
which was intended to create a mechanism for terminating military actions of which
Congress disapproved without having to cut off funding, has similarly failed to achieve
the lofty goals of its architects (Auerswald and Cowhey, 1997; Fisher and Adler, 1998;
Glennon, 1984). Such failures have led many analysts to write off Congress as all but
irrelevant when pitted against an ‘imperial presidency’ (Griffin, 2013; Rudalevige, 2005;
Savage, 2008; Schlesinger, 1973).
The formal interactions of legislatures and executives are, of course, important.
Moreover, there is an essential truth underlying the conventional view of inter-branch
power in American military affairs. Contemporary presidents are undoubtedly the focal
point of American military policy-making. However, scholarship examining the legisla-
ture’s influence in security policy both in the American and comparative contexts would
do well to consider more explicitly the legislature’s capacity to influence both the course
and conduct of security policy through more informal means (Howell and Pevehouse,
2007; Kriner, 2010). Perhaps most importantly, it should examine the capacity of legisla-
tures to influence public support for the use of force.
While Congress rarely imposes formal legal constraints on the commander-in-chief,
congressional opponents of administration policy can raise the political costs of pursu-
ing a policy course that strays too far from congressional preferences. One of the most
important mechanisms through which Congress can impose political costs on the presi-
dent is by shaping public opinion and eroding popular support for the president and his
policies. Public support is one of the most salient and significant metrics on which other
politicians assess the president’s political capital. Presidents who enjoy strong popular
support are much more successful in getting their policy proposals through Congress
(Beckmann, 2010; Canes-Wrone and De Marchi, 2002; Rivers and Rose, 1985) and,
ultimately, in securing reelection for themselves or for their partisan successors than are
presidents who do not enjoy strong support among the public (Abramowitz, 2008;
Sigelman and Brody, 1979; Wlezien and Erikson, 2004). Indeed, precisely because pres-
idents are sensitive to the political costs of military policy, defense policy-makers have
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