Consent
| Author | Albert Weale |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-9248.1978.tb01520.x |
| Date | 01 March 1978 |
| Published date | 01 March 1978 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
CONSENT*
ALBERT WEALE
University
of
York
Abstract.
This paper analyses the notion of consent. Two approaches
to
the topic are
distinguished: one which analyses consent in terms of the ethical concepts associated with
an established institutional practice and a second in which the concept is analysed by
reference to behavioural and mental concepts. The second approach is used to develop an
analysis
by
which consent is taken to consist in the inducing of reliance in a hearer by
a speaker who undertakes either not
to
interfere with some future action of the hearer
or
to
undertake a course of action which the hearer has previously proposed. On the basis of
this definition a concept
of
tacit consent is defined, whose force in political argument, it
is suggested, is analogous
to
the legal concept of ‘consideration’ in the law of contract.
Finally, the analysis is illustrated in terms of a reconstructed account of Locke’s theory of
obligation.
1
N
this paper
1
analyse the notion of consent. How useful this analysis is depends
on
its applicability to theories of political obligation;
my
concern for the present
however is the preliminary one of examining the concept itself. Although
I
show
how the analysis might be used in a reconstructed version
of
Locke’s account of
obligation, this material is illustrative, not a development of the argument. Any
theory
of
obligation based upon consent ought to contain an analysis
of
the
notion. But
I
have been struck how infrequently this is true. One notable
exception is Plamenatz, and
I
begin with
a
discussion
of
his views.
II
In
Consent, Freedom and Political Obligation’
Plamenatz offered not one but
two analyses of consent. In the first edition consent was analysed in terms of the
expression of a wish which gave someone a (moral) right to perform what they
would otherwise not have the right to perform.’ Thus A consents to B’s action
if
he expresses a wish that B perform some action he would otherwise not be
entitled to perform. In the
Postscript
to the second edition, however, Plamenatz
withdrew this original analysis and offered instead an alternative definition. In
this second account
A
consents to
B’s
performance
of
an action
if
A performs
This paper was written during my tenure
of
the James Knott Fellowship in the Department
of Politics, University
of
Newcastle upon Tyne.
I
am grateful to the following for discussion
and comments on an earlier version of this paper: Hugh Fkrrington, David George, Tim
Gray,
Jane Heal, John Horton, Peter Jones, and Hugh Mellor.
1
J.
Plamenatz,
Consent, Freedom and Political Obligation
(London, Oxford University Press,
1968).
Second edition.
Politicd Studies.
Vol.
XXVI,
No.
1
(65-77).
Plamenatz,
Consent, Freedom and Political Obligation,
p.
4.
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