Conspiracy theories and reasonable pluralism
| Author | Pavol Hardoš,Matej Cíbik |
| Published date | 01 July 2022 |
| DOI | 10.1177/1474885119899232 |
| Date | 01 July 2022 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Article EJPT
Conspiracy theories and
reasonable pluralism
Matej C
ıbik
University of Pardubice, Czech Republic
Pavol Hardo
s
Comenius University in Bratislava, Slovakia
Abstract
The popularity of conspiracy theories poses a clear challenge for contemporary liberal
democracies. Conspiracy theories undermine rational debate, spread dangerous false-
hoods and threaten social cohesion. However, any possible public policy response,
which would try to contain their spread, needs to respect the liberal commitment
to protect pluralism and free speech. A successful justification of such a policy must
therefore: 1) clearly identify the problematic class of conspiracy theories; and 2) clarify
the grounds on which the state is justified in acting against them. This article argues that
the prevailing epistemic approaches to conspiracy theorizing cannot fulfil these criteria.
Defining conspiracy theories by their flaws in reasoning, questionable coherence or
factual mistakes can neither sharply distinguish problematic conspiracy theories from
other, non-problematic worldviews nor justify state action. Thus, we propose to
understand conspiracy theories through their ethical unreasonableness. We hold that
containment of conspiracy theories is justifiable insofar as they undermine the liberal-
democratic ideals of mutual respect, freedom and equality. We then show that such
‘ethical’ criteria for conspiracy theories can be sufficiently robust and clear-cut so that
they can serve as a useful guide for public policy.
Keywords
Conspiracy theories, epistemology, freedom of speech, Nussbaum, Rawls
Corresponding authors:
Matej Cibik, University of Pardubice, Studentska
´95, 53210 Pardubice, Czech Republic.
Email: matej,cibik@upce.cz
Pavol Hardos, Comenius University in Bratislava, Mlynske
´luhy 4, 821 05 Bratislava, Slovakia
Email: pavol.hardos@fses.uniba.sk
European Journal of Political Theory
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DOI: 10.1177/1474885119899232
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2022, Vol. 21(3) 445–465
Conspiracy theories have a bad name, and rightly so. Studies have suggested a host
of unfortunate side-effects of certain types of conspiratorial thinking, such as the
rejection of scientific findings (Lewandowsky et al., 2013; Van der Linden, 2015),
lower participation in politics (Jolley and Douglas, 2014a) and unwillingness to
vaccinate (Jolley and Douglas, 2014b; Kata, 2010). Proponents of certain types of
conspiracy theories seem more likely to hold contradictory views, which threatens
rationality and logic (Wood et al., 2012), while morals are also at stake, since
people likely to endorse conspiracy theories do so because they themselves
would willingly participate in such conspiracies (Douglas and Sutton, 2011).
However, proposing a conspiracy theory does not necessarily amount to a log-
ical, epistemic or moral error as such a theory need not consist of unwarranted
beliefs and hoaxes. Conspiracies are not only a fact of historical record, they are
also a necessary result of social life in which people pursue different, often con-
flicting goals, or compete for the same rewards. Whenever two or more people
secretly act to advance their goals, they conspire, from the Latin for the ‘breathing
together’ of the whispering conspirators. Thus, to offer an explanation of an event
by positing that it results from a conspiracy of several individuals is ipso facto to
advance a conspiracy theory (see Basham, 2001; Coady, 2006, 2012; Dentith, 2014;
Jane and Fleming, 2014; Pigden, 2007).
‘Conspiring’ is usually understood to entail nefarious, illegal or morally dubious
purposes, which creates a need for secrecy.
1
But people ‘breathing together’doesnot
always imply a sinister attempt to change history. We often find conspiracies in both
bedrooms and boardrooms (adultery, hostile takeovers), as well as in everyday
political life – though the parties involved would baulk at describing their dealings
this way, mainly because of the negative connotations entailed by the word.
2
Thus, conspiracies occur quite regularly, and no theory advancing a conspiratorial
explanation of an event is automatically suspect. The assassination of the Archduke
Franz Ferdinand, the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact or the Watergate affair are just three
historical examples of conspiracies that were unquestionably real. Any explanation of
the events of 11 September 2001 has to work with a conspiracy of individuals – the
paranoid ‘inside job’ version as well as the clearly correct al-Qaeda account.
Still, it is conventional wisdom that conspiracy theories are to be discounted as
‘silly’, ‘paranoid’ or ‘dangerous’. It has even become part of regular political jargon
– always a dangerous sign – to dismiss any allegation of wrongdoing as mere
‘conspiracy theorizing’. The speaker alleges that whatever idea was advanced is
deeply suspect and too irrational to be seriously discussed. This, some critics note,
is quickly becoming a routine strategy of exclusion, ‘stripping the claimant of the
status of reasonable interlocutor’ (Husting and Orr, 2007).
3
Nonetheless, as Charles Pigden reminds us, there is nothing about conspiracy
theories as such that warrants this dismissal:
Some conspiracy theories are sensible and some are silly, but if they are silly this is not
because they are conspiracy theories but because they suffer from some specific defect
– for instance, that the conspiracies they postulate are impossible or far-fetched.
446 European Journal of Political Theory 21(3)
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