Conspiracy Thinking in Europe and America: A Comparative Study
| Author | Annemarie S Walter,Hugo Drochon |
| DOI | 10.1177/0032321720972616 |
| Published date | 01 May 2022 |
| Date | 01 May 2022 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
https://doi.org/10.1177/0032321720972616
Political Studies
2022, Vol. 70(2) 483 –501
© The Author(s) 2020
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/0032321720972616
journals.sagepub.com/home/psx
Conspiracy Thinking in Europe
and America: A Comparative
Study
Annemarie S Walter and Hugo Drochon
Abstract
What explains conspiracy thinking in Europe and America? This is the first and largest comparative
study of conspiracy thinking to date, presenting findings using a representative sample of 11,523
respondents in nine countries. First, it shows that the overall level of conspiracy thinking in Europe
is equal to or slightly lower than the United States, contradicting the notion that conspiracy
theories is an especially American phenomenon. Second, people more inclined to conspiracy
thinking position themselves towards the right of the political spectrum, engage in magical
thinking, feel distrust towards public officials and reject the political system. Finally, we find that
– surprisingly – the country context in which respondents reside has hardly any effect as predictor
of levels of conspiracy thinking or as a moderator of individual-level determinants. Heterogeneity
in conspiratorial thinking seems to be largely a function of individual traits.
Keywords
conspiracy theory, conspiracy thinking, misinformation, Europe, United States
Accepted: 8 October 2020
Introduction
From JFK to the X-Files to 9/11, and now with a president who famously launched his
political career with the ‘birther’ movement (Drochon, 2018), conspiracy theories are
often perceived to be an especially American affliction, and this alleged exceptionalism
has been reinforced by the field of cultural and American studies (Fenster, 2008; Knight,
2001, 2002; Melley, 2000). But Europeans, at least going back to the Protocols of the
Elders of Zion, have their own tradition. So, who is more likely to believe in conspiracy
theories?
With the current rise of fake news and misinformation, the study of conspiracy theo-
ries is gaining increased attention. And far from being an amusing peccadillo, belief in
conspiracy theories is linked to health risks, negative attitudes and prejudices towards
School of Politics and International Relations, University of Nottingham, Nottingham, UK
Corresponding author:
Annemarie S Walter, School of Politics and International Relations, University of Nottingham, University
Park, Nottingham NG7 2RA, UK.
Email: annemarie.walter@nottingham.ac.uk
972616PCX0010.1177/0032321720972616Political StudiesWalter and Drochon
research-article2020
Article
484 Political Studies 70(2)
groups in society, political radicalization, political violence, political disengagement and
diminishing support for public policies, such as measures against climate change and vac-
cination (Douglas et al., 2019; van Prooijen and Douglas, 2018). Following Smallpage
et al. (2020), we define a Conspiracy Theory as ‘a proposed explanation of events or
circumstances (past, present or future) which cites as the primary cause a conspiracy.
Conspiracy theories could be either true or false, and, in most circumstances, contradict
the proclamations of epistemological authorities’. Conspiracy Beliefs, therefore, are those
specific conspiracy theories that individuals will say are true. Finally, Conspiracy
Thinking, what is sometimes also referred to as ‘conspiracy ideation’ or ‘conspiracy men-
tality’, is a stable predisposition that drives individuals to see events as the product of a
conspiracy.
People are not equally prone to conspiracy thinking, so what explains people’s propen-
sity to conspiracy thinking? Most work on conspiracy beliefs examines a single context,
primarily the United States (Enders and Smallpage, 2018, for non-US single country
studies, see, for example, Hogg et al., 2017; Jasinskaja-Lahti and Jetten, 2019; Krouwel
et al., 2017; Mancosu et al., 2017; Siddiqui, 2020; Swami, 2012). However, even when
studies are conducted in different contexts, many are based on different concepts, opera-
tionalizations and analytical approaches, thereby making systematic comparison prob-
lematic (Nyhan and Zeitzoff, 2018 is the exception). The lack of comparative work raises
important questions: To what extent are findings context-specific, and how does context
affect people’s belief in conspiracy theories? To develop a general theory of conspiracy
thinking, we need work examining conspiracy belief in different contexts, not only to
verify the general applicability of findings but also to formulate and test theories on how
context characteristics interact with individuals’ characteristics affecting their conspiracy
thinking (Douglas et al., 2019; van Prooijen and Douglas, 2018).
In this article, we present the first cross-national representative sample survey of con-
spiracy beliefs across eight European countries (Sweden, France, Germany, Great Britain,
Portugal, Italy, Poland, and Hungary) and the United States, analysing data of 11,523
respondents collected by YouGov in August 2018. This study contributes to the field in
various ways. To begin, it is the first and largest integrated comparative study of con-
spiracy beliefs in the United States and Europe to date. Second, it assesses the ways in
which these beliefs are interconnected and consequently the structure of conspiracy belief
systems. Third, it tests for the first time the universality of individual-level predictors
explaining conspiracy thinking, thereby testing the external validity of findings of previ-
ous single country studies. Finally, it offers the first exploration of the importance of
country-level and cross-level predictors for explaining conspiracy thinking. Taken
together, these contributions are a fundamental step towards developing a broader theory
of conspiracy thinking.
We find that to explain people’s propensity to conspiracy thinking, we first have to
look at individual-level predictors as the effects of country-level and cross-level predic-
tors are surprisingly limited. As such, the propensity to conspiracy thinking almost
appears like an anthropological constant. This appears to replicate psychological work
that takes this view as its premise, but contradicts a basic ontological assumption of the
social sciences that people’s attitudes and behaviour are affected by the context that they
live in. We demonstrate people’s proneness to conspiracy thinking to be particularly con-
ditional on ideological position, magical thinking, trust in public figures and attitude
towards the political system. Moreover, contrary to both the popular view and the one
professed by American and cultural studies, we find that these eight European countries
To continue reading
Request your trial