Constitutionalising Equality in the European Union: Tolerance and Hierarchies

AuthorAnne Morris
Published date01 December 2005
Date01 December 2005
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1177/135822910500800203
International Journal
of
Discrimination and the Law, 2005, Vol.
8,
pp. 33-52
1358-2291/2005 $10
© 2005 A B Academic Publishers. Printed in Great Britain
CONSTITUTIONALISING EQUALITY IN THE EUROPEAN
UNION: TOLERANCE AND HIERARCHIES
ANNE MORRIS
University
of
Liverpool, UK
ABSTRACT
Equality was
amongst
the founding principles
of
the
European
Economic
Commu-
nity, based
on
the need for freedom
of
movement
and
fair competition
rather
than
on
adherence to ideals
of
social justice.
The
recent legislative developments which
have introduced laws prohibiting discrimination based
on
race, sexual orientation,
disability
and
religious belief represent
not
only the inclusion
of
many
more
groups
within the legislative matrix,
but
also a challenge
to
the traditional ideas
of
what
is
meant
by equality
and
to
institutional ways
of
addressing discrimination. This
article will consider
how
the very 'private' characteristics
of
belief
and
sexual
orientation
may
invite considerations
of
freedoms
and
rights within a rights
based discourse, albeit within the workplace.
It
will also
draw
attention
to
the
impending problems
of
multiple discrimination.
INTRODUCTION
The
Treaty
establishing
a
Constitution
for
Europe
(the
Constitution)
1
has
refocused
attention
on
the
problematic
nature
of
equality,
not
simply
in
the
sense
of
what
it
means
to
be
equal,
but
also
on
how
equality
is
to
be
achieved
in
such
a
diverse
community
as
the
expanded
European
Union,
operating
at
many
different
levels -
European,
national,
institutional
-
and
in
many
different
spheres
of
activity.
The
political
debates
surrounding
the
Constitution
have,
certainly
in
the
United
Kingdom,
concentrated
on
what
the
Constitu-
tion
is
not
setting
out
to
do
rather
than
on
what
it
might
achieve
(Goldsmith,
2004).
Particular
emphasis
has
been
laid
on
the
fact
that
the
competences
of
the
European
Union
will
not
be
extended.
In
the
UK
White
Paper
on
the
Treaty
Establishing
a
Constitution
for
Europe
(Cm
6309,
Sept
2004)
for
example
it
is
stated
that
'the
Constitution
is a
means
to
an
end,
not
an
end
in
itself'
(para.
12)
and
that
it
will
not
change
the
EU's
powers
on
human
rights
(para
13).
Those
competences
have
traditionally
been
market
based
and
the
protection
from
discrimination
available
to
individuals
has
been
concentrated
principally
on
the
labour
market.
2
Conversely,
the
34
European
Convention
on
Human
Rights
has
traditionally
had
a
tan-
gential
effect
on
the
individual,
as
opposed
to
collective,
rights
of
workers
within
employment
(Ewing,
1998).
Dismissal
on
grounds
of
political
affiliation
has
been
held
to
interfere
with
fundamental
rights
3
but
there
has
been
a
tendency
to
interpret
the
Convention
narrowly,
to
the
extent
that
it
has
been
held
that
a
worker
who
wishes
to
exercise a
particular
right,
for
example,
freedom
of
religion,
should
either
not
apply
for,
or
resign
from
any
occupation
which
restricts
it
(Stedman
v.
UK
(1997) 23
EHRR
CD
168).
Now
that
the
Charter
of
Fundamental
Rights
of
the
Union
is
included
as
part
of
the
Constitution,
the
question
arises
as
to
what
difference -