Contested Implementation: The Unilateral Influence of Member States on Peacebuilding Policy in Kosovo
Author | Steffen Eckhard,Hylke Dijkstra |
DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12455 |
Date | 01 August 2017 |
Published date | 01 August 2017 |
Contested Implementation: The Unilateral
Influence of Member States on Peacebuilding
Policy in Kosovo
Steffen Eckhard
LMU Munich
Hylke Dijkstra
Maastricht University
Abstract
International organizations play an important role in policy implementation. As member states do not necessarily resolve polit-
ical disagreements before delegating tasks, this article focuses on how individual member states seek to influence policy
implementation by international organizations. It argues that the institutional context in which delegation takes place affects
the opportunities for such unilateral influence. Particularly when the agent has considerable autonomy, implementation is
likely to be a contested process. The article presents evidence on the implementation of peacebuilding policy by three inter-
national organizations in Kosovo after independence in 2008. Despite the fact that the member states within the UN, OSCE
and EU fundamentally disagree on the legal status of Kosovo, the organizations have deployed substantial peacebuilding mis-
sions. The UN, OSCE and EU have, however, different institutional designs: implementing agents in the UN and OSCE have, by
default, more autonomy than those in the EU. We analogously observe variation in how and to what extent member states
exert unilateral influence during implementation of peacebuilding policy on the ground in Kosovo.
Policy Implications
•Policy implementation by international organizations can be as politically contested as the decision-making by member
states. Rather than avoiding the delegation of policy implementation, states should seek to balance between who gains
during decision-making and who gains during implementation.
•Strong states have a disproportionate amount of influence over policy implementation. Weaker states should focus on the
institutional constrains in which such unilateral influence plays out. This is an effective method of setting boundaries.
•The stricter collective control mechanisms in international organizations, the less likely individual member states exert
unwanted unilateral influence. States should, however, also recognize that strict collective control often comes at the
expense of the quality of policy implementation.
•The nitty-gritty institutional rules on staffing and budget allocation significantly affect how individual states can influence
policy implementation by international organizations. States should be aware that these politics of bureaucratic resourcing
can also undermine the quality of policy implementation.
Lobbying international organizations
International organizations play a key role in policy imple-
mentation. Member states often delegate resources –such
as staff or budget –for international organizations to
implement their agreements. By delegating implementa-
tion functions, member states run two risks. First, the
implementing agent may not implement the agreed policy
(Hawkins et al., 2006). Second, individual member states
may put unilateral pressure on the agent to influence
implementation at the expense of the other member
states (Sridhar and Woods, 2013; Stone, 2011; Urpelainen,
2012). Implementation by international organizations is
thus likely contested. We show in this article that the
autonomy agents have in the use of resources for imple-
mentation, affects how member states unilaterally influ-
ence implementation.
We analyse peacebuilding by three international organiza-
tions in Kosovo, which presents a unique empirical case to
study contested implementation. The member states of the
United Nations (UN), Organization for Security and Co-opera-
tion in Europe (OSCE) and European Union (EU) fundamen-
tally disagree on the status of Kosovo. As a result, they have
launched field missions in Kosovo (UNMIK; OMIK; EULEX)
with a ‘status neutral’mandate. This has moved the political
contestation on the status of Kosovo to the implementation
phase. Member states which recognize Kosovo –such as
France, UK and US –have tried to pressure these field
©2017 The Authors. Global Policy published by Durham University and John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Global Policy (2017) 8:Suppl.5 doi: 10.1111/1758-5899.12455
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use,
distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Global Policy Volume 8 . Supplement 5 . August 2017
102
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