Contesting the EU in times of crisis: The Front National and politics of Euroscepticism in France
| DOI | 10.1177/0263395718766787 |
| Author | Gilles Ivaldi |
| Date | 01 August 2018 |
| Published date | 01 August 2018 |
| Subject Matter | Special Issue Articles |
https://doi.org/10.1177/0263395718766787
Politics
2018, Vol. 38(3) 278 –294
© The Author(s) 2018
Reprints and permissions:
sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI: 10.1177/0263395718766787
journals.sagepub.com/home/pol
Contesting the EU in times
of crisis: The Front National
and politics of Euroscepticism
in France
Gilles Ivaldi
URMIS, CNRS-University of Nice Sophia Antipolis, France
Abstract
This article examines the performance and party system diffusion of Euroscepticism of the French
Front National (FN) during recent European crises. The article argues that Europe’s successive
crises since 2008 have been essentially ‘absorbed’ by the FN into its existing Eurosceptic
framework which is guided by its radical right-wing ideology. While allowing the FN to successfully
mobilize issues and grievances about the European Union (EU), Euroscepticism is, however,
significantly impeding its strategy of governmental credibility. The article identifies the main
political outcomes of these crises and finds differences in impact between the different EU crises
on party competition over Europe. These findings provide insight into the relationship between
the radical Right, Euroscepticism, and party competition. They also inform our current knowledge
of Euroscepticism in French politics, and changes that EU crises have triggered, according to party
system location and whether FN influence can be postulated.
Keywords
EU crises, Euroscepticism, Front National, populism, radical right
Received: 1st August 2017; Revised version received: 6th February 2018; Accepted: 18th February 2018
Introduction
In the past decade, the European Union (EU) has been hit by three crises –a financial
crisis, a refugee crisis, and the results of the 2016 UK referendum. These crises have cre-
ated a new context for party competition across EU member states. The crises have aug-
mented the level of politicization of European issues and increased voter pessimism with
the EU, thus creating a propitious context for Eurosceptic actors.
As advocates of national interests, Populist Radical Right (PRR) parties are often
found to be driving forces behind the contestation of European integration (Dolezal and
Hellström, 2016; Gómez-Reino and Llamazares, 2013). These parties share a common
Corresponding author:
Gilles Ivaldi, URMIS, CNRS-University of Nice Sophia Antipolis, Pôle Universitaire Saint-Jean d’Angely (SJA3),
Avenue des Diables Bleus, NICE Cedex 4, 06357 Nice, France.
Email: gilles.ivaldi@unice.fr
766787POL0010.1177/0263395718766787PoliticsIvaldi
research-article2018
Special Issue Article
Ivaldi 279
nativist and populist ideology, but they adopt varying anti-EU stances, however, and their
positions may also change over time (Mudde, 2007; Vasilopoulou, 2011). As suggested
by Pirro and Van Kessel (2017), PRR parties may respond to crises in different ways,
according to contextual incentives. Their electoral success may also affect mainstream
party positions differently over Europe (Meijers, 2017).
This article focuses on the Front National (FN) in France. The French case provides a
relevant case to the study of the PRR’s route towards politicization of the EU during cri-
ses and repercussions on its party system. The French FN is considered the prototype of
the PRR party in Western Europe (Mudde, 2007: 41). Since the mid-1990s, the FN has
also been a significant vehicle for Euroscepticism in French politics (Goodliffe, 2015;
Hainsworth et al., 2004). France has been hit, albeit to a varying degree, by each European
crisis and the FN has made significant electoral gains since 2008.
This article asks two main questions: first, how the successive EU crises have been
channelled by the FN into its Eurosceptic framework and may have affected its supply of
radical right-wing populist Euroscepticism, that is, the FN’s performance during crises
and, second, the impact this has produced on the other political actors and may have
affected the overall structure of party competition over Europe in France, that is, party
system diffusion. Based on an empirical analysis of the FN’s positions on the EU since
the early 2000s, this article argues, in contrast to Reungoat (2015), who sees a radicaliza-
tion of the FN, that EU crises have produced little change to the party’s core Eurosceptic
positions and frames, and that the FN has primarily adjusted its issue priorities to exploit
the opportunities produced by the crises.
A second set of questions in this article concerns the main party system outcomes that
these crises have produced, and the extent to which these outcomes may be seen as a
consequence of the influence of the FN. Successive EU crises have fuelled support for the
radical Right in France (Evans and Ivaldi, 2018; Goodliffe, 2015). As Meijers (2017)
demonstrates, a rise in electoral support for Eurosceptic challenger parties may have sig-
nificant effects on mainstream party positions. Mainstream parties in France may have
been incentivized to co-opt FN Eurosceptic strategies to enhance their electoral competi-
tiveness during crises, which in turn may have caused factionalism and internal division
(Taggart, 1998). Moreover, other peripheral parties may have recognized opportunities to
adjust/change their positions to exploit popular distrust of the EU.
This article is structured around four main sections. The first lays down the theoretical
foundations for the analysis of FN Euroscepticism and party competition during the EU
crises. The second provides justification for a French case study and the methodology.
The main outcomes of the EU crises are then examined across our two main dimensions,
that is, FN performance and party system diffusion. The findings are discussed in conclu-
sion. The case of the French FN suggests that PRR parties may channel European crises
into their nativist and populist ideology to mobilize a wide range of issues and grievances
about the EU. Euroscepticism may significantly impede those parties’ ability to achieve
governmental credibility, however, and therefore it may not be a viable long-term strategy
for PRR parties like the FN operating in a broadly pro-European context.
These findings also inform our current knowledge of Euroscepticism and the impact of
EU crises in French politics. This article suggests notable differences between the impacts
of the different crises on party competition over Europe, according to party system loca-
tion, and also to whether FN influence can be postulated. Essentially, this article identifies
three main political outcomes of the EU crises: the rise of new Eurosceptic alternatives,
To continue reading
Request your trial