Continuous recognition: A latent variable approach to measuring international sovereignty of self-determination movements
| DOI | 10.1177/0022343320960208 |
| Date | 01 November 2020 |
| Author | R Joseph Huddleston |
| Published date | 01 November 2020 |
| Subject Matter | Regular Article |
Continuous recognition: A latent variable
approach to measuring international
sovereignty of self-determination movements
R Joseph Huddleston
School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University
Abstract
How do self-determination groups move toward diplomatic recognition? Although recognition is the dominant
activity used to understand international sovereignty, it is perhaps the most costly decision states make towards these
groups. Third parties have many substantial interactions with aspiring states, building their sovereignty by other
important means. I argue that our understanding of international sovereignty can be improved by conceptualizing it
as a dynamic, continuous process, reflected in foreign policy decisions short of the legal recognition. I create a
Bayesian latent variable model of international sovereignty, using bilateral data on diplomatic exchange, IGO voting,
sanctions, military aid, and intervention in separatist conflicts. Complementing prior work on international sover-
eignty, my measure provides support for important theoretical expectations previously explored using only recog-
nition as a measure of sovereignty. I find that diplomatic recognition, extant violence, separatist victory, and sour
third-party–incumbent relations positively impact latent sovereignty of separatists, while concern for precedent
negatively impacts it.
Keywords
civil war, foreign policy, intervention, latent variable model, legitimacy, rebel diplomacy, secession, self-
determination, separatism, sovereignty
Reconsidering recognition
The United States government trains Kurdish soldiers
(Tomson, 2017), gives aid to the Kurdish military
(McCleary, 2017), consults the Kurdish government
(Cook, 2016), funds Kurdish non-military aid projects
(KRG, 2012), and hosts hundreds of meetings with
Kurdish officials every year (Huddleston, 2019). Many
other states interact with Kurdish authorities in the
same way. These actions advance and sustain the de facto
sovereignty of the Kurdish government over that terri-
tory, even while the same governments make no moves
to recognize it as a new member of the international state
system. States treat de facto and de jure sovereignty of
aspiring states as separate problems altogether. As they
bolster the aspiring state’s ability to fight and govern,
they may be building the case for that state’s ‘eligibility’
for recognition, but legal recognition is still a distinct
political calculation.
Scholars have striven to understand the problem of
state emergence at nearly every step of the process: the
origins of and formation of nationalist movements
(Gellner, 1983; Anderson, 1991); the justification of
separatist claims (Wellman, 2010; Buchanan, 1998;
Moore, 2010); the difficulties of weakening the existing
governments’ claims on a territory and establishing sup-
port for separation or secession (Kolstø, 2006; Jenne,
Saideman & Lowe, 2007; Roeder, 2007; Hale, 2008;
Siroky, 2009; Carment & James, 1995; Cunningham,
2014); and the complications of building a case for inter-
national sovereignty (Krasner, 1999; Fabry, 2010;
Coggins, 2014; Sterio, 2013; Buzard, Graham & Horne,
2017). And some have examined the circumstances under
which groups aspiring to statehood have managed to
Corresponding author:
joseph.huddleston@shu.edu
Journal of Peace Research
2020, Vol. 57(6) 789–800
ªThe Author(s) 2020
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/0022343320960208
journals.sagepub.com/home/jpr
To continue reading
Request your trial