Controlling Weapons in Turbulent Times

AuthorWilliam Hogg
DOI10.1177/002070200405900205
Published date01 June 2004
Date01 June 2004
Subject MatterArticle
WILLIAM
HOGG
Controlling
weapons
in
turbulent
times
Canada
and
the
future
of
the
Conventional
Armed
Forces
in
Europe
Treaty
INTRODUCTION
A
security
dilemma
problem
in
international
relations
refers
to a
sit-
uation
where
sovereign
states,
in
the
context
of
an
anarchic
interna-
tional system,
will
arm
themselves
for
fear
of
being
dominated
by
their
neighbours.'
Security
dilemmas
can
be
mitigated,
but
mitigation
can
lead
to
two
divergent
outcomes-peace
or
conflict.
A state
can
miti-
gate
the
security
dilemma
problem
by
balancing
the
armed
power
of
its
neighbours-levelling
the
distribution
of
power
among
states
by
building
up
conventional
armed
forces.
On
its
own,
balancing
can
have
both
positive
and
negative
effects
on
peace
and
stability
at
the
regional
and
international
level.
Unregulated, it
can
lead to
long
peri-
ods
of
peace-the
"long
peace"
in
Europe
in
the
19th
century and
the
William
Hogg
is
a
PhD
candidate
and
lecturer
in
international
relations
and
com-
parative
politics
at
McGill
University,
Montreal,
as
well
as
a
lecturer
at
Bishop
'
University.
The
author
would
like
to
thank
the
Canadian
Department
ofForeign
Affairs
and
International
Trade's
International
Security
Research
and
Outreach
Program
(ISROP)
for
their
funding
for
this
research
project;
T
V
Paul,
Hans-
Joachim
Schmidt andAgnes
Pust
for
their
support
and
advice;
and
two
anonymous
reviewersfrom
the
InternationalJournal
for
their
comments
on
the
draft.
i
Glenn
H.
Snyder,
"'Prisoner's
Dilemma'
and
'Chicken'
Models
in
International
Politics,"
International
Studies Quorterly
15,
no.
i
(March
1971):
66-103;
Robert
Jervis,
"Cooperation
under
the
Security
Dilemma," World
Politics
3o,
no.
2
Oanuary
1978):
167-214.
INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL
Spring
2004
William
Hogg
Cold
War
period
from
1945-1989
are
good
examples.
Unregulated
balancing
can
also
lead
to
devastating
regional
and international
con-
flict:
The
outbreak
of
the
First
and Second World
Wars
highlight
this
problem.
Unregulated
balancing
is
unpredictable, and
as
such unstable.'
A
security
dilemma
problem
can also be
mitigated
by
balancing
power
through
regulated
regional
and
international
cooperation,
espe-
cially
through
the
creation
of
arms
control
regimes.
Regulated balanc-
ing
should,
theoretically,
increase
chances
of
peace.
The
1990
Conventional
Armed
Forces
in
Europe Treaty
(CFE),
and
its
subse-
quent
modifications,
has
been
a successful
example
of
a
rules-based
balance
of
power
mitigating
significantly
the
security
dilemma
prob-
lem
in
Europe
after
the
Cold
War.
The
use
of
an
international
arms
control
regime (generally
understood
as
a
set
of
principles,
norms,
rules
and
decision making
procedures)
3
can
help
significantly
to
miti-
gate
the
security
dilemma problem
by
providing
both
an
institutional-
ized
forum
for
discussion
and
decision
making,
and
by
providing
rela-
tively
unbiased
information
to
the
participants,
removing
that
measure
of
uncertainty
and
unpredictability
that
traditionally
taints
relations
between
states. Taken
in
this
light,
the
CFE
has
played
an
important
role
in
ensuring
stability
in
Europe
after the
Cold
War,
acting
as
its
cornerstone.
The
CFE
as
a
'"ornerstone" ofEuropean
security
It
has
been
argued
that
the
institutionalization
of
arms
control
in
Europe
played
a
relatively
minor
role
in
ensuring
a
peaceful
transition,
and
the mitigation
of
the
security
dilemma,
in
Europe after
the
end
of
the
Cold
War.
Critics
highlight
more
important
issues
such
as
European
integration,
the
spread
of
liberal
democracy
and
capitalism
into
eastern
Europe,
or
the
evolution
and
enlargement
of
NATO
as
key
explanatory
variables.
Others
have
argued
that
the
CFE
was
only
one
of
many
contributing
factors
to
the
pace
of
disarmament
in
Europe
after
the
Cold
War.
4
The
CFE
is
certainly
not
the
sole
factor
contributing
to
2
For
a
historical
overview
of
the
effects
of
balancing
on
the
different
time
periods
mentioned,
see
Michael
Sheehan,
The
Balance
of
Power:
History
and
Theory
(New
York:
Routledge,
1996).
3
Stephen
Krasner,
International
Regimes
(Ithaca:
Cornell
University
Press,
1983).
4
Louis
A.
Delvoie,
"Trials,
Triumphs
and Tribulations:
The
Saga
of
Arms
Control,"
Canadian
MilitaryJournal
2,
no.
i
(Spring
2oo1):
33.
326 INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL
Spring200
4

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