Conway v Wade
| Jurisdiction | UK Non-devolved |
| Court | House of Lords |
| Year | 1909 |
| Date | 1909 |
Trade Union - Workman - Interference with Employment - Inducing Dismissal by Threats - “Trade Dispute” - “Contemplation or furtherance of a Trade Dispute” -
In an action for damages for inducing the plaintiff's employers to dismiss him, by threats that otherwise the union men would cease working, the defence was that the acts (if any) of the defendant were not actionable as provided by s. 3 of the Trade Disputes Act, 1906. The jury found that there was no trade dispute existing or contemplated by the men, and that the defendant's threats were uttered in order to compel the plaintiff to pay a union fine and to punish him for not paying it and to prevent him from getting or retaining employment, and they gave the plaintiff damages:—
Held, that there was as a matter of fact evidence to justify the findings of the jury.
Observations on the words “contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute” in s. 3 of the Trade Disputes Act, 1906.
THE facts material to this appeal are stated in the judgments in this House and in the report of the decisions below.
April 26, 27. Avory, K.C., and Joel (Drysdale Woodcock and G. Considine O'Gorman with them), for the appellant. The jury were entitled to express their opinion on the facts, and the verdict they found was warranted by the evidence and was certainly not perverse. A verdict can only be set aside if it is perverse or such as no reasonable man could have found. There is no allegation of misdirection or non-direction by the county court judge. The jury saw the witnesses and were entitled to act upon their own opinion and to disbelieve the defendant's evidence. He seems to have acted either from jealousy or vindictiveness, or from a desire to get the old fine paid. If he only wished to get the fine paid there was no dispute within the meaning of the Act. The word must mean a present dispute, but there was no dispute either present or past. The appellant had never refused to pay the fine, which in fact was never brought to his attention. It was not for the plaintiff to prove that there was no dispute; it was for the defendant to establish affirmatively that there was an existing dispute, and this was not done. The Court of Appeal were not entitled to go behind the findings of the jury. Sect. 3 of the Trade Disputes Act provides that an act done in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute shall not be actionable “only” on the ground that it induces to a breach of contract or is an interference with trade or certain rights of others. There may be other grounds. If, for example, one man assaulted another, the Act would have no application. The section cannot mean that a man may do anything he likes, if it is in connection with or in contemplation of any possible dispute in the future. It is not contested that by the common law the defendant's conduct was actionable. This is clear from Giblan v. National Amalgamated Labourers' Union of Great Britain and Ireland.F1 An Act which like that of 1906 restricts the common law right of action must be strictly and narrowly construed.
C. A. Russell, K.C., and Edward Shortt, for the respondent. The finding of the jury that there was no dispute is contrary to the evidence. The jury were no doubt at liberty to believe or disbelieve particular witnesses, but not to reject all the evidence and act on their own view of the case. The words of the Act are general and comprehensive. Any difference or dissension among the men in connection with their employment constitutes a “dispute” within the meaning of s. 3. The evidence shews that the men were unwilling to work with the appellant and would leave if he were allowed to stay on. The respondent had, it is true, no authority to act in the matter; but he was the men's mouthpiece to convey their views to Conway. Manifestly trouble was imminent, and the Act of 1906 excludes from the consideration of the Courts an act done “in contemplation …. of a trade dispute.” Such a case is within the scope of the statute.
Apart from the statute Wade was guilty of no actionable wrong towards Conway. The situation is precisely the same as that which existed in Allen v. Flood.F2 Men have a right to tell their employers that they will not be fellow servants with such or such a man. Motive, as several noble and learned Lords said in Allen v. FloodF2, is immaterial. Wade or Mullen may have been actuated by pure malice towards Conway. It makes no difference whether they were or not. There was no unlawful act; no threat or coercion or conspiracy. In both aspects, under the Act of 1906 and on the merits apart from the Act, the decision of the Court of Appeal was right.
Avory, K.C., in reply. It was not argued in the Court of Appeal that there were no threats or coercion. Threats are not necessary, if coercion is employed, to give a right of action. It is sufficient if there be an intention to injure: Giblan's Case, per Romer L.J.F3 Lord Macnaghten said in Quinn v. LeathemF4: “It is a violation of legal right to interfere with contractual relations recognized by law, if there be no sufficient justification for the interference.” Wade was a delegate of the union, and Baines treated his communication as an order that Conway should be got rid of.
The House took time for consideration.
July 27. LORD LOREBURN L.C. My Lords, in my opinion the order appealed from should be reversed. This action was tried before Judge O'Connor at South Shields. Your Lordships have not that learned judge's summing up before you, but no kind of objection was raised to it. A series of questions were put to the jury by desire of counsel on both sides, and duly answered, so that we have all the material facts either admitted or found.
If the jury are right, what happened was as follows. The plaintiff Conway was in employment under the firm of Read-head & Sons. The defendant Wade, in order to compel the plaintiff to pay a fine due to the trade union and to punish him for not paying it, procured Messrs. Read-head & Sons' foreman to dismiss him, by threats that unless they dismissed the plaintiff the union men in their service would leave off work, which was not true. The plaintiff had to quit his employment in consequence, and so suffered damage. So far I own that from the evidence, as it appears on paper, I am not sure I should have myself found all those things. But I am quite sure that the jury who heard the witnesses are better judges on such a subject than I can be. The defendant must be taken to have acted as a mischief-maker in order to injure the plaintiff from unworthy motives, accompanied by threats that he would cause Messrs. Readhead's men to come out, in a matter with which he had no concern; for it is admitted that, though district delegate of the union, he was acting without authority. The only defence really made to this action, beyond a denial of these facts, was the 3rd section of the Trade Disputes Act, 1906, and it was upon this ground alone that the Court of Appeal decided the case.
Manifestly it is essential to any defence under this section for the defendant to shew that the act complained of was done in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute. Otherwise the section cannot possibly apply. Now the jury in addition to their other findings have explicitly found that there was no trade dispute either existing or contemplated by the men, which has been properly taken to mean that the act complained of was not done in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute. Judge O'Connor was satisfied with this verdict, as was the Divisional Court. In the Court of Appeal, however, the learned judges found this fact the other way, and thereupon entered judgment for the defendant.
My Lords, knowing as I do how averse the Court of Appeal is to usurping the functions of a jury, I conclude that the learned judges were enabled to bring this case within this section by taking a different view of the section from that which I take. For the verdict of the jury seems, I believe to all your Lordships, a reasonable enough conclusion from the evidence, and one which it is our duty to support.
“Trade dispute” is a familiar phrase in earlier Acts of Parliament, and is defined in this Act. I do not know that the definition is of much assistance. If this section is to apply there must be a dispute, however the subject-matter of it be defined.
A mere personal quarrel or a grumbling or an agitation will not suffice. It must be something fairly definite and of real substance. If this be so, I am then so far from thinking it impossible to doubt there was a trade dispute that I actually think there was none, if, indeed, my opinion, founded on printed evidence, is worth much. The law, however, prefers the opinion of a jury, and the jury have in this...
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