Corporatism
| Date | 01 March 1984 |
| Published date | 01 March 1984 |
| Author | Colin Crouch |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-9248.1984.tb00170.x |
| Subject Matter | Article |
PoliticulStudies
(1984),
XXXII,
113-116
Corporatism
COLIN
CROUCH
London
School
of
Economics
Sometimes tails wag dogs to good effect. The need to operationalize corpora-
tism and develop methodologies for studying it produces in Lehmbruch and
Schmitter’s volume1 some advances that have eluded the literature directly pre-
occupied with theory. How does one give an account
of
the comparative
position of a number of countries on an institutional variable for which
no
direct data exist? It is a familiar problem in macro-comparative work, and the
normal solution is to seek indicators. In his excellent introduction, Gerhard
Lehmbruch points out what
a
minefield this is where corporatism is con-
cerned:
. . . .
there is no uniform institutional framework of corporatist participa-
tion
of
organised interests in policy formation. In particular, the ‘classical’
corporatist formula of quasi-parliamentary representation (the Economic
and Social Council) has not proved particularly effective-except in the
Netherlands. Consultative administration by advisory committees and
commissions appears to be widespread in all advanced industrial countries;
however, a comparative scaling
of
its relative importance is excluded at the
present stage
of
research. But one may doubt whether there exists
a
strong
corporatist policy formation, is
of
course always to be found, but that no
specific institutional framework leads with necessity to the emergence of
corporatism (pp.
23-4).
So
far as institutions are concerned, we are led to the rather trivial
conclusion that some institutionalization of organizational participation in
corporatist policy formation, is
of
course always to be found, but that no
specific institutional framework leads with necessity to the emergence of
corporatism (pp.
234).
Similarly dispiriting in their complications for the indicator hunter are the
functional equivalents of straightforward corporatist devices to which
Lehmbruch then turns his attention. But this is exciting and creative as well as
cautionary, for functional equivalents draw our attention to flexibilities that
take us beyond definitions
of
corporatism which specify particular
institutional configurations. For example, the clearest cases
of
liberal corporat-
ism within industrial relations are the Austrian and Scandinavian cases,
where highly centralized peak associations play a crucial direct role in bargain-
ing. In his paper in this volume, Wolfgang Streeck shows how West German
unions behave in a very similar way, despite the ostensibly elaborate pluralism
I
G.
Lehrnbruch and
P.
Schrnitter (eds),
Patterns
of
Corporatist Policy-Making
(London, Sage,
1982).
292pp.,f17.001SBNO80399832,5,f7.95pbk
ISBNO803998333.
0032-3217/84/01/0113-04/$03.00
1984
Political Studies
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