Correctional oversight bodies’ resources and protections across the European Union: Are their hands tied?
| Author | Mary Rogan,Eva Aizpurua |
| Published date | 01 July 2022 |
| Date | 01 July 2022 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/1748895820986966 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
https://doi.org/10.1177/1748895820986966
Criminology & Criminal Justice
2022, Vol. 22(3) 383 –403
© The Author(s) 2021
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DOI: 10.1177/1748895820986966
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Correctional oversight bodies’
resources and protections
across the European Union:
Are their hands tied?
Eva Aizpurua
The University of Dublin, Trinity College Dublin, Ireland
City, University of London, UK
Mary Rogan
The University of Dublin, Trinity College Dublin, Ireland
Abstract
Oversight bodies play a critical role in upholding human rights standards in prison. Several
international instruments require states to establish independent forms of prison oversight
and to give them the powers they need to conduct their work. Resources are central to the
effectiveness and independence of oversight bodies. Of equal importance is the ability of prison
oversight bodies to offer protections against reprisals for those who choose to speak to them
and for their own staff. In this article, we provide results from the first survey of prison oversight
bodies in the European Union and the United Kingdom, focusing on the resources and protections
which prison oversight bodies in these states have to enable them to conduct their work. Our
results suggest the need to strengthen the financial independence of prison oversight bodies, with
slightly less than half of the bodies having their own budget to monitor prisons. Bodies which had
their own budgets had a greater number of staff members and a greater variety of professional
backgrounds among their members, likely influencing their ability to fulfil their mandate. Our
results also point to the need to develop further protection mechanisms against reprisals for
those who speak with inspectors as well as for staff from prison oversight bodies.
Keywords
Human rights, independence, inspection, monitoring, prison, survey research
Corresponding author:
Eva Aizpurua, Trinity Research in Social Sciences (TRiSS), The University of Dublin, Trinity College Dublin,
6th Floor Sutherland Centre, Arts Building, Dublin 2, Ireland.
Email: Eva.Aizpurua@city.ac.uk
986966CRJ0010.1177/1748895820986966Criminology & Criminal JusticeAizpurua and Rogan
research-article2021
Article
384 Criminology & Criminal Justice 22(3)
Correctional oversight bodies play a critical role in upholding human rights standards in
places far from public view. Several international human rights instruments require con-
tracting states to put in place systems for the independent oversight of what happens in
places of detention. The United Nations’ (UN) Standard Minimum Rules for the
Treatment of Prisoners, known as the Mandela Rules, oblige contracting states to estab-
lish both internal, or governmental, forms of correctional inspection and external forms,
which are independent of the correctional authorities. Another UN instrument, the
Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture (OPCAT), represented a major step
forward in the independent oversight of places where people are deprived of their liberty.
OPCAT requires contracting states to establish domestic bodies, called National
Preventive Mechanisms (NPMs), with the remit and powers to visit places of detention,
with a view to preventing torture and other forms of inhuman and degrading treatment.
These two developments represent an increasingly global consensus on the need for
independent oversight of what happens in prisons.
While there is agreement at the level of international human rights law about the need
for independent oversight of prisons, implementation of these principles on the ground
remains variable. As of September 2020, 90 States Parties have ratified OPCAT, with an
additional 13 states having signed it.1 Within Europe, OPCAT has achieved a good
degree of coverage (Aizpurua and Rogan, 2020), with 24 of the 27 Member States of the
European Union (EU) having signed and ratified it.
While OPCAT entered into force in 2006, relatively little remains known about how
the bodies it established operate in practice. In this article, we provide results from the
first survey of prison oversight bodies in the EU and the United Kingdom, focusing on
the resources and protections which correctional oversight bodies in these states have to
conduct their work. Correctional oversight bodies can only be effective when they are
adequately resourced. Resources are central not only to the effectiveness of correctional
oversight bodies, allowing them to visit regularly, plan their own activities properly, and
recruit appropriate staff, but also to their independence. Having insufficient resources
and having to rely on government authorities to permit them to conduct their activities
compromise that independence formally and functionally. The UN Subcommittee for the
Prevention of Torture (SPT), a supranational body established under OPCAT, has repeat-
edly emphasised the necessity for adequate resources (SPT, 2010a, 2016a, 2016b). Of
equal importance is the ability of correctional oversight bodies to offer protections
against reprisals for those who choose to speak to them and for their own staff.
Correctional institutions are places filled with risk for vulnerable groups, particularly
those inmates and staff who decide to speak out about poor conditions, violations of
rights, ill-treatment or other injustices. Staff of oversight bodies may also be at risk. A
necessary condition for an effective oversight is, therefore, the ability of inspectors to
conduct their work without fearing threats or sanctions against them or the people who
talk to them (Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights (OHCHR), 2018). The
importance of this safeguard is emphasised by the fact that the SPT has created a specific
policy on the prevention of reprisals, which notes that reprisals put the principle of ‘do
no harm’ at risk in the implementation of oversight and also imperil the effectiveness of
monitoring given the chilling effect the threat of reprisals has on those who may other-
wise wish to cooperate with the oversight body (SPT, 2016c). The SPT’s guidance to
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