Corruption, Underdevelopment and the State

DOI10.1111/j.1467-9256.1984.tb00085.x
Published date01 April 1984
Date01 April 1984
AuthorRobin Theobald
Subject MatterArticle
Bentham, Thou Should'st
be
Living
at this
Hour
13
Burns,
J.H.
(1974),
'Bentham's Critique
of
Political Fallacies',
in
B.
Parekh,
ed.
Jeremy Bentham
-
Ten Critical Essays (London: Frank Cass).
-0-000-0-
CORRUPTION, UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND THE STATE
Robin Theobald
During the past
two
decades the phenomenon of corruption has attracted a
good
deal of attention from social scientists.
This
attention would
seem
to
be
bound
up
with
the emergence of African and Asian countries as independent nations in
the wake of World War
Two.
After a brief period of optimism in which a smooth
transition to modernity was envisaged,
the
descent
of
many former colonies into
instability, internecine conflict, military takeover and even civil war (often
accompanied by an orgy of looting of public resources) forced once-hopeful scholars
to
re-fashion
their
typologies. 'Modernising' or 'developing' societies were
now dubbed 'praetorian', 'soft','unsteady'
or
'broken-backed' states; or, more
unequivocally, as 'kleptocracies'
.
(See for example Huntington, 1968; Tinker,
1965; and Andreski, 1966.
)
Corruption, Tradition
und
Modern Bureaucracy
Generally speaking explanations of corruption, including those by political
scientists, have tended
to
be socio-cultural in character. That is
to
say corrup-
tion
is
understood mainly
in
terms
of
the
survival of traditional patterns of
behaviour: familism; tribalism, primordialism, clientelism, friendship and the
like. (For a review of the substantial literature on clientelism see especially
Roniger, 1981.)
Without
wanting to discount entirely their importance
I
do
not
feel that cataloguing cultural patterns in rapidly changing societies amounts to
an explanation of corruption and
its
allegedly high incidence
in
such societies.
I
want to
suggest
that a proper understanding
of
corruption requires an examina-
tion
of the political and economic changes that make possible the emergence
of
modern bureaucracy particularly its central feature
-
the
separation of public
from private interests.
down
with
the
question of the definition
of
corruption.
butions to
Heidenheimer,
ed., 1978.)
I
would, however, maintain that whatever
working definition
we
use,corruption always
in
some sense involves the private
appropriation of public resources.
of rational -legal bureaucracy, with its separation between office and incumbent
,
pervades our thinking about modern public bureaucracies.
Our
conception
of
the
corrupt official who misappropriates public resources is modeled on
its
obverse
the professional civi
1
servant who scrupulously separates official duties
from
private interests.
The
extent to which
the
latter exists
in
Europe, North America
or
elsewhere
is
not my concern here.
that not only is
this
notion
of
the
separation of public from private a relatively
recent historical phenomenon,
but,
in addition, that clearcut economic and
political reasons
underlie
this.
priation of bureaucratic resources, now regarded as deviant, was an entirely nor-
mal feature of European states until at least the eighteenth century.
I
would
suggest
that our understanding of corruption is likely
to
be
enhanced by
a brief consideration of the emergence of modern public administration
in
Europe
andthe political and economic conditions which made this possible.
order to provide a basis
for
comparison let
us
first
of all look at the essential
characteristics of pre-modern bureaucracies.
In this context it is
not
necessary that
I
become bogged
(For
this
see the contri-
Whether we admit it or
not
Weber's ideal type
My principle aim is
to
remind ourselves
We
should not forget that
the
private appro-
Accordingly
However
in

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