Counter-Mobilization against Child Marriage Reform in Africa
| DOI | 10.1177/0032321717742859 |
| Published date | 01 November 2018 |
| Author | Liv Tønnessen,Ragnhild Louise Muriaas,Vibeke Wang |
| Date | 01 November 2018 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
https://doi.org/10.1177/0032321717742859
Political Studies
2018, Vol. 66(4) 851 –868
© The Author(s) 2017
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DOI: 10.1177/0032321717742859
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Counter-Mobilization
against Child Marriage
Reform in Africa
Ragnhild Louise Muriaas1, Liv Tønnessen2
and Vibeke Wang2
Abstract
Legislating a minimum age of marriage at 18 has stirred counter-mobilization in some, but not all,
countries where religious or traditional institutions enjoy constitutional authority. To explore
differences between states regarding likelihood of counter-mobilization, we investigate two
cases in Africa. In Sudan, a government-led child marriage reform initiative has sparked counter-
mobilization by conservative religious actors, while a similar initiative in Zambia has not caused
visible counter-mobilization among traditional groups and has gained the support of many chiefs.
With the literature on doctrinal gender status issues as theoretical background, we argue that
the nature of law—codified versus living—is a factor in these distinct trajectories. We further
identify variations in two mechanisms, legal power structure (centralized vs decentralized) and
type of political battle (interpretation vs administration), that link nature of law to variation in the
likelihood of counter-mobilization.
Keywords
family law reform, counter-mobilization, Africa, child marriage, gender, issues
Accepted: 24 October 2017
Introduction
Some gender equality law reforms meet with more fervent resistance than others. Recent
scholarship on gender law reform emphasizes the importance of disaggregating gender
status issues to explain this variation. If a gender status issue “contradicts the explicit doc-
trine, codified tradition, or sacred discourse of the dominant religion or cultural group,” it
is more likely that religious or traditional organizations will counter-mobilize against the
reform (Htun and Weldon, 2010: 210, in press; see also Charrad, 2001; Tripp et al., 2009:
113–115). In this scholarship, family law—the body of rules governing matters of mar-
riage, divorce, custody, inheritance, and maintenance—is considered a doctrinal gender
1Det Samfunnsvitenskapelige Fakultet, Universitetet i Bergen, Bergen, Norway
2Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI), Bergen, Norway
Corresponding author:
Vibeke Wang, Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI), PO Box 6033, N-5892, Bergen, Norway.
Email: vibeke.wang@cmi.no
742859PSX0010.1177/0032321717742859Political StudiesMuriaas et al.
research-article2017
Article
852 Political Studies 66(4)
status issue. As child marriage legislation is part of family law, counter-mobilization
against measures to prohibit child marriage is expected (Wodon, 2015: 2). In both Sudan
and Zambia, the central government has led initiatives to legislate a minimum age of mar-
riage at 18.1 Yet, counter-mobilization has occurred only in Sudan, even though child mar-
riage is a doctrinal gender status issue in both countries. Why does counter-mobilization
arise in some cases of doctrinal reform but not in others?
In most studies, religious and traditional counter-mobilizing actors are conveniently
lumped together as forces inhibiting such reform (Charrad, 2001; Htun and Weldon,
2012; Tripp et al., 2009). We argue that scholars have overlooked one or a set of underly-
ing factors that influence religious and traditional actors. Based on our inductive study of
child marriage reform in cases where religion and tradition are politically institutional-
ized, we identify the nature of law—whether it is codified (written statutes, rules, and
regulations) or living (oral legal tradition)—as a feature that tends to promote either coun-
ter-mobilization or cooperation on the part of religious and traditional leaders. The dis-
tinction between a codified and a living system of family law is important because it leads
to variation in the legal power structure and, by extension, in the political battle over
changes to family law.
To clarify these mechanisms, we investigated the roles of conservative Islamists in
Sudan and hereditary chiefs in Zambia in response to activism on child marriage reform.
In Sudan, a government-led reform initiative has caused strong counter-mobilization
from religious groups, and in this context, we identify a centralized legal power structure
in which the political battle between political and religious elites is over the proper inter-
pretation of Sharia law. In Zambia, a similar government-led initiative has not caused any
visible counter-mobilization among traditional groups. The legal power structure in this
context appears clearly decentralized, and the political disputes center on administration
of the law rather than on its interpretation.
Both cases illustrate the political institutionalization of religious and traditional author-
ity (Htun and Weldon, 2015: 457). Religious and traditional institutions in Sudan and
Zambia, respectively, are granted authority through constitutional provisions, funding,
and the de facto practice of religious and customary law (Fox, 2008, 2013). In this article,
we define Sudan as a typical Muslim-majority state with codified religious family law.
Sudan’s 2005 Constitution, in article 5(1), requires nationally enacted legislation to have
Sharia as its source. We see Zambia as a typical traditional-majority state with a living
customary law. Traditional institutions and customary law are protected by the 1991
Constitution, as article 23(4c–4d) explicitly excludes customary law and family law from
the anti-discrimination clause set forth in article 23(1). Few studies have looked specifi-
cally at the policy process of legislating a minimum age of marriage at 18 (notable excep-
tions are the works by Prettitore (2015) and Scolaro et al. (2015)), and there is a dearth of
studies that consider how the constitutional role granted to religious and traditional insti-
tutions shapes the potential for counter-mobilization against child marriage reform.
Our analysis draws on field studies conducted in Sudan and Zambia. Sources of infor-
mation include official and legal documents, media statements, parliamentary debates,
campaign materials, and qualitative interviews. In Sudan, the authors started collecting
data in November 2006 in the wake of the 2005 peace agreement and new constitution.
We have conducted field visits every year since then and carried out interviews in
Khartoum with more than 100 key actors, including government representatives, mem-
bers of Parliament, women activists, United Nations agencies, international nongovern-
mental organizations (NGOs), political parties, journalists, religious scholars, and
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