Court of Appeal
| DOI | 10.1177/002201836803200103 |
| Published date | 01 January 1968 |
| Date | 01 January 1968 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
Court
of
Appeal
CARELESS
AND
DANGEROUS
DRIVING
R. v.
Scammell
THE appellant in this case was convicted of causing
death
by
dangerous driving, as a result
of
what
the
Court
later described as
"a
quite atrocious piece of driving" on his part, so
that
there could
be no room, on the evidence, for the defence
that
jury
might have
taken the view
that
he should have been prosecuted for careless
driving only. At the trial, the defendant's counsel
had
endeavoured
to induce the
jury
to find only careless driving,
but
the
Court
of
Appeal went
out
of its way to commend those trial judges who try
to stop
that
manner
of seeking to establish
that
the driving was not
dangerous
driving-for,
as the
Court
put
it,
"to
introduce the sub-
ject
of whether the driving could possibly be termed careless driving
rather
than
one
of
(sic)
dangerous driving is
bound
to produce
confusion with the
jury".
In
the instant case (1967 3 All E.R. 97; IW.L.R.
II
67), the
defendant appealed on the ground
that
the
jury
had
been mis-
directed by the learned trial
Judge's
statement
that
"counsel for the
(appellant) is wrong in saying
that
if
you thought this was only
careless driving it could not be dangerous".
The
jury
were instructed
that
they could say
that
"dangerous driving is careless driving which
puts people in
danger"
-followed
by the now generally cited words
in R. o. Evans (1963, I
Q.B.
412, 418).
They
were then further
instructed to ask themselves whether the driving was careless or
inattentive or in some other way
bad
driving; to "look at the results
and
say, was it dangerous in the circumstances.
Did
it
put
people in
danger?"
The
Court
of
Appeal held
that
the right tests
had
been
put
to the
jury,
for "careless driving
may
well be dangerous, though
all careless driving is
not
necessarily dangerous driving".
Of
counsel's
suggestion
that
if
the offence were one of careless driving
that
in
fact would exclude it from being an offence
of
dangerous driving,
the
Court
said bluntly:
"Nothing
could be further from the
truth".
It
may be surmised
that
judges on circuit will be alert to stop quest-
ions or argument from counsel tending to suggest to
the
jury
that
if
28
COURT
OF
APPEAL
29
only they could convince themselves
that
the defendant was guilty
of
careless driving they should find
him
not guilty of dangerous
driving.
ASSAULT:
CIVIL
AND
CRIMINAL
PROCEEDINGS
Lane
v.
Holloway
The
proceedings reported in 1967, 3 W.L.R. 1003
and
1967,
3All E.R.
129
were an appeal in civil proceedings arising
out
of
an
assault, for which the defendant
had
already been found guilty of
unlawful woundingin the magistrates' court. But the Court
of
Appeal
dealt with two questions
of
direct concern to the criminal lawyer.
In
the first place, it was argued that, in the civil action for damages,
what
had
taken place in the criminal court could not be given in
evidence in support of the claim for damages. Indeed, it has generally
been understood
that
Hollington
v.
Hetothom
(1943, IK.B. 587)
decides quite clearly
that
this is so. But in
Lane
u,
Holloway
(supra)
Lord
Denning
M.R.
said
that
he
had
doubted the decision in
that
case for a long time
and
hoped
that
it might soon be done away with.
In
the result, he held
that
that
case did not prevent the
Court
of
Appeal from being told
that
the magistrates
had
convicted the
defendant.
If
this dictum be followed, it may result in more care
being taken by defendants in the lower criminal courts. A motorist
for example,
may
at
present be tempted to let the criminal conse-
quences
of
apetty offence go by default,
rather
than
take the trouble
and
time
and
expense to set up an elaborate defence. If, however,
his conviction is to be given in evidence against him in subsequent
proceedings in which he is sued for damages for the injury or loss
caused by his petty offence, he may be well advised to defend himself
more vigorously in the lower criminal courts. Moreover,
if
evidence
of
what
happens in a magistrate's court is to be
of
importance in
determining liability for, possibly, very substantial sums by way of
damages, it might be argued
that
more attention will be required
in those courts
than
is, perhaps, sometimes given today to
what
seem to be "obvious" cases
of
motoring offences.
The
second
matter
of
importance to the criminal lawyer in
Lane
v.
Holloway
(supra)
is to be found in
Winn
L.J.'s pronouncements
upon
R. v.
Coney
(1882, 8 Q,.B.D. 534), a case decided by eleven
judges
and
regarded as leading authority in all later reports.
In
Lane
v.
Holloway,
a
man
of 23
had
struck a
man
of 64 a blow in the
eye with his fist, causing very severe injury. His defence was
that
the older
man
had
called his wife
"a
monkey-faced
tart",
had
chal-
lenged
him
to a fight
and
had
struck
him
in the shoulder. His counsel
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