Courting War over a Rubber Stamp
| DOI | 10.1177/002070200806300320 |
| Author | Daniel Macfarlane |
| Published date | 01 September 2008 |
| Date | 01 September 2008 |
| Subject Matter | Coming Attraction |
Daniel Macfarlane
Courting war over a
rubber stamp
Canada and the 1961 Berlin Wall crisis
The establishment of the Berlin Wall was one of the seminal moments of
the Cold War. Not only did the wall serve as the most powerful symbol of the
protracted conflict, but its erection was one of the few occasions in which a
“hot” war appeared imminent. Construction on the “Berliner Mauer” began
on 13 August 1961, marking the beginning of the indefinite period that has
become known as the Berlin Wall crisis. Although Berlin was technically
under the purview of the occupation powers, the other North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) countries had a vested interest in the status of Berlin
because of the strategic and symbolic significance of the divided city. Canada
was no exception, as was demonstrated by the active and leading role the
country played within the western alliance during the crisis, displaying a
commitment to Cold War collective security.
Daniel Macfarlane is a PhD student in the department of history at the University of Ot-
tawa. His dissertation explores the Diefenbaker government, Canadian foreign policy, and
Canadian-US relations during the early 1960s. The author gratefully acknowledges Serge
Durflinger for his guidance and the following people for reading drafts and assistance: Rob
Paul, Norman Hillmer, Bonnie Wagner, and Becky Macfarlane.
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| Daniel Macfarlane |
The Progressive Conservative government of John G. Diefenbaker set
forth its policy in two major public addresses—a speech on 1 September to
the Canadian Bar Association and in the opening statement to the fall session
of the house of commons on 7 September. It will be argued here that the
Canadian government arrived at a firm, balanced, and constructive response
to the crisis: a commitment to allied rights in Berlin and the resolve to use
force to defend them if necessary—including an increase in Canada’s mili-
tary capabilities—while exhibiting a willingness to negotiate and involve the
United Nations. Although this approach represented a blending of Diefen-
baker’s and the Department of External Affairs’ views—with the input of Es-
cott Reid, Canadian ambassador to West Germany—the final shape and tone
of the policy was ultimately determined by Diefenbaker.
This article will take the form of an intra-governmental decision-making
history, charting the evolution of Canadian policy from 13 August to 7 Sep-
tember 1961. This requires examining the discussions within and between
Diefenbaker’s cabinet and the Department of External Affairs (DEA). The
latter sought to chart a course emphasizing negotiations—what could be
termed a more conciliatory response—while Diefenbaker favoured a re-
sponse that underlined negotiations with an ability to respond militarily.
The relevant sources are therefore the files of the Department of External
Affairs, cabinet conclusions, and the Diefenbaker prime ministerial papers.
Unfortunately, the Diefenbaker prime ministerial papers (including the per-
sonal and confidential series) reveal virtually nothing about Diefenbaker’s
rationale or discussions within the prime minister’s office and the Progres-
sive Conservative government. The cabinet conclusions, however, do provide
some insight into the thought processes of the government, while the Exter-
nal Affairs papers reveal a great deal about that department’s opinions.
Diefenbaker’s memoirs have little to say about the Berlin crisis, which is
surprising given that it appears to be one of the highlights of his foreign pol-
icy record. The majority of secondary sources covering Canadian interna-
tional activities in 1961 either briefly mention the Berlin Wall crisis, or omit
it entirely. Basil Robinson served as the liaison between the PMO and Exter-
nal Affairs, and his study of Diefenbaker’s foreign policy, Diefenbaker’s
World: A Populist in Foreign Affairs, is the most revealing secondary source
concerning the 1961 crisis. It is virtually the only source that delves into the
evolution of the Canadian position to any extent. Peyton V. Lyon’s Canada in
World Affairs, 1961-1963 is also useful, occupying a unique position as a
quasi-primary source, since it was published in 1968, and the author inter-
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| Courting war over a rubber stamp |
viewed a number of individuals involved. Both Lyon and Robinson identify
the government’s response as a positive one, and this study shares their as-
sessment of the final policy. However, Lyon’s contribution does not ade-
quately explore the intra-governmental policy formulation process that took
place in August, while Robinson’s evaluation does not sufficiently credit
Diefenbaker’s role.
Knowlton Nash’s Kennedy and Diefenbaker: Fear and Loathing Across
the Undefended Border touches on the crisis over the course of several pages,
but largely in the context of the Canadian acquisition of nuclear weapons.
Other standard works on Diefenbaker, such as those from Denis Smith and
Peter Newman, have little to say on the matter—the same is generally true
of broader works on Canadian international relations in the Cold War era. By
omitting the Berlin crisis and over-emphasizing Diefenbaker’s handling of the
negotiations for nuclear warheads, the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, and his re-
lationship with the American president, John F. Kennedy, the historiography
has created a skewed view of Diefenbaker’s foreign policy. This article will sug-
gest that, using Diefenbaker’s management of the Berlin Wall crisis as a case
study, a reappraisal of a number of historiographical issues is necessary.
The history of divided Germany and Berlin between 1945 and 1961 is a
complex one, and will not be covered in detail here. While the western occu-
pation powers (United States, France, and Britain) had a direct stake in
Berlin, Canada’s commitment to the city was by virtue of its role in NATO,
although it did maintain a diplomatic mission in West Berlin. Canada had re-
fused to recognize the German Democratic Republic but had not officially
participated in the Berlin airlift. Canada’s role in the 1958-59 Berlin crisis
has received little academic attention, and only a brief overview will be pro-
vided here.
During the crisis, Diefenbaker was quite pessimistic about the potential
of negotiating or compromising, or at least was wary that such an approach
would come to be seen as representative of the Canadian position. Neverthe-
less, he still gave External Affairs latitude to float “lines of inquiry” infor-
mally. Norman Robertson contends that Diefenbaker was opposed to
conciliatory action and somewhat skeptical of the department’s emphasis on
flexibility due to a mixture of personal conviction, the belief that a genuine
accommodation with Khrushchev could not be achieved, domestic political
considerations, and his trust in the collective judgments of the leaders of the
major powers and their “hard-line” approach. At the same time, the Tory
leader was concerned that if the United States appeared too aggressive, it
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| Daniel Macfarlane |
might lead Moscow to conclude that the west was contemplating large-scale
military action. During this time the prime minister of Britain, Harold
Macmillan, proposed the idea of a UN settlement that caught Diefenbaker’s
interest. This would be one of the issues that would resurface in 1961; the di-
chotomy between negotiation and firmness would be central, as would the
differing perspectives between Diefenbaker and Robertson.
As was the case in the other western countries, Canada was caught un-
awares by the events of 13 August, although an examination of External Af-
fairs records reveal that the department was indeed preoccupied with the
Berlin situation in the summer of 1961 and had been drafting contingency
plans and background papers. During the preceding summer months,
Diefenbaker “was treating Berlin as a staple in the political dialogue” and
was fascinated by Khrushchev and Berlin, frequently referring to the latter
in speeches.1 Concern over Berlin had also led the Tory cabinet to decide in
July that Canada needed to demonstrate its solidarity as a member of the
western alliance. However, Robinson recollects that Diefenbaker’s state-
ments were
not enough, although it was necessary to show firmness and unity;
it was Canada’s role to caution against bluster and to think of ways
in which negotiated settlements could be reached without showing
weakness. I suppose, in retrospect, that in External Affairs we were
still not weaned from the Pearson method and outlook. One could
equally say that the department had not fully adjusted itself to the re-
alities of serving a prime minister whose priorities were so differ-
ent—so much, as it were, closer to home.2
Robinson’s statement about the department’s penchant for the “Pearson
method and outlook”—Lester B. Pearson had been minister of External Af-
fairs in the Liberal Louis St. Laurent government—are particularly revealing,
as is Diefenbaker’s apparent preoccupation with domestic implications, and
both of these themes will be further discussed.
Kennedy’s 25 July address had contained much of which Diefenbaker ap-
proved, and on 14 August the prime minister gave a speech stressing western
1 H. Basil Robinson, Diefenbaker’s World: A Populist in Foreign Affairs (Toronto: Uni-
versity of Toronto Press, 1989), 220.
2 Ibid., 220-221.
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