Courts of Summary Jurisdiction
| Date | 01 January 1950 |
| DOI | 10.1177/002201835001400101 |
| Published date | 01 January 1950 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
The
Journal
of
Criminal
Law
VOL.
XIV.
No.
1.
JANUARy-MARCH,
1950.
Courts of Summary Jurisdiction
DISABLED PERSONS (EMPLOYMENT) ACT 1944
ACASE under
the
above Act which
the
prosecution des-
cribed as
the
first of its kind in
the
countrycamebefore
the
Walsall Justices on
the
14th November, 1949, when
two
partners
in a local firm were summoned for
that
they
"being persons for
the
time being having in their employ-
ment
persons to
the
number of
not
less
than
twenty
did
on or
about
the
3rd
June
1949
take
into their employment
aperson
not
registered as handicapped
by
disablement
whereby
the
number of persons so registered
and
then
in
their employment was less
than
the
number
that
was
their
quota
as ascertained in accordance
with
section 10 of
the
Disabled Persons (Employment) Act 1944,
contrary
to
sec-
tion 9
(2)
of
that
Act".
Both
defendants pleaded guilty.
By section 9
(1)
of
the
Act
it
is
the
duty
of a person
who has asubstantial number of employees to give employ-
ment
to persons registered as handicapped
by
disablement
to
the
number
that
is his
quota
as ascertained in accord-
ance with section 10,
and
this
duty
is enforceable against
aperson who has (or in accordance with his normal practice
and
apart
from transitory circumstances would have)
not
less
than
20 persons in his employ.
If
an
employer takes or offers to
take
into his employ-
ment
apersonwho is
not
registered as disabled in
the
records
of
the
Ministry of Labour,
and
by
so doing
the
percentage
of registered disabled persons
then
in his employ falls
below
that
specified
by
order made
by
the
Minister of
Labour
and
National Insurance, he is guilty of
an
offence
1
2
THE
JOURNAL
OF
CRIMINAL LAW
under
section 9
(2)
under which
the
present proceedings
were brought.
But
this section is
not
to apply to a person
taking
or offering to
take
into his employment aperson
whom
it
would otherwise
have
been his
duty
to
take
into
his employment
at
that
time
by
virtue
of an agreement
made before
the
1st
June
1945 (when section 9
(2)
was
brought
into force
by
regulation) or
by
virtue
of another
Act,
e.g.
the
Re-instatement in Civil Employment Act 1944.
Moreover
the
Minister is authorised to
grant
permits to
employers to enable
them
to
take
unregistered persons
into their employment beyond
the
numbers specified.
The
quota
of registered disabled persons which
an
employer
must
have
in his employ is ascertained
by
refer-
ence
to
the
"standard
percentage" or "special percentage"
according to
the
type
of employment,
and
in
the
present
case
the
standard
percentage of 3
per
cent. applied as
fixed
by
the
Disabled Persons (Standard Percentage)
Order 1946 (S.R. &O. 1946, No. 1258).
If
the
number so
ascertained includes or consists of a fraction less
than
one
half,
the
fraction is to be disregarded,
but
if
it
includes or
consists of a half or more
the
quota
shall be to
the
nearest
higher whole number (section 10).
The
facts of
the
present case were
that
the
company
employed a
total
of 27 people
at
the
beginning of
June,
1949, when aperson who was
not
registered as a disabled
person was
taken
into employment. None of
the
28 people
then
employed was registered as disabled although
the
quota
of registered disabled persons which
the
firm should
have
had
in their employ was one, i.e., 3
per
cent. of 28 to
the
nearest whole number.
The
prosecuting solicitor said
that
an enquiry
by
aMinistry of Labour official revealed
these facts
and
the
attention
of
the
firm was drawn to them.
One
partner
said
that
he
thought
it
was sufficient if a dis-
abled
man
was employed
by
him,
and
as
the
firm did in
fact employ one disabled
man
who was
not
registered, he
thought
he was complying with
the
Act.
It
was pointed
out
to him
that
the
quota
applied to registered disabled
persons only,
and
application forms were sent to
the
firm
for
the
man
to be registered. After several warnings these
were still
not
returned to
the
Ministry
and
an information
was laid on
the
28th
October 1949 in respect of
the
present
proceedings. Since
the
prosecution
had
commenced, how-
COURTS
OF
SUMMARY
JURISDICTION
3
ever,
the
necessary forms
had
been completed
and
a
man
employed
by
the
firm was now registered as a disabled
person, so
that
at
the
date
of
the
hearing
the
company were
complying
with
the
Act.
For
the
defence one of
the
partners
told
the
Justices
that
the
firm
had
actually
had
three
disabled men in their
employ
at
different times,
but
none of
them
was registered
at
the
time
the
Ministry made
their
several enquiries. One
man
whom he
had
sent
to be registered refused to fill in
the
forms, saying he did
not
wish
to
be
set
down as
an
"old
crock",
and
there
was also some delay before
the
one
who was employed
at
the
time
of
the
enquiries
had
his
application form completed.
"I
feel I
have
been let down
by
the
employees", he said.
Each
defendant was fined £10
and
in announcing
the
decision of
the
Court
the
presiding magistrate said he hoped
the
case would draw
the
attention
of
other
employers
to
their responsibilities
under
the
Act.
ADULTERY-UNCORROBORATED
EVIDENCE
OF'
ACCOMPLICE'
. Since
the
commencement of matrimonial jurisdiction
in
summary
courts
the
laws of evidence relating to adultery,
although complex,
have
had
to
be carefully followed.
Adultery has always been a
bar
to
the
obtaining of a separ-
ation
or maintenance order
by
amarried woman providing
it
has
not
been condoned, connived
at
or conduced to
by
the
husband.
It
has also been aground for
the
discharge
of an existing order.
Further
by
the
Matrimonial Causes
Act, 1937, s. 11, adultery has been added as a ground for
an application
both
by
wife
and
husband
for an order.
Applications involving adultery are
not
infrequent in
courts of
summary
jurisdiction,
but
comparatively few are
successful. Such applications are made on
the
most
scanty
evidence
and
the
high
standard
of proof required
is
not
realised. Of course from
its
nature
adultery
is
secretive so
that
proof is nearly always circumstantial.
Inference is deduced from
the
existence of a guilty affection
coupled
with
opportunity. There are cases, however, when
direct evidence is tendered
but
acceptance is a
matter
of
particular caution. Confessions are admissible,
but
because
of
the
possibility of connivance on
the
part
of a spouse who
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