Courts of Summary Jurisdiction

DOI10.1177/002201835301700101
Published date01 January 1953
Date01 January 1953
Subject MatterArticle
The
Journal of Criminal Law
voi,
XVII.
No.1.
JANUARy-MARCH,
1953
Courts of Summary Jurisdiction
AWARDING COSTS AGAINST
THE
FREQUENTERS
OF
BETTING-HOUSES
The case of Murphy v. Arrow
(1897,
62
J.P.
38) upheld
the
long established practice
that
a person who was found
on premises entered
by
the
Police upon a search warrant
issued under
the
Betting Act, 1853, s. 11, could be brought
before a justice
and-unless
he could satisfy
the
justice
that
he was there for an innocent
purpose-required
to
enter into a recognizance
"no
more to play, haunt, or
exercise from thenceforth
at
any gamingho use" pursuant
to
the
Unlawful Games Act, 1542.
It
perhaps hardly
needed
the
case of Roden v. Brett
(1936,
100
J.P.
296) to
establish
that
where such a person in fact proved to
the
court
that
he was on
the
premises for an innocent purpose
only,
the
court has no power to require him
to
enter into
such a recognizance.
In
recent years, however,
the
diffi-
culty of enforcing a recognizance entered into under
the
Unlawful Games
Act-which
can only be enforced under
the
cumbersome procedure laid down in
the
Levy of Fines
Act,
1822-has
led courts to adopt
the
practice of binding
over such frequenters under
the
Justices of
the
Peace Act,
1360
"to
be of good behaviour". The advantage of this
practice is
that,
if
the
power given
by
the
Justices of
the
Peace Act is wide enough to enable courts to bind over
frequenters of gaming houses to be of good
behaviour-
and
this has not so far been
challenged-then
if aperson
who has been bound over is subsequently found in a betting
house, his conduct will amount to a breach of
the
condition
to be of good behaviour, and accordingly
the
recognizance
1
2
THE
JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW
maybe estreatedunder
the
provisions of s. 9 of
the
Summary
Jurisdiction Act, 1879.
In
arecent case a number of frequenters of a betting
house which
had
been entered
by
the
Police were brought
before Mr. R. Thomas, sitting
at
Marlborough Street Court,
and
anumber of
them
disputed
that
they
were there for
the
purpose of betting. At
the
end of several protracted
hearings
at
which many witnesses were called,
and
the
services of an interpreter required,
the
magistrate found
that
the
frequenters
had
been on
the
premises for
the
purpose
of betting,
and
the
question arose whether he could order
them
to
pay
costs in addition to binding
them
over.
It
would seem
at
first
that
s. 18 of
the
Summary
Jurisdiction Act, 1848, which provides
that
"In
all cases of
orders made
by
ajustice
....
it
shall be lawful for
the
justice
....
to award and order in
and
by
such order
that
the
defendant shall
pay
to
the
complainant such costs as
to
the
justice
....
seem
just
and reasonable in
that
behalf
....
"provides ample justification for
an
order
for costs,
but
it
was argued
that
this power of ordering
costs arose only when
the
justices are dealing with a com-
plaint made under s. 1 of
the
Summary Jurisdiction Act
1848 on which a summons has been issued
to
the
defendant.
In
this case
the
defendants
had
been brought before
the
court
not
in accordance with the provisions of s. 1 of
the
Summary Jurisdiction Act,
but
under
the
provisions of
the
Betting Act, 1853, which Act provided
its
own code of
procedure.
It
was pointed
out
that
s. 25 of
the
Summary
Jurisdiction Act, 1879
had
made provision for awarding
costs where
the
court adjudged adefendant to be of good
behaviour towards
the
person laying
the
complaint,
and
this special provision emphasised
the
fact
that
there was no
general power
to
award costs when
the
court made an order
binding aperson over to be of good behaviour under
the
Justices of
the
Peace Act.
If
the
court
had
decided to bind
the
defendants over under
the
Unlawful Games Act,
the
position,
it
was argued, would have been
the
same, since
that
Act, too, contained no special provision concerning
costs.
By way of rebuttal
it
was urged
that
although
the
defendants were before
the
court
by
virtue of process issued
under
the
Betting Act 1853,
and
not as a result of process

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