Courts of Summary Jurisdiction
| Published date | 01 October 1946 |
| Date | 01 October 1946 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/002201834601000402 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
Courts of Summary Jurisdiction
A
CONSTABLE'S
DUTY
Police u. Beryl Sawyer
INprosecutions for assaulting
and
for obstructing
the
police (Prevention of Crimes Act, 1871, s. 12
and
Prevention of Crimes
Amendment
Act, 1885, s. 2)
it
is
necessary to show
that
at
the
time
of
the
alleged incident
the
constable was acting in
the
execution of his
duty.
A
perusal of some of
the
judgments in
High
Court decisions
illustrates
that
it
is
not
always easy to determine precisely
how
far
this
duty
extends. Thus, in Great Central Railway
Co. v. Bates,
(1921)
3
K.B.
578, a police constable, noticing
awarehouse door open
after
dark, entered on his own
initiative to see
if
everything was all right (and sustained
injury
in so doing),
but
he was held
not
to be acting in
the
execution of his duty. Again, in Davis v. Lisle (1936)
2
K.B.
434, which was an appeal by case
stated
from
the
County of London Sessions,
it
was held
that
two police
officers were
not
acting in
the
execution of
theirduty
when
after
being requested
to
leave
they
remained in a garage
which
they
had
entered
without
a
warrant
for
the
purpose
of pursuing enquiries
about
a
street
obstruction. Arrests
for obstructing
the
Police arise
most
often
out
of conduct
with
which
the
courts
have
long been familiar as, for
example,
the
activities of
the
street
bookmaker's 'look-out'
man, or where someone tries
to
prevent
amiscreant's
march
to
the
police station. Asomewhat unusual case was
tried
at
Clerkenwell Magistrates' Court recently, when
Beryl Sawyer was unsuccessfully prosecuted for obstructing
apolice officer in
the
execution of his
duty.
The
evidence was
that
two Board of
Trade
inspectors
held a
warrant
under
the
Defence Regulations empowering
them
to inspect premises where
the
manufacture of con-
trolled articles was being carried out. Accompanied
at
242
COURTS
OF
SUMMARY
JURISDICTION
243
their
request
by
a police officer (not in uniform)
they
went
to premises in Caledonian Road, information
about
which
they
had
obtained a
short
time
previously when calling
at
an
address in
Roman
Way.
In
particular,
the
police
officer was anxious
to
interview two
men
about
stolen
property.
The
inspectors produced
their
warrant
to
a
man
who appeared to be in charge,
and
the
three were
admitted
to
the
premises.
The
officer asked all
the
employees
(who, including
the
defendant, were engaged in
the
manu-
facture of divans) to come to
the
ground floor for question-
ing.
At
this,
the
defendant disappeared
and
was dis-
covered
later
hiding in
the
adjoining building. She
returned with
the
officer, who explained
that
he was there
with two Board of
Trade
officials who
had
entered
by
means of a
warrant
and
that
he wanted to see two men
about
certain property found
at
the
Roman
Way
address.
After refusing to give her name she
said:
"You
are
not
going
to
fix anything on
D--;
you've no right here,
get
out"
. She became excited, tried
to
prevent
the
officer
from moving
about
the
premises
and
was finally arrested.
The
defendant denied causing
any
obstruction
and
said
that
she
had
refused her name because she
thought
that
there was something 'fishy'
about
the
premises.
The
solicitor for
the
prosecution contended
that
Davis
v. Lisle, supra, did
not
apply
inasmuch as
the
officer was
on
the
premises
at
the
invitation of someone in authority,
and, further,
that
the
defendant
had
no right
to
order
him out.
Mr. W. Blake Odgers, K.C., giving his decision,
observed
that
no evidence
had
been
put
before him
that
the
man
who
admitted
the
inspectors
and
the
police officer
was a person in
authority:
it
mightbe
somebody who
had
nothing to do with
the
premises.
The
learned magistrate
went on to say
that
he
very
much doubted whether
they
were invited
into
the
premises in
the
sense
that
the
invitation conferred
any
special privilege on
the
police
officer.
The
Board of
Trade
inspectors entered
by
virtue
of powers derived from
the
Defence Regulations,
but
so far
as
the
police officer was concerned
the
defendant might be
right
in saying to
him:
"You
have no right here"•Taking
that
view, Mr. Blake Odgers said
that
it
was
not
necessary
for him
to
decide
the
question of fact whether
the
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