Credibility and Reputation in Peacemaking
| DOI | 10.1177/0022343302039004007 |
| Date | 01 July 2002 |
| Author | S. MANSOOB MURSHED,TONY ADDISON |
| Published date | 01 July 2002 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
487
Introduction
The theoretical modelling literature on civil
wars as a failure of commitment to peaceful
behaviour is characterized by its paucity. Of
the few studies that exist, Azam (1995, 2000)
has a number of models regarding the imper-
fect credibility of transfers made by a ruling
group to potential armed rebels. Fearon
(2001) also characterizes ongoing civil war as
commitment failure due to the presence of
random shocks that might make the remote
possibility of outright military victory a more
attractive option to compromise and peace.
But there is no explicit analysis of post-
conflict peace agreements and why they tend
to break down. Why do so many peace agree-
ments fail? The model in this article analyses
the credibility of peace agreements in post-
conflict situations in the immediate after-
math of civil war, where there is a danger of
conflict breaking out again. It is not about
© 2002 Journal of Peace Research,
vol. 39, no. 4, 2002, pp. 487–501
Sage Publications (London, Thousand Oaks,
CA and New Delhi)
[0022-3433(200207)39:4; 487–501; 025825]
Credibility and Reputation in Peacemaking*
TONY ADDISON
World Institute for Development Economics Research (WIDER), United
Nations University
S. MANSOOB MURSHED
Institute of Social Studies, The Hague
This article analyses credibility and reputation in the context of peace negotiations. The model is appli-
cable to the credibility of peace agreements in post-conflict situations in the immediate aftermath of
civil war, where there is a danger of conflict breaking out again. The analysis is motivated by the empiri-
cal regularity with which peace agreements break down in the context of civil war, as for example in
Angola, Sierra Leone and many of the conflicts in the Caucasus region. Where war provides economic
gains to one side, peace is not incentive compatible, and peace agreements will necessarily degenerate,
as they become time inconsistent. The party that has something to gain from surprise warfare, agree-
ing to peace but reneging on it, will do so and return to war. The levels of conflict chosen by this group
are an increasing function of greed and capturable rents, but decreasing in the direct costs of war. In
this context, action by external powers could lower the risk of civil war reigniting. Basically, these
involve a greater commitment to peace, induced by policies known as commitment technologies. Sanc-
tions, aid and direct intervention, if effective, could eliminate conflict, as well as help in devising com-
mitment technologies to peace. In a multiple-time framework, uncertainty about the type of the group
that may renege on peace generates extra costs in terms of greater fighting, and the key role of the dis-
count rate in trading off present versus future consumption enters the analysis. High discount rates and
the impatience to consume at present engender greater conflict.
*Email addresses of authors: Addison@wider.unu.edu,
Murshed@iss.nl. We are grateful to Alex Cukierman, Ingrid
Eide, Scott Gates, Nils Petter Gleditsch, Leif Helland,
Halvor Mehlum, Kalle Moene, Prasanta Pattanaik;
especially Burkhard Schipper and Stergios Skaperdas; and
to the anonymous referees of this journal, for helpful com-
ments and discussions. The usual disclaimer applies.
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