Criminal Intention– A New Definition?
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2230.1985.tb00874.x |
| Date | 01 November 1985 |
| Published date | 01 November 1985 |
Nov.
19851
NOTES
OF
CASES
717
relations, which would assume that a non-contractual licence is not
a legal relation
-
as Lord Templeman does throughout. Such an
assumption is quite unnecessary, may do damage to the future
development of the law of licences, and is at odds with rigorous
analyses
of
legal relations like H0hfe1d’s.l~ It is to be hoped that
this theme in Street v. Mountford may simply be regarded as an
aberration.
l5
STUART ANDERSON*
CRIMINAL
INTENTION
-
A NEW DEFINITION?
AMIDST the controversy surrounding the redefinition of the word
“reckless” started in CaZdweZZ’ little has been said. about the
meaning of one of the other words hitherto often discussed which
relates to mew rea in criminal cases. Now, however, in the recent
case of MoZoney2 the House of Lords have grappled with the
confusion surrounding the meaning of the word “intention.” The
purpose of this note is to consider the changes in the law brought
about by the decision and to show that the concept of intention has
been significantly redefined.
It has been
10
years since the House of Lords directed their
minds to the problem of Mrs. Hyam’s case.3 The facts are now well
known.
D.
was jealous of Mrs. Booth
(P.)
because she believed
that
P.
was about to marry Mr. Jones,
D.’s
former lover.
D.,
therefore, set fire to
P.’s
house while
P.
and her three children
were sleeping.
D.
was subsequently charged with the murder
of
the
two children who died in the blaze, but pleaded not guilty on the
ground that she had only intended to frighten
P.
and did not, as a
result, have the mem rea of murder, namely malice aforethought.
D. was convicted, but appealed against the direction given to the
jury by Ackner
J.
on the question of intent. The learned judge had
stated that the necessary intent was established if the jury was
satisfied that when the accused set fire to the house she knew it
was highly probable that this would cause (death or) serious bodily
harm.
The case came before the House of Lords in the form of a
certified question:
“Is
malice aforethought in the crime of murder
established by proof beyond reasonable doubt that when doing the
act which led to the death of another the accused knew that it was
Hohfeld, (1917) 27 Yale
L.J.
66,
92-100; C.
E.
Clark,
Real Covenants and Urher
Interests “Running
with
Land,”
2nd ed. (1947), ch.11; and compare I11
Powell on Real
Pro erty
p.34-294.
0689;
also
para. 1-0674 illustrating that, contrary to Lord Templeman’s apparent
assumption, the relationships of landlord and tenant and vendor and purchaser are not
always mutually exclusive.
’
P
See,
e.g.,
Woodfall,
Landlord and Tenant,
Vol.
I,
paras. 1-0679 and, especially,
1-
*
Fellow of Hertford College, Oxford.
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