Criminal Justice Act 2003: Hearsay; Implied Assertions
| Author | Ben Fitzpatrick |
| Published date | 01 October 2006 |
| Date | 01 October 2006 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1350/jcla.2006.70.5.398 |
| Subject Matter | Court of Appeal |
restrictive approach to what counts as ‘evidence’ under s. 100 may thus
be reconcilable with a broader approach under s. 101.
The final observation of note is the endorsement of the position in
Renda, that bad character is in some ways to be treated as a ‘precedent-
free zone’. Judge LJ stated in that case (at [3]):
Several of the decisions or rulings questioned in these appeals represent
either judgments by the trial judge in the specific factual context of the
individual case, or the exercise of a judicial discretion. The circumstances in
which this Court would interfere with the exercise of a judicial discretion
are limited. The principles need no repetition. However we emphasise that
the same general approach will be adopted when the Court is being invited
to interfere with what in reality is a fact specific judgment. As we explain
in one of these decisions, the trial judge’s ‘feel’ for the case is usually the
critical ingredient of the decision at first instance which this Court lacks.
Context therefore is vital. The creation and subsequent citation from a vast
body of so-called ‘authority’, in reality representing no more than observa-
tions on a fact specific decision of the judge in the Crown Court, is
unnecessary and may well be counterproductive. This legislation has now
been in force for nearly a year. The principles have been considered by this
Court on a number of occasions. The responsibility for their application is
not for this Court but for trial judges.
Ben Fitzpatrick
Criminal Justice Act 2003: Hearsay; Implied Assertions
R v Singh [2006] EWCA Crim 660
The appellant was convicted of conspiracy to kidnap. As part of their
case, the prosecution claimed that the appellant was the user of certain
mobile telephones, which he used to make and receive a high volume of
calls to and from co-conspirators at and around the time of the kidnap-
ping. The memories of telephones of co-accused contained the numbers
of the telephones allegedly used by the appellant. The telephone of one
co-accused also contained the appellant’s land line number. The tele-
phone of another co-accused had in its memory the name ‘Alex’—the
appellant’s first name—against the number of one of the telephones
allegedly used by the appellant, and an envelope containing the same
information was recovered from the home of that co-accused. The
prosecution also relied on a call made from the appellant’s mother’s
address to one of the telephone numbers in question.
The appellant claimed that he was at his mother’s home at the time of
kidnapping and was not using the telephones in question. He claimed
that one of the telephones belonged to a plasterer called Alex who was
working in the appellant’s house.
It was accepted by the defence that it could legitimately be inferred
that the same person, called Alex or Al, was using the telephones in
question at the relevant time, and was a party to the kidnapping.
The appellant argued, inter alia, that the trial judge had been wrong to
admit in evidence the contents (outlined above) of the memories of the
The Journal of Criminal Law
398
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