Criminal Justice Act 2003: Bad Character Provisions (1)
| Author | Ben Fitzpatrick |
| Published date | 01 August 2006 |
| DOI | 10.1350/jcla.70.4.300 |
| Date | 01 August 2006 |
| Subject Matter | Court of Appeal |
increase in his minimum term, it seems that he should. Although this
may seem unfair, had it been decided differently this would in turn have
implied differential liability (a concept alien to a joint enterprise). Indeed
this concept has been counselled against by Lord Phillips of Worth
Matravers CJ, in relation to the starting points in Sched. 21, where he
cautioned against the use of them to create three different categories of
murder (R v Jones [2005] EWCA Crim 3115 at [8]). For Peart, a starting
point of 30 years seems excessive (considering the trial judge’s doubt as
to intent and his non-activity in the sadistic conduct), whereas a starting
point of 15 years was, by the court’s decision, lenient. It is unfortunate
that a middle ground could not have been found.
Andrew Beetham
Criminal Justice Act 2003: Bad Character Provisions (1)
R v Renda [2005] EWCA Crim 2826
Appellant R had been convicted, in May 2005, of attempted robbery.
Appellant B had been convicted, in April 2005, on two counts of
rape.
Appellant A had been convicted, in March 2005, of dangerous
driving.
Appellant O had been convicted of robbery.
Appellants Ra1 and Ra2 were convicted, in March 2005, of assault
occasioning actual bodily harm and affray.
Appellant R
It was alleged that appellant R had harassed the complainant for money
while the complainant was walking home. When the complainant
reached his home, R was allegedly still with him and assaulted him,
demanding money.
When the police arrived, R argued that he had not done anything at
all. When interviewed later, he submitted a prepared statement alleging
that he had been attacked by the complainant.
At trial, R claimed that he had been a serving soldier, and that while
so employed, he had sustained a serious head injury resulting in brain
damage. He also stated that he was in regular employment as a security
guard.
The Crown were concerned that R was creating a false impression of
his life, to the effect that he was of good character. They had evidence to
suggest, for example, that the head injury had been sustained on holi-
day, rather than in the military. Under cross-examination, R conceded
that the injury had been sustained on holiday.
The Crown sought to adduce evidence of R’s bad character through
the gateway of s. 101(1)(f) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (‘the 2003
Act’), in that R had given a ‘false impression’. The Crown wished to
adduce evidence (referred to below as ‘the 2001 incident’) that in July
300
Criminal Justice Act 2003: Bad Character Provisions (1)
2001 R had been found unfit to plead on a count of assault occasioning
actual bodily harm, and that the jury on that occasion had been satisfied
as a fact that R had committed the act alleged. R received an absolute
discharge.
R argued that the 2001 incident did not give rise to a criminal
conviction; nor did it constitute reprehensible behaviour’ amounting to
misconduct such as to trigger the bad character provisions of the 2003
Act. However, the trial judge admitted the evidence of that incident. R
also argued on appeal that his concessions under cross-examination
were such that he had disassociated himself from any false impression,
and that s. 105(3) of the 2003 Act should have applied to prevent the
Crown from adducing the evidence in question.
Section 98 of the 2003 Act states:
References in this Chapter to evidence of a person’s ‘bad character’ are to
evidence of, or of a disposition towards, misconduct on his part . . .
Section 112 of the 2003 Act is an interpretation section. It states:
(1) In this Chapter—
. . .
“misconduct” means the commission of an offence or other reprehensible
behaviour.
Section 101(1) of the 2003 Act states:
(1) In criminal proceedings evidence of the defendant’s bad character is
admissible if, but only if—
. . .
(f) it is evidence to correct a false impression given by the defendant . . .
Section 101(1)(f) of the 2003 Act is supplemented by s. 105, which
states:
(1) For the purposes of section 101(1)(f)—
(a) the defendant gives a false impression if he is responsible for the
making of an express or implied assertion which is apt to give
the court or jury a false or misleading impression about the
defendant;
(b) evidence to correct such an impression is evidence which has
probative value in correcting it.
. . .
(3) A defendant who would otherwise be treated as responsible for the
making of an assertion shall not be so treated if, or to the extent that, he
withdraws it or disassociates himself from it.
. . .
(6) Evidence is admissible under section 101(1)(f) only if it goes no
further than is necessary to correct the false impression.
HELD, DISMISSING THE APPEAL, the appellant had not successfully
disassociated himself from the false impression he had created that he
was a ‘rather...
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