Crisis Management
| DOI | 10.1177/004711787200400306 |
| Date | 01 August 1972 |
| Author | P. Williams |
| Published date | 01 August 1972 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
261
CRISIS
MANAGEMENT
P.
WILLIAMS
One
of
the
most
prominent
characteristics
of
an
adolescent
discipline
is
that
it
encompasses
a
large
number
of
areas
which
have
not
been
subjected
to
careful
and
comprehensive
examination.
International
politics
is
such
a
discipline,
and
the
study
of
crisis
management
has
long
retained
this
’Cinderella’
status
within
it.
Even
during
the
1950s
when
theories
of
deterrence,
limited
war,
and
arms
control
were
being
developed
in
abundance,
comparatively
little
attention
was
given
to
the
dangers
arising
from
crises
and
none
at
all
to
the
problem
of
how
such
dangers
could
be
ameliorated.
This
situation
seemed
to
have
improved
after
October
1962
when
the
drama
of
the
Cuban
Missile
Crisis
coupled
with
its
skilful
resolution
stimulated
a
great
deal
of
interest
in
the
notion
of
crisis
management.
Rather
like
Cinderella’s
visit
to
the
ball,
however,
the
transformation
was
short-lived
and
more
apparent
than
real.
Although
the
concept
became
fashionable,
it
rarely
received
more
than
cursory
attention
or
superficial
analysis.’
This
neglect
of
crises
and
the
manner
in
which
they
are
handled
is
extremely
unfortunate.
There
are
good
reasons
why
crises
merit
attention.
In
the
first place,
their
practical
importance
is
difficult
to
overestimate.
Crises
are
integrally
related
to
the
issue
of
war
or
peace.
Indeed,
our
understanding
of the
outbreak
of
wars
is
likely
to
be
greatly
enhanced
by
a
study
of
major
crises,
and
possibly
by
comparing
crises
which
precipitated
war
with
those
which
were
resolved
peacefully.
Even
when
there
is
no
outbreak
of
violence,
the
repercussions
of
a
crisis
situation
may
be
enormous.
Whether
a
crisis
acts
as
a
turning
point
is
debatable,
but
there
can
be
little
doubt
that
it
catalyzes
existing
trends
within
the
international
system.
Furthermore,
it
is
possible
to
argue
that
crises
deserve
attention
since
they
highlight
many
important
characteristics
of
inter-state
relations.
If,
as
Clausewitz
once
claimed,
a
battle
is
’war
concentrated’,
then
a
crisis
can
equally
legitimately
be
regarded
as
a
microcosm
of
international
politics.
As
well
as
increasing
our
substantive
knowledge,
however,
the
study
of
crises
can
also
contribute
to
the
methodology
of
inter-
national
politics.
The
area
is
one
where
traditional
historical
and
political
analysis
can
profitably
be
combined
with
some
of
the
newer,
more
scientific
techniques.
By
examining
a
relatively
small
number
of
crises
on
a
comparative
basis,
for
example,
it
is
possible
to
avoid
both
the
Scylla
of
the
historian
who
regards
every
event
1
A
notable
exception
is
Coral
Bell,
The
Conventions
of
Crisis,
(London,
O.U.P.,
1971).
Also
worthy
of
mention
is
Oran
R.
Young,
The
Politics
of
Force:
Bargaining
during
International
Crises,
(Princeton,
Princeton
University
Press
1968).
Young’s
book
does
not
deal
with
crisis
manage-
ment
as
such,
but
contains
many
important
insights
of
immediate
relevance.
It
is
a
pioneering
work
on
the
subject
of
crises
and
one
to
which
the
author
owes
a
great
intellectual
debt.
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