A critical analysis of the anti-corruption policy of the federal executive council of Nigeria

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1108/JMLC-06-2017-0021
Date07 May 2019
Published date07 May 2019
Pages176-187
AuthorEhi Eric Esoimeme
Subject MatterAccounting & Finance,Financial risk/company failure,Financial compliance/regulation,Financial crime
A critical analysis of the
anti-corruption policy of the
federal executive council
of Nigeria
Ehi Eric Esoimeme
Department of Public Law, University of Lagos Faculty of Law, Akoka Yaba,
Lagos, Nigeria
Abstract
Purpose This paper aims to examine the anti-corruption policy of the Federal Executive Council of Nigeria,
to determine whether the policy is working and/or has produced unintended effects. The Federal Executive
Council is the body comprising all the Ministers of the Federation, including the President and Vice President.
Design/methodology/approach The analysis took the form of a desk study, which analysed various
documents and reports suchas the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index,2008-2016, the
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), the Economic and Financial Crimes
Commission (Establishment) Act, 2004, the Administration of Criminal Justice Act, 2015, the UKs
Investigatory Powers Act, 2016, the Public Interest Disclosure and Witness Protection Bill, 2017 and the
FinancialAction Task Force Recommendations, 2012.
Findings This paper determined that the anti-corruption policy of the Federal Executive Council of
Nigeria could achieve its desired objectives if the following recommendations are implemented:research
grants which are sent to Nigerian universities by international and corporate bodies should be exempted
from the current treasury single account arrangement. This would enable universities to easily access the
funds and disburse the same to qualif‌ied students. The Federal Governmentshould follow the guidelines
laid down in Section 270 of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act, 2015 for plea agreements. In other
words, the prosecuti on should only offer a plea bargain to a pe rson who has been charged with an offe nce.
The prosecution should not receive and consider a plea bargain from a person who has not been charged
with an offence. Any attempt to water down the effect of Section 270 of the Administration of Criminal
Justice Act, 2015 may weaken the ongoing f‌ight against corruption and money laundering because
criminals will be encouraged to continue looting public funds. The Financial Action Task Force
Recommendations (R ecommendation 3) requires that crimi nal sanctions for natural persons conv icted of
money laundering should be effective, proportionate and dissuasive. The Federal Government of Nigeria
should introduce a Bill to the National Assembly that would provide a clear framework for the use of
investigatory powers by law enforcement, the security and intelligence agencies and other public
authorities. This includes the interception of communications, the retention and acquisition of
communications data, the use of equipment interference and the retention and use of bulk data by the
security and intelligence agencies. The Bill must establish a number of safeguards against the arbitrary or
unlawful use of invest igatory powers by the executive. The U Ks Investigatory Powers Act, 2016, for
example, established a number of safeguards for the retention and acquisition of c ommunications data.
Authorisations for obtaining communications data will have to set out why accessing the communications
data in question is necessary in a specif‌ic investigatio n for a particular statutory purpose and h ow it is
proportionate to what is sought to be achieved. A police off‌icer who receives information f rom a
whistleblower about money hidden in an apartment should apply to a Court or Justice of the Peace within
the local limits of whose jurisdiction he/she is for the issue of a search warrant before conducting a search
on the said premises. This procedure is in line with Section 143 of the Administration of Criminal Justice
Act, 2015 and the Court of Appeal decision in Hassan v. E.F.C.C. (2014) I NWLR (Pt. 1389) 607 at 625. The
Public Interest Disclosure and Witness Protection Bill, 2017 should be given accelerated consideration in
the House of Represent atives based on its urgency and signif‌icanc e for the Federal Executive Councils
whistleblowers policy.
JMLC
22,2
176
Journalof Money Laundering
Control
Vol.22 No. 2, 2019
pp. 176-187
© Emerald Publishing Limited
1368-5201
DOI 10.1108/JMLC-06-2017-0021
The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available on Emerald Insight at:
www.emeraldinsight.com/1368-5201.htm

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