Critique of Nuclear Extinction
| DOI | 10.1177/002234338201900401 |
| Published date | 01 December 1982 |
| Date | 01 December 1982 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Critique
of
Nuclear
Extinction
BRIAN
MARTIN
Australian
National
University,
Canberra
The
idea
that
global
nuclear
war
could
kill
most
or
all
of
the
world’s
population
is
critically
examined
and
found
to
have
little
or
no
scientific
basis.
A
number
of
possible
reasons
for
beliefs
about
nuclear
extinction
are
presented,
including
exaggeration
to
justify
inaction,
fear
of
death,
exaggeration
to
stimulate
action,
the
idea
that
planning
is
defeatist,
exaggeration
to
justify
concern,
white
western
orientation,
the
pattern
of
day-to-day
life,
and
reformist
political
analysis.
Some
of
the
ways
in
which
these
factors
inhibit
a
full
political
analysis
and
practice
by
the
peace
movement
are
indicated.
Prevalent
ideas
about
the
irrationality
and
short
duration
of
nuclear
war
and
of
the
unlikelihood
of
limited
nuclear
war
are
also
briefly
examined.
The
peace
movement
and
its
allies’
I
are
almost
completely
unprepared
for
the
politi-
cal
consequences
and
aftermath
of
nuclear
war
and
nuclear
crisis.
This
lack
of
pre-
paredness
is
both
a
result
of
and
a
cause
of
a
limited
political
analysis
and
practice
for
ending
the
threat
of
nuclear
war.
The
possible
crises
that
may
arise
for
the
world
and
for
the
peace
movement
can
be
illustrated
by
a
few
scenarios.
2
(a)
Limited
nuclear
war
in
the
periphery.
A
war
breaks
out
in
the
Middle
East,
and
resort
is
made
to
nuclear
weapons,
killing
a
few
hundred
thousand
people.
The
United
States
and
the
Soviet
Union
place
their
nu-
clear
forces
on
the
highest
alert.
As
the
tension
continues
to
build
up,
a
state
of
emergency
is
declared
in
the
US.
Normal
democratic
procedures
are
suspended,
and
’dissidents’
are
rounded
up.
A
similar
pro-
cess
occurs
in
many
countries
allied
mili-
tarily
to
the
US,
and
also
within
the
Soviet
bloc.
A
return
to
the
pre-crisis
state
of
affairs
does
not
occur
for
years
or
decades.
As
well
as
precipitating
bitter
political
re-
pression,
the
crisis
contributes
to
an
in-
creased
arms
race,
especially
among
non-
nuclear
and
small
nuclear
powers,
as
no
effective
sanctions
are
applied
to
those
who
used
nuclear
weapons.
Another
similar
lim-
ited
nuclear
war
and
superpower
crisis
be-
comes
likely ...
or
perhaps
the
scene
shifts
to
scenario
b
or
c.
(b)
Limited
nuclear
war
between
the
su-
perpowers.
A
limited
exchange
of
nuclear
weapons
between
the
US
and
the
Soviet
Union
occurs,
either
due
to
accident
or
as
part
of
a
threat-counterthreat
situation.
A
sizable
number
of
military
or
civilian
tar-
gets
are
destroyed,
either
in
the
US
or
the
Soviet
Union
or
in
allied
states,
and
perhaps
5
or
10
million
people
are
killed.
As
in
scenario
a,
states
of
emergency
are
declared,
political
dissent
repressed
and
public
out-
rage
channelled
into
massive
military
and
political
mobilisation
to
prepare
for
future
confrontations
and
wars.
Scenario
c
be-
comes
more
likely.
(c)
Global
nuclear
war.
A
massive
nu-
clear
exchange
occurs,
killing
200
million
people
in
the
US,
Soviet
Union
and
Europe.
National
governments,
though
decimated,
survive
and
apply
brutal
policies
to
obtain
economic
and
military
recovery,
brooking
no
dissent.
In
the
wake
of
the
disaster,
au-
thoritarian
civilian
or
military
regimes
take
control
in
countries
relatively
unscathed
by
the
war,
such
as
Australia,
Japan
and
Spain.
The
road
is
laid
to
an
even
more
devastating
World
War
IV.
Many
other
similiar
scenarios
could
be
presented.
One
feature
of
these
scenarios
is
familiar:
the
enormous
scale
of
physical
de-
struction
and
human
suffering,
which
is
only
dimly
indicated
by
the
numbers
of
dead
and
injured,
whether
this
is
hundreds,
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