Crosbie v Hamilton
| Jurisdiction | Scotland |
| Judgment Date | 26 September 1989 |
| Date | 26 September 1989 |
| Docket Number | No. 1. |
| Court | High Court of Justiciary |
JC
Lord Brand, Lords Wylie, Murray.
Procedure — Summary procedure — Plea of guilty tendered at first calling of summary complaint — Accused persuaded by duty agent to tender said plea — Accused had no previous experience with court procedure — Whether circumstances sufficient to justify suspension of conviction and subsequent sentence.
The complainer appeared on summary complaint in the sheriff court. At first calling, despite having a stateable defence, he was allegedly persuaded by the duty agent to plead guilty to the libel he faced. The complainer had consulted with the duty agent who had advised him that the situation did not look good for him; that it would take a considerable time for the case to come to trial; and that, if convicted after trial, he would receive a stiffer sentence than if he pled guilty at first calling. The complainer was also left with the impression that if he pled not guilty he would be remanded in custody pending trial. He had had no previous experience with court procedure. The agent thereafter pled guilty on the complainer's behalf and the complainer was accordingly sentenced by the presiding sheriff (Simpson). Subsequently, he appealed by way of bill of suspension to the High Court of Justiciary against the conviction and sentence.
Held, (1) that, the circumstances would have to be exceptional to interfere with a plea of guilty tendered on professional advice and by a member of the legal profession; (2) that, there had been nothing erroneous about the tendering of the plea, it having been tendered on the instructions of the complainer and in his presence; and (3) that, there had been nothing to prevent the complainer when he heard the plea being tendered telling the agent that he wished to change the plea; and bill refused.
Observed that, (a) suspension was a competent method of review when some step in the procedure had gone wrong or some factor had emerged which satisfied the court that a miscarriage of justice had taken place, resulting in a failure to do justice to an accused; (b) that, a bill of suspension would not be entertained in the ordinary case where the accused had pled guilty and, after sentence, wished to go back on his plea, for, otherwise, the doors would be opened wide to people seeking review because the sentence imposed following a plea of guilty was more than they bargained for; and (c) that, where relief was sought on the ground that there had been an error in...
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