Cyber‐Organised Crime — The Impact of Information Technology on Organised Crime
| Date | 01 February 2001 |
| DOI | https://doi.org/10.1108/eb025998 |
| Published date | 01 February 2001 |
| Pages | 332-346 |
| Author | Barry A.K. Rider |
| Subject Matter | Accounting & finance |
Journal of Financial Crime — Vol. 8 No. 4
Cyber-Organised Crime — The Impact of
Information Technology on Organised Crime
Barry A. K. Rider
Journal of Financial Crime
Vol.
8,
No.
4,
2001,
pp.
332-346
© Henry Stewart Publications
ISSN 0969-6458
A NEW THREAT?
Some have argued that organised crime is a problem
of the last quarter of the 20th century and in the case
of most states is a new phenomenon. Of course, so
much depends upon what is meant by organised
crime. Groups of individuals formed and managed
to perpetrate acts against the law are nothing new.
Nor is it novel that the primary motivation of such
enterprises is economic gain — spurred on by
'plain old-fashioned' greed and corruption. Banditry,
smuggling, racketeering and piracy were just as much
a problem for the praetors and the vigils of ancient
Rome as they are today for the Italian authorities.
What has changed is the criminals' ability to operate
beyond the reach of the domestic legal system and,
therefore, be able to conduct an enterprise in crime
that is not so amenable to the traditional criminal
justice system and its agents. Of course, in truth,
thinking criminals have always sought to place them-
selves beyond the reach of the law and it was not just
a matter of having a faster horse. Corruption of
officials and the patronage of powerful individuals
whose interests, for whatever reason, might be at
variance with those of the state are tried and tested
tools.1
It has always been recognised that even if as
a matter of theory jurisdiction was unfettered, the
practicalities are such as to render enforcement paro-
chial. Thus, when Henry II of England was asked
towards the end of the 12th century how far his
writ ran, he responded 'as far as my arrows
reach'.2
While developments in ballistic technology might
render this a relatively useful approach to dealing
with the international criminal, in the vast majority
of cases the criminal law in its application, or at
least administration, will be confined within domestic
borders. Developments in technology, communica-
tion, travel and the liberalisation of movement,
whether of persons, things or wealth, have all com-
bined to give the criminal enterprise of today the
same ability as any other business to move from
one jurisdiction to another, or involve in a single
act two or more different jurisdictions.
Since the end of the Cold War a new threat to
world stability has been recognised, which previously
was both localised and parochial. This threat is
often and somewhat misleadingly referred to as the
Russian 'Mafia'. The downward slide of black
marketers and smugglers into organised crime, and
the creation of essentially ethnically based organised
crime groups within the former Soviet Union, have
inevitably had a powerful influence on the way in
which business is carried out, both domestically and
internationally.
Organised crime impacts on and even gives effect
to business activity at almost every level of the
economy,3 whether it is simply a matter of providing
protection or facilitating corruption, or actually
providing a viable business partner. The so-called
Russian mafia is a reality, although far more complex
in its structures and aspirations than might be ima-
gined from the often sensationalised reports that
may be read in the Western press. Given the roots
of many criminal organisations within this region
and their historical involvement with the black
economy, they are an important element within the
pervading Russian underground economy.4 Conse-
quently, to a very real extent they become almost
indistinguishable, at least in economic terms, from
what is left of the economy. This has led some to
assert that the state has itself become little more
than a criminal enterprise.
Control and interdiction of organised crime and its
effects on this scale are in practical terms impossible.
Containment within what were the borders of the
USSR has also proved to be a naive strategy. The
level of interdependence, integration and penetration
by organised crime throughout the regional econ-
omy and sub-political structures is such as to
render such a policy both unacceptable and impracti-
cal.
On the other hand, it is almost certain that the
resources within the state, within a political frame-
work that the West would wish to contemplate,
could not be made available to control and eradicate
organised crime.5 The resources that have been made
available by Western nations and international orga-
nisations to assist law enforcement within the region
are not such as to convince anyone who has a grasp of
the extent of the problem that the West still believes
Page 332
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