Deal or No-Deal: Does it Matter? Data Protection Predictions for Post-Brexit Britain

Published date01 May 2020
Pages275-281
DOI10.3366/elr.2020.0633
Date01 May 2020

This article examines the data protection implications for Britain following its withdrawal from the European Union (“EU”)/European Economic Area (“EEA”) and the passage of the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020 (“2020 Act”). It investigates the data protection implications under this agreement – in particular, whether leaving on the basis of this deal makes a truly substantive difference to data protection in post-Brexit Britain than if a no-deal Brexit were to occur, or, whether it merely delays the inevitable: fewer protections for the personal data and privacy of those residing in the UK; loss of access to important EU police databases, and serious disruptions to data flows for companies.

CURRENT LANDSCAPE

Whilst an array of reasons for Brexit were put forward by the “Leave” campaign, the main purposes centred around: parliamentary sovereignty; immigration; and security. Brexiteers claim that it is necessary to leave the EU in order for the UK to restore parliamentary sovereignty and re-establish itself as an independent nation, enabling greater control over its borders and limiting immigration. In doing so, it was argued that security would be enhanced on the basis that open borders make it too difficult to sufficiently “check and control people”.1 The following analysis demonstrates how each of these putative purposes for leaving the EU are challenged by the impact of Brexit on data protection.

Whilst the 2020 Act remains similar in many ways to the October 2019 incarnation of the Withdrawal Agreement Bill (“WAB”) – including with regard to data protection arrangements – it does introduce significant changes, including: the removal of certain protections for workers' rights;2 a reduction of government obligations for unaccompanied child refugees;3 and the provision to Ministers of a power to specify circumstances in which lower courts could depart from the rulings of the Court of Justice of the EU (“CJEU”) after the transition period.4 The 2020 Act also prohibits any extension to the transition period beyond 21 December 20205 which SNP leader, Ian Blackford, has warned will place the “risk of a no-deal Brexit, that we all fear…on the table again”.6 It therefore remains necessary to consider whether leaving on the basis of the 2020 Act makes any substantive difference to the future of data protection in the UK than if a “hard” Brexit were to take place.

BREXIT UNDER <a href="https://vlex.co.uk/vid/european-union-withdrawal-agreement-842484637">THE 2020 ACT</a>

As stated above, the transition period will not be extended beyond the 21 December 2020 deadline under the 2020 Act, bringing down the guillotine on the formal Brexit process, regardless of what has or, more importantly, has not yet been negotiated with the EU at that point. During this transition period the UK has ceased to be a member of any EU institutions and will lose all input into the drawing up of EU rules and regulations. Ironically, this conflicts with the aforementioned purpose of Brexit being to regain “control” as the UK will have to abide by all EU laws and regulations for the length of the transition period, whilst absent from the law-making process. However, the benefit of a transition period is that it provides something of a safety net to the UK by allowing more time for government and businesses to prepare for a future outwith the EU and for the UK's future trading relationship with the EU to be agreed and formalised. Putting aside the length of the transition period, until – or indeed if – the EU reaches a data transfer deal with the UK (discussed below) the UK will lose all access to EU databases. This includes a loss of access to: European arrest warrants; passenger name records (“PNR”); investigation orders; and the Schengen information system II – the largest information system for public security in Europe enabling information exchanges between national border control, customs, and police authorities.7 Contrary to one of its primary justifications, in this context, Brexit poses a real risk to UK...

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