‘Death to Tyrants’: Self-Defence, Human Rights and Tyrannicide-Part II
| Date | 01 April 2009 |
| Author | Shannon K. Brincat |
| Published date | 01 April 2009 |
| DOI | 10.3366/E1755088209000330 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
‘DEATH TO TYRANTS’: SELF-DEFENCE, HUMAN RIGHTS
AND TYRANNICIDE– PART II
SHANNON K. BRINCAT
Abstract: This is the final part of a series of two papers that have examined
the conceptual development of the philosophical justifications for tyrannicide.
While part I focused on the classical, medieval, and liberal justifications for
tyrannicide, Part II aims to provide the tentative outlines of a contemporary
model of tyrannicide in world politics. It is contended that a reinvigorated
conception of self-defence, when coupled with the modern understanding of
universal human rights, may provide the foundation for the normative validity
of tyrannicide in contemporary world politics.
Keywords: History of ideas, human rights, tyrannicide, tyranny, self-defence
Introduction
Part I of ‘Death to Tyrants’ (Brincat 2008) traced the philosophical development
of tyrannicide through three periods or conceptual models, the classical,
medieval and liberal respectively. Its primary aim was to outline the theoretical
principles in each period that justified tyrannicide. As we saw, each model
offered unique normative constructions for the validation of tyrannicide that
were particular to each period; the classical model, through the belief in the
functional role of the leader as to promote the virtue of citizens and realise
the ‘good life’; the medieval, based on natural law principles; and the liberal,
on social contract theory postulates. However, these historically particular
philosophical positions cannot serve as a satisfactory basis for a contemporary
theory of tyrannicide. The passage of time has either eroded the relevance of
certain aspects of the models (such as the importance attached to public life in the
classical world), or wider changes in socio-political norms have rendered such
theories inoperative altogether (such as the collapse of Absolutism). It becomes
Journal of International Political Theory, 5(1) 2009, 75–93
DOI: 10.3366/E1755088209000330
© Edinburgh Univeristy Press 2009
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Shannon K. Brincat
readily apparent that these philosophical justifications served the ends of very
different worlds. And yet a strictly historical review of the justifications of
particular acts of tyrannicide on a case by case basis would be equally ineffectual
in grounding a contemporary theory of tyrannicide as it would be prone to
manipulation as a political arcana doctrine in order to justify certain political
ends. What this theoretical impasse necessitates is a contemporary normative
foundation that both condemns tyranny as a deformed political system and which
offers redress to those affected by such oppression.
The survey of the problems and limitations of the classical, medieval,
and liberal models of tyrannicide in Part I brought into sharp relief two
fundamental elements that a contemporary model of tyrannicide must satisfy;
first, the necessity of objective criteria to determine the crime of tyranny
and the conditions under which the act of tyrannicide could be legitimately
resorted to; and second, that there be a requisite degree of universality in this
determination through which all humans could be equally safeguarded against
tyranny and employ tyrannicide in their own self-defence (Brincat 2008). The
first point requires acceptable criteria that would provide an adequate basis for a
definition and consensus of tyrannicide in the international realm, and the second
necessitates a philosophical basis that affirms the right of individual equity
against tyranny. Without this personal element, the permissibility of resistance
would be a mere abstraction divested from the person and would encourage
deference to a public institution that may be ineffectual or completely overrun
under tyranny. Yet, how can we achieve these twin goals of an individual right
and international application of tyrannicide within a theoretical framework that
does not rely on the problematic arguments that pertain to a classical worldview,
natural law sentiment, or the vulnerabilities of liberal theory? In this final
part, I am concerned with setting out the broad strokes of a theory that would
provide a philosophical justification of tyrannicide, one that is both viable for
the individual suffering oppression within a tyrannous state and which is also
applicable within the contemporary international community. Unfortunately,
only a brief and inherently speculative outline of such a contemporary theory
of tyrannicide can be offered here, with the hope that other scholars may further
explore these ideas. In this part, I suggest that common-law conceptions of self-
defence, when coupled with the modern understanding of universal human rights
and the necessity of their protection, may serve as possible legitimising factors
for tyrannicide. However, it should be noted that the argument of this paper
does not assert that there exists a human right of tyrannicide per se. Rather,
it posits that the concept of human rights in itself presupposes a minimum
threshold of protection of the individual, most clearly seen in the right to
life (Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948: Article 3) and that when
oppressive rule from above threatens this fundamental human right that an act of
tyrannicide may be legitimated under the legal justification of self-defence.
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