Decentralization reforms in dictatorial regimes as a survival strategy: Evidence from Pakistan
| Date | 01 January 2019 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0192512117712177 |
| Published date | 01 January 2019 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512117712177
International Political Science Review
2019, Vol. 40(1) 126 –142
© The Author(s) 2017
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DOI: 10.1177/0192512117712177
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Decentralization reforms in
dictatorial regimes as a survival
strategy: Evidence from Pakistan
Ghazia Aslam
George Washington University, USA
Abstract
Are decentralization reforms in dictatorial regimes mere window dressing or can they deliver longevity for
dictators? Many scholars in political science have argued that seemingly democratic institutions established
in dictatorships play a crucial role in increasing the survival potential of the authoritarian regime by providing
a channel to the dictator to co-opt members of the opposition, identify their bases of support and recruit
effective coalition members. While most of the existing analysis has focused on national elections and
political parties, we use primary data and social network methodology to analyze the 2001 decentralization
reforms established during General Musharraf’s military regime in Pakistan. We show that seemingly
democratically empowering decentralized governance structures can also be used to distribute rents to
political supporters through ostensibly legitimate channels. Therefore, this paper adds to the literature on
institutions in dictatorships on two fronts in addition to providing crucial information about the political
landscape in a strategically important country.
Keywords
Dictatorship, decentralization reforms, Pakistan, institutions in dictatorships, authoritarianism, patronage
Do decentralization reforms, when established in dictatorial regimes, provide a veneer of legiti-
macy to the dictator, make the regime more democratic, or play a role in the dictator’s longevity?
Decentralization reforms are generally understood as bringing people closer to the government and
providing citizens with avenues for greater and more effective participation in decision-making
processes (Dauda, 2006; Fung, 2004). They are also meant to improve development outcomes by
increasing accountability in governance processes (Mueller, 2000). However, when General
Musharraf’s military regime implemented decentralization reforms in 2001 in Pakistan, two years
after the military takeover of the government, various groups in the society reacted with disdain.
Political parties believed that it was an attempt by the dictatorial regime to weaken political forces
Corresponding author:
Dr Ghazia Aslam, George Washington University, 2115 Monroe Hall, Suite 440, Washington, DC 20052, USA.
Email: gaslam@gwu.edu
712177IPS0010.1177/0192512117712177International Political Science ReviewAslam
research-article2017
Article
Aslam 127
(Mir, 2000), and the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan commented that the purpose ‘seems
to be to depoliticize governance and to earn a lease of life for the military government’ (Quoted in
ICG, 2004:10).
A quick look at developing countries suggests that the phenomenon of instituting some form of
decentralization reforms within dictatorial regimes is not unique to Pakistan. China, the Democratic
Republic of Congo, Rwanda, and Guinea, to name just a few, have established various forms of
decentralization structures within dictatorial regimes. Despite their widespread prevalence, the
objectives and incentives of creating decentralized governments in non-democratic regimes have
not been explored. The literature that ventures into the incentives behind decentralization reforms
assumes that the underlying system of governance is democratic. Most of these explanations sug-
gest that it is economic development and globalization that result in public sector expansion,
income and population growth, as well as integration of markets, and encourage decentralization
by allowing better exploitation of economies of scale (Arzaghi and Henderson, 2005; Oates, 1972).
Even when scholars go beyond the efficiency criteria to explore the motivations of the countries to
decentralize, they do not include a non-democratic system of governance as a significant factor in
their analyses (Burki et al., 1999).1 Similarly, while there is a vast amount of literature exploring
the impact of decentralization reforms on service delivery and other development outcomes,2 the
impact of these reforms on the workings of dictatorial regimes has not been investigated.
Recently a burgeoning political science literature (as summarized in the next section) that aims
to understand the causes and consequences of establishing democratic institutions in authoritarian
regimes provides insights into the motivation of dictators to establish decentralization reforms.
Scholars have long noted that many dictators operate with some form of seemingly democratic
institutions.3 Recently, they have argued that authoritarian leaders establish these institutions to
provide longevity and stability to their dictatorial regimes. While apparently similar in form, the
function these institutions perform in authoritarian regimes is different from the function they are
expected to perform in democracies. Seemingly democratic institutions provide dictators with a
channel for negotiation with various groups in society so that they can co-opt members of the
opposition (Gandhi and Przeworski, 2006; Lust-Okar, 2005), identify their bases of support, and
recruit effective coalition members (Boix and Svolik, 2013; Brownlee, 2007; Magaloni, 2008).
This paper builds upon and contributes to this literature. We analyze the role that seemingly
democracy-enhancing decentralization reforms instituted in 2001 played in the survival and stabil-
ity of Musharraf’s military regime in Pakistan. The analysis is performed in two steps. First, we
examine the local governance structure and political landscape within which these reforms
occurred. This analysis shows that a patronage-based political landscape, dominated by family ties,
motivated Musharraf to institute decentralization reforms, which allowed him to co-opt powerful
local elites and distribute rents to them, all through ostensibly legitimate means: the ballot box.
Second, using data on inter-governmental fiscal flows, we provide empirical evidence to show that
decentralized governance structures were indeed used to distribute rents to the co-opted politicians,
who in return provided political support to Musharraf, thereby helping him to increase his survival
potential.
The existence of a patronage structure and its utilization to distribute rents is integral to the
argument of this paper that the reforms helped Musharraf remain in power. A patronage-based
political landscape made it easy for Musharraf to identify powerful potential supporters of his
regime. Once the patronage structure dominated by family ties was formalized through decentrali-
zation reforms, Musharraf co-opted the local elite by distributing rents through decentralized struc-
tures, providing them with a veneer of legitimacy. In return for rents, local elites brought their
political clout to support the dictatorial regime (see Waseem, 2006), which in turn helped strengthen
Musharraf’s hold on power.
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