Defence and Ideology: The Anglo-Canadian Military ‘Alliance’ in the 1930s
| Author | Norman Hillmer |
| DOI | 10.1177/002070207803300306 |
| Published date | 01 September 1978 |
| Date | 01 September 1978 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
NORMAN
HILLMER
Defence
and
ideology:
The
Anglo-Canadian
military
'alliance'
in
the
1930s
The
British
dominions
in
the
1930s
were
a
defence
planner's
night-
mare.
The
empire
had
become
a
gouty giant:
'disjointed,
discon-
nected
and
highly
vulnerable.
It is
even
open
to
debate
whether
it
is
in reality
strategically
defensible."
Canadians,
South
Africans,
and Irish
all expressed
an
interest
in
and
concern
for
the
welfare
and standing
of
the
mother country
in
a
threatening
world,
2
but
they
gave
almost
nothing
in the
way
of
material
assistance
and
no
commitments for the
future.
Though
they
insisted
on
separate
de-
fence
policies,
they
spent
little
on
their
own
security,
emphasizing
instead
their
pacific
nature,
geographical
situation,
and
domestic
political
problems.
The
Australians
and
New
Zealanders,
directly
dependent
on
British
sea
power,
were
more
positive
in
their
atti-
tude
towards
the
problems
of
imperial
defence.
But
even
they
were,
or
might rapidly
become,
liabilities
rather
than
assets
on
the
im-
perial
account: 'the
contribution
which
they
had
made
at
Gallipoli
was
a
debt
which
London
might
one
day
have
to
repay
with
heavy
interest.'
8
Visiting
Professor of
Modem
Commonwealth
History,
Leeds
University.
This
paper
was
originally presented
to
the
1977
annual
meeting
of
the
Canadian
Historical
Association,
Fredericton,
New
Brunswick.
i
Admiral
Sir
Ernle
Chatfield
in
August
1936,
quoted
in
Lawrence
R.
Pratt,
East
of
Malta,
West
of Suez:
Britain's
Mediterranean
Crisis,
1936-1939
(London
1975),
P
.
2
See,
for example,
the
speeches
made
on
behalf
of
the
three
governments
at
the
Commonwealth
prime
ministers'
meetings
of
1935.
Public
Record
Office,
London
(PRO),
Cabinet
Office
(cAB)
32/125,
minutes,
mtgs
1-4,
3
April-23
May
1935.
3
Michael
Howard,
The Continental
Commitment:
The
Dilemma
of
British
De-
fence
Policy
in
the
Era
of
the
Two
World
Wars
(London
1972),
p
76.
THE
ANGLO-CANADIAN
MILITARY
'ALLIANCE'
589
In
any
imperial
enterprise,
nevertheless, the
dominions
were
potential
backers
of
proven capacity.
Their
citizens,
for the
most
part,
were of
known
sympathies.
Had not
the
dominions
been
a
powerful
source
of
strength
and support
during
the
First
World
War?
Was
not
the
military relationship
between
Great
Britain
and
the
countries
of
the
emerging
Commonwealth
so
intimate
that
ob-
servers
-
then
and
later
-
described
it
as
nothing
less
than
an
alli-
ance?
4
And
yet
this
was
an
alliance
with
a
difference.
5
As
the British
government
began
to
rearm, ministers
and
officials
sought,
without
notable
success,
assurance
of
active
moral
and material
support
from
the
former
colonies.
The
unwillingness
of
the
majority
to
contribute
significantly
to
empire
defence
and the
reluctance
of
even
the
most
'loyal'
to
become
involved
in
European
complica-
tions,
agreements,
or
guarantees
can
only
have
added
to
London's
sense
of
unease
and
lack
of
resolution.
The
attitude
of
the
domin-
ions
undoubtedly
reinforced
an
already
strong
desire
on
Britain's
part
to
remain
aloof
from
continental
commitments:
the
concept
of
'limited
liability'
was
in
fact
embraced
by
every
leading
British
minister
from
the
mid-i
930s
onwards and
was
not
seriously
chal-
lenged
until
1939.6
Canadians
were
apt
to
think
that
the
military
alliance
with
Great
Britain
was
one-sided.
The
dominion
was 'off
the main
stra-
tegic
highway of
the Empire'
7;
the
defence
of
Canada
played
no
4
Escott
Reid, 'An Anglo-Canadian
Military
Alliance?'
Canadian
Forum,
xvi
(June
1937),
83-5;
H.
Duncan Hall,
'The
British
Commonwealth
of
Nations
in
War
and
Peace,'
in
W.Y.
Elliot
and
H.D.
Hall,
The
British
Commonwealth
at
War
(New
York
1943),
pp
67-8;
D.C.
Watt,
'Imperial
Defence Policy
and
Imperial
Foreign
Policy,
1911-39:
The
Substance
and
the
Shadow,'
in
his
Personalities
and
Policies
(London
1965),
pp
153-4;
R.A.
Preston,
'The
Military
Structure
of
the
Old
Commonwealth,'
International Journal,
xvu
(spring
1962),
98-9.
See
also
C.P.
Stacey,
Arms,
Men
and
Governments:
The
War
Policies
of
Canada
1939-r945
(Ottawa
1970),
p
94.
5
Watt,
'Imperial
Defence
Policy,'
pp
153-4.
6
For
a
discussion
of
'limited
liability,'
see
Peter
Dennis,
Decision
by
Default:
Peacetime Conscription
and
British
Defence
1919-39
(London
1972)
and
Howard,
Continental
Commitment,
chap
5.
7
L.S.
Amery
Papers,
Amery
to
J.L.
Garvin,
25
October
1926.
I
am
indebted
to
the
Rt
Hon
Julian
Amery
for permission
to
consult
his
father's
papers.
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