Delegative democratic attitudes: Theory and evidence from the Asian barometer survey
| Date | 01 September 2018 |
| Published date | 01 September 2018 |
| Author | Youngho Kang,Dongwon Lee |
| DOI | 10.1177/0192512117702755 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512117702755
International Political Science Review
2018, Vol. 39(4) 455 –472
© The Author(s) 2017
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DOI: 10.1177/0192512117702755
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Delegative democratic attitudes:
Theory and evidence from the
Asian barometer survey
Youngho Kang
Soongsil University, Republic of Korea
Dongwon Lee
Sungkyunkwan University, Republic of Korea
Abstract
This paper analyzes the factors influencing whether individuals have delegative democratic attitudes (i.e.
supporting strong executive power with little oversight from the legislature). Roughly up to 50% of voters
in East Asia have delegative democratic attitudes, which are known to undermine democratic governance
in new democracies. Understanding delegative democratic attitudes is thus closely linked to the question of
why delegative democracy persists. Our theoretical analysis suggests that delegative democratic attitudes are
associated with low support for democracy, a perception of the strong influence of interest groups on policy,
and trust in a national leader who can counter the power of interest groups. Using Asian Barometer Survey
data from East Asian countries, 2001–2011, we confirm the hypotheses. Our findings imply that transforming
a delegative democracy into a consolidated democracy requires promoting support for democracy and
preventing interest group dominance over public policy.
Keywords
Delegative democracy, support for democracy, interest group politics, Asianbarometer survey
Introduction
Delegative democracy—a variant of the democratic regime—operates under a general principle that
elected presidents govern their countries as they see fit, and their decrees substitute for legislation as
the main source of policy (O’Donnell, 1994). Prevalent in developing democracies, delegative demo-
cratic attitudes do not support the legislature and judiciary because these institutions are unnecessary
Corresponding author:
Dongwon Lee, Department of Economics, Sungkyunkwan University, 25-2, Sungkyunkwan-ro, Jongno-gu, Seoul 03063,
Republic of Korea.
Email: danlee200@skku.edu
702755IPS0010.1177/0192512117702755International Political Science ReviewKang and Lee
research-article2017
Article
456 International Political Science Review 39(4)
impediments to the authority that has been delegated to the presidents and their governments (Larkins,
1998; Walker, 2009).
Because delegative democratic attitudes undermine democratic governance, understanding vot-
ers’ attitudes on delegative democracy is closely linked to the question of why delegative democ-
racy emerges and persists. Delegative democratic attitudes differ from (1) authoritarian attitudes,
because delegative persons delegate the full authority to the president in free elections and from (2)
liberal democratic attitudes, because delegative persons subordinate checks and balances to the
policy preferences of the elected president (Larkins, 1998; O’Donnell, 1994). For instance, in a
study of three Central American countries (Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Nicaragua), Walker (2009)
found that delegative democratic persons are more likely to use presidential performance as a yard-
stick for evaluating the legislature and judiciary than are liberal democratic persons. Because del-
egative democratic attitudes do not rigorously evaluate the legislature or judiciary, delegative
persons tend to support these two institutions more than liberal persons.
Delegative democratic attitudes are often reinforced by deep socioeconomic crises inherited
from previous authoritarian regimes (Kubicek, 1994; O’Donnell, 1994).1 If a majority of voters
share delegative democratic attitudes about the proper exercise of political authority, delegative
democracy could become a dominant form of governance. For instance, delegative democracy in
Argentina emerged when the voters demanded a strong president amid the economic crisis of the
late 1980s. This allowed President Menem to exercise unchecked authority by issuing decrees of
necessity and urgency that replaced congressional action (Larkins, 1998). In addition, the judiciary,
often siding with the government, was instrumental in weakening the separation of powers during
the 1989−1996 period.
Similarly, voters in East Asian countries that experienced authoritarian regimes until recent
years are more likely to support delegative democracy if economic situations deteriorate. Note that
delegative democratic attitudes are known to impede the consolidation of democratic governance
in new democracies. More specifically, a high level of support for unrestrained executive power—
while contributing to the stability of the regime—reduces the horizontal institutional accountabil-
ity that is necessary to consolidate democratic governance (Walker, 2009). Accordingly, examining
delegative democratic attitudes in East Asia can give us a clue as to why many East Asian countries
have yet to become fully consolidated democracies.
Previous studies have focused on the nature of delegative democracy and their effects on demo-
cratic governance (e.g. Larkins, 1998; O’Donnell, 1994; Walker, 2009). With a few exceptions,
however, previous research has not examined the question of which individuals (or countries) have
delegative democratic tendencies. Using the World Values Survey data drawn from nine Latin
America countries, Gronke and Levitt (2005) examined individual-level variables for delegative
attitudes, including, for instance, support for democracy and socioeconomic status.2 In a study of
11 Latin American countries from 1980 to 2010, González (2014) found that the probability of
having a delegative democracy decreases with support for democracy and confidence in politi-
cians. These studies, however, do not provide the theoretical mechanism connecting individual
attitudes toward politics and democracy to the delegative democratic attitudes.
Although most studies have focused on delegative democracy in Latin America, some recent
studies have examined delegative democratic tendencies in other regions. For instance, despite
having a parliamentary regime with proportional representation, contemporary Turkey, under the
rule of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, shows the distinctive patterns of delegative democracy,
including “unchecked powers legitimized through a crisis-driven narrative and clientelism” (Taş,
2015). Other studies have noted that elected leaders in post-communist countries (e.g. President
Yeltsin in Russia, President Kravchuk in the Ukraine) used their democratic legitimacy as an
excuse for authoritarian behavior, undermining the consolidation of democratic governance
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