Delegative Federalism? Subnational Abdication and Executive Fiscal Centralisation in Argentina
| Published date | 01 May 2022 |
| Date | 01 May 2022 |
| DOI | 10.1177/1478929920978529 |
| Author | Jorge P Gordin |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
https://doi.org/10.1177/1478929920978529
Political Studies Review
2022, Vol. 20(2) 265 –281
© The Author(s) 2020
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DOI: 10.1177/1478929920978529
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Delegative Federalism?
Subnational Abdication and
Executive Fiscal Centralisation
in Argentina
Jorge P Gordin
Abstract
What accounts for the varying and increasing levels of centralisation in federal systems? This
article contributes to this debate showing that, despite normative and theoretical arguments on
the advantages of decentralised fiscal federalism, changing economic conditions and governance
hurdles prompt an increasing trend towards executive fiscal centralisation. It seeks to unravel this
theoretical riddle by proposing the concept of delegative federalism, defined as a model of federal
governance suitable for explaining how economic contexts impel a dynamic of subnational assent to
centralisation policies and reforms that oftentimes breach the historic institutional empowerment
of subnational authorities. The experience of Argentina, a paradigmatic case of hyper-presidentialist
federalism amid institutionally strong provinces, is analysed to show that national executives may
increasingly extend their reach not only because of congressional dysfunction but also due to the
disproportionate sway of overrepresented, mostly transfer-dependent subnational governments
that shun revenue responsibility. Accordingly, and perpetuating centralisation, they delegate
tax authority in crises times and abdicate it further when economic windfall affords them with
predictable federal grants.
Keywords
federalism, centralisation, economic crises, Argentina
Accepted: 15 November 2020
Introduction
Amid strong normative and conceptual arguments against it, centralisation is a common-
place trend in federal systems across the world (Braun, 2011; Di Giacomo and Flumian,
2010; Faguet, 2004; Fenwick, 2010). Yet, this ostensible manifest trend to bolster the
political centre’s authority is at loggerheads with decades of academic and policy-ori-
ented scholarship extolling the virtues of decentralisation of all sorts. Moreover, once we
The Lady Davis Fellowship Trust, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel
Corresponding author:
Jorge P Gordin, The Lady Davis Fellowship Trust, Department of International Relations, The Hebrew
University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem 91904, Israel.
Email: Jorgegordin@yahoo.com
978529PSW0010.1177/1478929920978529Political Studies ReviewGordin
research-article2020
Article
266 Political Studies Review 20(2)
take a critical and empirical look at the functioning of federal systems, the putative advan-
tages of decentralisation cannot be taken for granted. Even admitting the possibility that
decentralisation may amount to a driving force behind democracy (Putnam, 1993;
Tocqueville, 2002 [1835–1840]) or a rationalising mechanism for steering the public sec-
tor towards Pareto optimality (Oates, 1972; Tiebout, 1956; Weingast, 1995), there is a
manifest distributional hindrance to the fulfilment of the federalism cum decentralisation
dictum. Specifically, the institutional design of federalism prompts the proliferation of
multi-level fiscal veto players, boosting collusion among national and state-level elites,
each interested in maximising the power of purse and influence.
In fact, while all countries have diverse reasons to experience episodes of centralisa-
tion as a response to crisis scenarios, this topic acquires greater theoretical significance
when applied to federal systems, as these are deemed to institutionalise a reasonable level
of decentralisation mostly by de jure instruments and at times through off-the-record
institutional and political practices. Of particular interest is the possibility of a disjuncture
between constitutional instruments to deepen subnational representation at the national
level and the deliberate acceptance of and passivity of subnational units towards the pro-
cess of centralising authority to the central executive body thereafter. Worse still, if cross-
cutting such process of surrendering power to the political centre transpires a trend of
centralisation of power towards the executive at both levels of government (Kollman,
2013). That is to say, the asymmetric structure of fiscal incentives in federal systems may
lead towards political centralisation whereby the political elites at the national and state
level, embodied primarily in the executive branch, are part of a ruling coalition in which
some subnational units hand over decision-making power to the national executive.
What is more, while the mainstream literature on federalism typically claims that
decentralisation, or noncentralisation (Elazar, 1987), is the rational choice for institu-
tional design in federations, no much theoretical attention has been paid to the fiscal and
political incentives altering the decentralising spirit of the founding moments of federal
constitutions. This article seeks to fill this theoretical gap by proposing the concept of
delegative federalism, defined as a model of federal governance suitable for explaining
how severe changes in the economic context impel a dynamic of subnational assent to
centralisation policies and reforms that oftentimes breach the historic institutional
empowerment of subnational authorities. This concept is put forward as a putative contri-
bution to the study of federalism, insofar as it encompasses horizontal and not just verti-
cal, that is, intergovernmental, dynamics. Similarly, it puts analytical emphasis on the
need to avoid overstating the separateness of national and subnational governments since
partisan and other linkages often prevent autonomous action by either sphere. While this
is pertinent to most federations, this model of delegative federalism departs from the
experience of other federations resorting to centralising fiscal policies, insofar as ‘bursts
of economic adjustment’ amount to critical junctures where earlier institutionalised fiscal
powers are revoked. In this vein, I focus on the experience of crisis-ridden Argentina’s
fiscal and political federalism to illustrate how the intergovernmental concentration of
political power at the executive level amid subnational transfer dependency of legisla-
tively overrepresented provinces begets endogenous federal centralisation.
This article is written with the primary goal of engaging in ongoing theoretical debates
on apparent paradoxical fiscal imperatives to centralise de facto political and policy
authority in hitherto de jure decentralised polities. While extant research has focused on
the incentives of politicians and bureaucrats throughout central government to hold onto
their power or renege historic commitments by recentralising (Dickovick, 2011; Eaton
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