Deliberation beyond Borders: The Public Reason of a Society of Peoples
| Published date | 01 October 2011 |
| DOI | 10.3366/jipt.2011.0011 |
| Author | William Smith |
| Date | 01 October 2011 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
DELIBERATION BEYOND BORDERS: THE PUBLIC
REASON OF A SOCIETY OF PEOPLES
WILLIAM SMITH
Abstract: The aim of this article is to contribute to the elaboration of a
deliberative approach to global institutional design. A deliberative approach
aims to embed processes of mutual reason-giving at the heart of international
relations and global decision-making. The theoretical framework that orientates
this discussion is the liberal approach to international law developed by John
Rawls. It may seem strange to invoke this model: after all, Rawls does not
specifically discuss the issue of global institutional design and indeed has been
widely criticized for neglecting this topic. In fact, in its account of global public
reason, Rawls’s approach can be shown to contain important and surprisingly
neglected resources for constructing a dynamic and inclusive theory of global
deliberative politics.
Keywords: Civil society, global public reason, human rights, John Rawls, the
Law of Peoples
The goal of constructing normative standards to guide the evaluation and reform
of global political arrangements is one that is pursued by many international
political theorists (Held 2004; Kuper 2004; Slaughter 2004).1The idea that these
arrangements should be reformed, at least in part, along deliberative lines has
emerged as a prominent theme in much of this work (Smith and Brassett 2008;
Dryzek 2006; Bohman 2007). The distinctive feature of a deliberative approach
is that global arrangements should be justified in terms that could be accepted
as reasonable by those who must comply with their decisions. The challenge
confronting such an approach is to specify these terms in light of the current
underdetermined state of knowledge about what is reasonable to expect of global
political arrangements (Cohen and Sabel 2006). The advocates of deliberation
Journal of International Political Theory, 7(2) 2011, 117–139
DOI: 10.3366/jipt.2011.0011
© Edinburgh University Press 2011
www.eupjournals.com/jipt
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William Smith
meet this challenge by proposing normative standards that have enough content
to guide assessments of existing practices, but which allow global political
actors to reflect upon and perhaps revise those very guidelines in and through
deliberation (Buchanan and Keohane 2006).
The contention of this article is that ideas suggested by John Rawls in
his much-discussed work The Law of Peoples provide valuable and hitherto
untapped resources for incorporating a deliberative element into a global
political theory (Rawls 1999a; henceforth LP).2This contention might appear
strange, given that Rawls proposes a doctrine for the foreign policy of liberal
societies that does not appear to leave much scope for deliberation about the
terms of global political arrangements. This impression, I suggest, cannot be
sustained in view of the important role that the idea of global public reason plays
within his theory (Cohen 2004). Global public reason is a shared vocabulary
that peoples must employ when justifying their foreign policies and debating
the design and decisions of global cooperative arrangements. It also provides
a normative framework that can be invoked by other actors, including citizens
and civil society groups, in criticizing the actions of peoples and/or global
institutions. This deliberative resource, I argue, introduces a dynamic element
into the Rawlsian framework, in that it indicates how peoples and other political
actors might reinterpret and even transform the terms of global cooperation in
light of changing circumstances and evolving ideas about global politics.
The argument develops over three sections. The first takes a closer look at
the idea of deliberation by focusing on the ‘complex standard’ of legitimacy for
global institutions proposed recently by Allen Buchanan and Robert Keohane. A
distinctive feature of their account is that it incorporates provisions that allow
for the revision, through dialogue between institutional and non-institutional
actors, of the standards that should be met by global institutions (Buchanan
and Keohane 2006: 406). Although it makes a compelling case for the role
of deliberation in global governance, the complex standard is vulnerable to
an important objection. The second section aims to avoid this difficulty by
using the complex standard as a lens through which to construct a Rawlsian
conception of global public reason. The content of global public reason is
identified with competing but reasonable interpretations of the Law of Peoples,
which are debated and discussed by a variety of global political actors. The plural
complexion of global public reason, I argue, indicates that its content is not fixed
once and for all, but can change over time in response to emerging challenges
and new problems. The third section defends the Rawlsian account of global
public reason against the cosmopolitan objection that it excludes arguments that
address the fundamental interests of individuals and the realist objection that
it expects implausible ties of affinity between peoples. In the course of this
defence, further elements of the dynamic and pluralistic complexion of global
public reason are brought to the fore. The paper draws to a close by raising an
important issue that requires attention if the Rawlsian account of global public
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