Democracy and public goods revisited: Local institutions, development, and access to water
| Author | Rebecca E Schiel,Bruce M Wilson,Malcolm Langford,Christopher M Faulkner |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/13691481211070176 |
| Published date | 01 May 2023 |
| Date | 01 May 2023 |
| Subject Matter | Original Articles |
https://doi.org/10.1177/13691481211070176
The British Journal of Politics and
International Relations
2023, Vol. 25(2) 237 –259
© The Author(s) 2022
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DOI: 10.1177/13691481211070176
journals.sagepub.com/home/bpi
Democracy and public goods
revisited: Local institutions,
development, and access to
water
Rebecca E Schiel1,2 ,
Bruce M Wilson1,2 , Malcolm Langford2,3
and Christopher M Faulkner1,4
Abstract
Democracies are commonly thought to provide greater levels of public goods than autocracies.
Given that many public goods are provided locally, higher levels of local democracy are further
thought to result in better rates of provision in both autocratic and democratic systems. However,
several studies have cast doubt on democratic superiority in public goods provision both nationally
and locally. We re-examine these contested relationships, investigating a locally provisioned public
good: access to basic water. To determine what, if any, effects democracy has on public goods
provision, we analyse the effects of both national and local democratic institutions, in conjunction
with economic development. In cross-national regression analyses, we examine a global sample of
140 states from 2000 to 2015, arriving at three findings. First, access to basic water varies little by
national regime type once accounting for development. Second, the existence of local elections and
the degree to which they are free and competitive are positively correlated with basic water access
rates in poor states. Finally, the positive effects of local democracy on water access in poor states
increase with democratic institutional longevity. The findings of this study suggest two necessary
additions to future research. First, more nuance is needed in the study of public goods provision
beyond resources or a theoretical rationale for increased provision related to national regime
characteristics. Second, considering the conditional influences of local institutional characteristics,
development metrics could help illustrate the complicated circumstances determining access to
basic public goods.
Keywords
democracy, development, local democracy, public goods, water
1University of Central Florida (UCF), School of Politics, Security, and International Affairs, Orlando, FL. USA
2Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI), Bergen, Norway
3University of Olso, Public Law, Oslo, Norway
4United States Naval War College, National Security Affairs Department, Newport, RI, USA
Corresponding author:
Bruce M Wilson, University of Central Florida (UCF), 4297 Andromeda Loop N Orlando, 32816 FL, USA.
Email: Bruce.wilson@ucf.edu
1070176BPI0010.1177/13691481211070176The British Journal of Politics and International Relations X(X)Schiel et al.
research-article2022
Original Article
238 The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 25(2)
Introduction
Scholarship remains divided over the relationship between democracy and the provision
of public goods. Early studies found that democratic regimes outperform autocracies in
goods provision (Baum and Lake, 2003; Deacon, 2009; Lake and Baum, 2001; Przeworksi
et al., 2000). More recently, the literature has asserted that in comparison with autocratic
regimes, democracy does not result in better public goods outcomes (Bardhan and
Mookherjee, 2005; Dahlum and Knutsen, 2017; Ross, 2006; Wang and Yao, 2007). For
example, in the case of infant mortality, Ross (2006) found no significant difference
across regime types, arguing that democracies create few incentives for governments to
provide basic public goods for the poor as there is no direct benefit to the median voter.
Similar results are found in studies of more advanced public goods, such as education
quality. Given that verifying educational quality is difficult for ordinary citizens and that
failings in provision are not easily attributable to the central government, few incentives
exist for politicians to invest resources (Dahlum and Knutsen, 2017; Harding and
Stasavage, 2014).
Discordant findings suggest that assumptions concerning democratic superiority in
public goods provision require further study. In the following assessment, we focus on
three assumptions that may help explain varied results. First it is often presumed that
development is an independent causal factor and, inversely, that institutional characteris-
tics in wealthy states are present, or indeed operate similarly, in poor states. We assert that
development must be studied in conjunction with institutional context. While democratic
and autocratic incumbents approach spending on public (and private) goods with differ-
ent priorities, the level of development in a state sets spending capacity for both. For
instance, while democracies have been shown to spend more on public goods, spending
in poor states is ultimately constrained. In wealthier states, even if the median voter in
many (or most) democracies will capture more public resources than the poor, there are
nonetheless more resources available for spending on public goods. Therefore, develop-
ment context must be considered when formulating expectations concerning public goods
provision according to institutional context. Second, much of the literature is state-cen-
tric. We argue that the focus on the relationship between democracy and provision of
public goods at the national level has obscured trends related to goods provisioned locally.
Indeed, many public goods are made available at the local level and under the manage-
ment and influence of local institutions.1 Third, we focus on the treatment of public goods
in prior literature as a monolith, producing a similar set of political considerations.
Selecting basic water access as our case study, we suggest that the service delivery char-
acteristics specific to it make it a highly politically salient good; water is a basic necessity
that is rivalled, excludable, and has high visibility. These characteristics together result in
political calculations that differ from those concerning higher order public goods (e.g.
healthcare or education), such that even when development is low, politicians should be
incentivised to provide it. We therefore set out to re-examine the role of democracy in
affecting access to basic public goods by adding considerations concerning the relative
level of development, local institutional characteristics, and the political calculations
resulting from service delivery characteristics.
Together, our overarching hypotheses assert that water is a highly politically salient
good and basic necessity, resulting in high incentives for politicians to provide it regard-
less of national institutional context. The provision of basic water should therefore be
similar between democracies and autocracies at similar levels of development (H1).
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