Democracy, reputation for resolve, and civil conflict
| Author | Casey Crisman-Cox |
| DOI | 10.1177/00223433211024697 |
| Published date | 01 May 2022 |
| Date | 01 May 2022 |
| Subject Matter | Regular Articles |
Democracy, reputation for resolve,
and civil conflict
Casey Crisman-Cox
Department of Political Science, Texas A&M University
Abstract
There is a long-running disagreement about how regime type affects a country’s ability to project resolve. Specifically,
there is an open question about whether being a democracy helps or hurts a country’s reputation for resolve.
I consider this question by directly estimating a state’s reputation for resolve using a unified theoretical and statistical
approach. To be precise, I derive an empirical model from a dynamic game of continuous-time bargaining where
each side fights in order to build a reputation for resolve. I then fit this model using data on the duration and
termination of civil conflicts between 1946 and 2009. I find that while governments tend to have stronger reputa-
tions for resolve than the rebels they face, democracies are seen as much less likely to be resolved both prior to and
during conflict than their autocratic counterparts. Likewise, democracies are more likely to end a conflict by making a
policy change in favor of the rebels than autocracies. Despite these differences, both democracies and autocracies
experience a discrete increase in their reputations for resolve once conflict begins, with democracies receiving a much
larger boost. As such, these findings contrast with a large literature on democratic credibility theory, while simul-
taneously providing evidence consistent with some of the logic behind democratic credibility theory.
Keywords
civil conflict, democratic credibility theory, EITM, reputation for resolve, structural model
A long debate in the conflict literature asks whether
democracies are disadvantaged relative to autocracies in
various aspects of internal or civil conflict (e.g. Horne,
1977; Getmansky, 2012). Part of this debate focuses on
whether democratic norms and institutions strengthen
or weaken perceptions that a state is resolved or commit-
ted to fighting. While the concept of a reputation for
resolve has been mostly considered within the interstate
conflict setting, concerns related to resolve are often
found in theories that consider democratic disadvantage
in civil conflict. This raises the question: Do democracies
have stronger or weaker reputations for resolve than
autocracies in civil conflict?
One common understanding suggests that the com-
petitive aspects of democracy (e.g. election cycles) and/or
a commitment to democratic norms prevent democra-
cies from fully committing to fighting in civil conflict,
hurting their ability to build a reputation for resolve (e.g.
Horne, 1977; Merom, 2003; Valentino, Huth & Balch-
Lindsay, 2004). This line of thought suggests that
democracies are unable to credibly commit to standing
firm against rebels as both sides know that the state does
not have the domestic support for long conflicts. In
contrast, a competing approach suggests that democra-
cies might have an advantage over other regime types
because giving into an enemy’s demands could lead to
domestic political punishments for backing down. The
prospect of punishment enhances a state’s reputation for
resolve by pushing it to stand firm in conflicts (Fearon,
1994; Weeks, 2008). Historically, these types of punish-
ment concerns have only been considered by interstate
conflict scholars, but recent work has found that domes-
tic punishment threats hang over leaders during intras-
tate conflicts, too (Prorok, 2016). The extension of
domestic punishment concerns to the civil conflict set-
ting raises questions about how the prospect of punish-
ment affects a democratic state’s reputation for resolve.
Corresponding author:
c.crisman-cox@tamu.edu
Journal of Peace Research
2022, Vol. 59(3) 382–394
ªThe Author(s) 2021
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DOI: 10.1177/00223433211024697
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