Democracy versus deterrence: Nuclear weapons and political integrity
| Author | Andrew Futter,Steve Cooke |
| Published date | 01 November 2018 |
| Date | 01 November 2018 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/0263395717733978 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
https://doi.org/10.1177/0263395717733978
Politics
2018, Vol. 38(4) 500 –513
© The Author(s) 2017
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DOI: 10.1177/0263395717733978
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Democracy versus deterrence:
Nuclear weapons and political
integrity
Steve Cooke and Andrew Futter
University of Leicester, UK
Abstract
This article argues that the practice and performance of nuclear deterrence can never be fully
representative or democratic due to the particular pressures placed on leaders by the nuclear
condition. For nuclear deterrence to be effective – and for nuclear weapons to have any political
value – a leader must always convince both their electorate as well as any possible foe, that
they are willing to use nuclear weapons in extremis, irrespective of whether this is their true
position. In any nuclear-armed state, where politicians privately believe that using nuclear weapons
is always wrong, but publicly stress that possessing nuclear weapons to use as a deterrent is right,
they are forced to act dishonestly. These tensions are particularly acute in the UK context given
the reliance on just one form of nuclear weapons system for deterrence and the concurrent
requirement to pre-delegate secret orders through a ‘letter of last resort’. The consequences
for democratic nuclear-armed states are troubling; for public morality, the personal integrity of
democratic leaders, and for true democratic accountability. This article concludes that public
criticism of political leaders, and citizen voting choices, ought to take account of the problem of
transparency posed by policies of nuclear deterrence.
Keywords
accountability, democracy, nuclear deterrence, political integrity, publicity of reasons,
transparency
Received: 23rd January 2017; Revised version received: 8th August 2017; Accepted: 24th August 2017
According to Thomas Schelling, nuclear deterrence is as ‘the threat that leaves something
to chance’ due to the inability of an attacker to ever know its adversary’s true intentions
and red lines (Schelling, 1990). But a similar dynamic also plays out in the domestic
realm where the leader of any nuclear-armed state must express a particular position on
nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence irrespective of whether this is what they truly
Corresponding author:
Steve Cooke, School of History, Politics and International Relations, University of Leicester, University Road,
Leicester LE1 7RH, UK.
Email: smc77@le.ac.uk
733978POL0010.1177/0263395717733978PoliticsCooke and Futter
research-article2017
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