Democratic Deficit or the Europeanisation of Secession? Explaining the Devolution Referendums in Scotland
| Date | 01 June 2005 |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-9248.2005.00531.x |
| Author | Paolo Dardanelli |
| Published date | 01 June 2005 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
Democratic Deficit or the
Europeanisation of Secession?
Explaining the Devolution
Referendums in Scotland
Paolo Dardanelli
University of Kent
This article deals with the variation in the demand for self-government in Scotland – as measured
by the vote in the two referendums – between 1979, when devolution was rejected, and 1997,
when devolution was endorsed. The existing literature mainly deals with each of the two refer-
endums in isolation and does not offer an explicitly comparative analysis of them. However,
implicit comparisons contained in analyses of the 1997 referendum tend to identify as the main
cause of the variation the ‘democratic deficit’ created by Conservative rule between 1979 and
1997, which was consistently rejected in Scotland. I take issue with this explanation on theoret-
ical and empirical grounds and advances an alternative account grounded in an explicit compar-
ison of the two referendums. Based on a rationalist approach, the analysis presented here identifies
three key elements in the voting dynamics at the two points in time – a gap between support for
self-government and the actual vote in the referendum; an interaction effect between attitudes to
devolution and to independence; and the role of the European context in shaping perceptions of
independence. I argue that significant change in these three variables (rather than a ‘democratic
deficit’) appear to have been the most important determinants of the different results of the two
referendums.
Scottish devolution is one of the most far-reaching changes in the British consti-
tution since the secession of southern Ireland in the 1920s.1Despite its importance,
it has not attracted the level of scholarly interest, especially outside Scotland, that
it deserves. This is even more surprising since the dynamics of the demand for self-
government in Scotland present an intriguing puzzle for political science analysis.
On the one hand, public opinion was extraordinarily stable throughout the post-
war period, with support for home rule – as measured by opinion polls – consis-
tently above 60 percent.2On the other, the two crucial moments of the post-war
history of devolution – the 1979 and 1997 referendums – produced starkly differ-
ent results: in 1979 devolution was rejected while in 1997 it was emphatically
endorsed.3Analyses of the Scottish demand for self-government thus face a two-
fold task. First, to explain why devolution was rejected in the 1979 referendum
despite the fact that opinion polls suggest there was 60 percent support for self-
government and, second, to explain why devolution was endorsed in 1997 after
having been rejected in 1979. The present analysis is also informed by, and intends
to contribute to, the growing literature on the peculiarities of referendum voting
behaviour in comparison to parliamentary elections and, in particular, on explain-
ing referendum outcomes at odds with well-established patterns of public opinion
POLITICAL STUDIES: 2005 VOL 53, 320–342
© Political Studies Association, 2005.
Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA
DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT OR EUROPEANISATION OF SECESSION? 321
(for a summary see LeDuc, 2002). Of particular interest are referendums held on
similar questions at different points in time, such as those on Scottish devolution
and Quebec’s independence. Yet, while the latter have been subjected to compar-
ative analysis (Pammett and LeDuc, 2001) this has not yet been done in the
Scottish case.
Existing studies of Scottish devolution deal with each of the two referendums in
isolation and as yet there is no explicitly comparative work addressing the puzzle
outlined above. This article does so by proposing a theoretical model able to explain
the puzzle and by presenting evidence supporting it. The model is centred on the
interaction between attitudes to devolution and attitudes to independence and on
the role of the European dimension in framing perceptions of independence. The
results indicate that the argument advanced here is able to take up the two-fold
task mentioned above and to provide a more robust explanation for the variation
between 1979 and 1997 than those currently advanced in the literature, in terms
of both theoretical coherence and empirical substantiation. The article proceeds as
follows. The first section reviews and provides a critique of the literature. The
second section introduces the theoretical and methodological framework of the
research. The third section presents the results of the analysis and the fourth section
concludes by discussing them in relation to the research questions and pointing to
the relevance of these findings for the scholarly debate on both Scottish devolu-
tion and referendum voting.
A Review and a Critique of the Literature
Though no explicitly comparative study of the two referendums has so far been
carried out and no comprehensive explanation for the difference in results has been
advanced, it is possible to identify three main explanatory accounts in the litera-
ture. The first is centred on the content of the two devolution packages as repre-
sented by the Scotland Act 1978 and the Scotland’s Parliament 1997 White Paper,
respectively. According to this thesis, the former was perceived as an overwhelm-
ingly partisan document intended to entrench Labour domination in Scotland
through an assembly elected by the first-past-the-post system. In contrast, the 1997
White Paper was the product of a wide consensus within Scottish society, symbol-
ised by the agreement on a proportional electoral system. The partisan nature of
devolution in 1979 produced a partisan pattern of voting whereby non-Labour pro-
devolutionists – notably Conservative identifiers – turned against the Scotland
Act in the run up to the referendum. In contrast, the consensual nature of the
1997 proposals ensured a broad and steady support for devolution up to and at the
referendum (Balsom and McAllister, 1979, pp. 402–5; Mitchell, Denver, Pattie,
Bochel, 1998, p. 168).
The second explanation focuses on the degree of unity and the popularity of the
Labour party and the effectiveness of the pro-devolution referendum campaign. It
points out that Labour was divided and deeply unpopular in 1979 and that the Yes
campaign was divided and underfunded relative to their opponents.4In contrast
the Labour party was united and at the peak of its popularity in September 1997,
the Yes campaign was also united and it enjoyed higher financial resources
than the No side.5These differences determined that in 1979 Labour’s unpopu-
To continue reading
Request your trial